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The electricity value chain is facing several challenges. The transport sector is electrified, the 
electricity system digitalized, and generation decentralized. These trends transform the 
outlook of the electricity system. In the Norwegian electricity system, new consumption 
patterns and changing load profiles increase an already apparent need for reinvestment in the 
aging network infrastructure.  
Increasing network capacity through investment in physical infrastructure is costly. Network 
operators model network capacity based on the few hours of year with peak demand, resulting 
in low utilization rates of excess capacity. Thus, network operators consider alternative ways 
of increasing capacity, which are less costly and more flexible. One such option is end-user 
flexibility provided from the demand side of the electricity system.  
The analysis is based on an investment case provided by Skagerak Nett. We discuss different 
scenarios of utilization, flexibility volume and predicted load increase, and investigate how 
different compensation methods affect the benefits of utilizing end-user flexibility to defer 
investments. We find evidence that utilizing end-user flexibility to defer investments have cost 
saving effects under certain conditions, depending on flexibility volumes, utilization level and 
compensation method. Network operators can reduce costs by using end-user flexibility to 
manage malfunctions in transformers and peak loads in normal operations.  
A key finding in the thesis it that the choice of compensation method has a large impact on the 
change in revenue cap and efficiency in the regulatory model. By issuing direct payments, 
end-user flexibility results in a lower efficiency, although a higher revenue cap, while 
redistribution of network tariffs have a marginal effect on changes in efficiency and revenue 
cap. Through redistribution of network tariffs, the network operator can defer investments 
without a notable increase in the revenue cap or change in efficiency. The results from the 
different end-user flexibility cases highlight some of the future challenges the regulator face 
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The unique physical properties of electricity define how electricity systems are designed. Since 
supply and demand must be perfectly balanced at all times, changes in demand must be 
matched by a similar change in supply. Furthermore, the electric system is built to be a 
redundant network. To ensure a reliable electricity supply and a sufficient safeguard against 
loss of power, network operators determine investments on the hours of peak load in a year. 
This often results in significant overinvestment in network capacity to ensure that reliability- 
and safety standards are met. Thus, optimizing investment decisions through smarter 
electricity system solutions is highly prioritized by Norwegian network operators. 
The global trends of electrification, decentralization and digitalization increase the focus on 
innovative ways of planning and upgrading electricity system infrastructure. The trends 
introduce a plethora of new solutions to the network operator. To ensure a secure and stable 
supply of electricity, exploiting flexible resources and capabilities in the electricity system is 
highlighted as a promising attribute. However, utilizing flexible capacities in the electricity 
system is not a new concept. With a tight relationship between supply and demand, flexible 
generation and production has been implemented by large generators and producers at the 
transmission level of the Norwegian electricity systems for several years. Since technological 
advances mainly occur at the distribution level of the electricity system, there is a large, 
untapped potential in utilizing flexibility at the end-user level. This type of end-user flexibility 
can be used to shift consumption in periods of peak-load, mitigating the need for costly 
investments in network infrastructure.  
With an increasing share of decentralized energy production, Europe´s highest EV penetration 
rate and an aging and mature infrastructure, new and cost-efficient ways of securing sufficient 
capacity is a priority. On the other hand, the Norwegian electricity system is well equipped for 
the challenges of the future. With 98% of all electricity production coming from flexible and 
renewable hydro power energy, mature and multinational markets with satisfying liquidity in 
the day-ahead, intra-day and real-time market and power tariffs being introduced by 2021, 
Norway could get a head start in terms of smart electricity infrastructure management 
compared to the rest of Europe. 
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1.2 Definition of End-User Flexibility 
In current literature and research, flexibility from the demand side of the electricity system is 
represented by a range of terms. The most common terms for this kind of flexibility is demand-
side flexibility, consumer flexibility or end-user flexibility. In this thesis, we will subsequently 
make use of the term “end-user flexibility”. Demand response and flexibility from the demand 
side of the electricity system is represented by the end-user offering or supplying it. The basis 
for our use of the term is that it is the most end-user centric.  
THEMA Consulting (2015) define end-user flexibility as the willingness to change volumes 
of electricity consumed for short or long periods as a response to market prices, price 
incentives in networks tariffs or other economic incentives. We choose to adjust this definition 
to better emphasize the role of the end-user and define end-user flexibility as the end user’s 
ability and capacity to shift, curtail or limit consumption.  
1.3 Scope 
In this thesis, we analyze how Norwegian network operators can solve challenges related to 
capacity adjustments by utilizing end-user flexibility to defer investments in network 
infrastructure. We discuss how the network operator can compensate its end-users for offering 
their flexibility, and what impact end-user flexibility have on the Norwegian regulatory model. 
We do not discuss flexible load from industrial customers or local storage in detail. However, 
we cover research on topics in the close periphery of end-user flexibility such as local storage, 
the role of aggregators and power tariffs in the literature review. 
1.4 Research Question 
With a strong emphasis on how end-user flexibility deployment and current regulations 
interrelate, the thesis answers the following research question; 
“Is end-user flexibility a feasible measure to defer capacity increasing investments in the 
distribution network, and what impact does end-user flexibility have on the revenue cap and 
efficiency of the network operator in terms of the regulatory model?” 
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The essence of the research question is to analyze how end-user flexibility can influence 
investment decisions of Norwegian network operators. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 briefly discusses the technical and economic aspects of the Norwegian power 
market. The chapter also cover three main trends influencing the future of electricity system 
design. This serves as a backdrop for the feasible application of end-user flexibility as an 
alternative to traditional investments.  
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of end-user flexibility, discusses different types of end-user 
flexibility and map the potential of end-user flexibility in the Norwegian distribution network. 
Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive review of relevant research and literature on end-
user flexibility from both a technical, economic and market based perspective.  
Chapter 4 discusses the latest legislative proposals from the EU, Norwegian regulations and 
the Regulatory Model. The chapter introduces how DEA-analysis is applied to network 
operators to determine the revenue cap in the Norwegian regulatory framework.  
Chapter 5 introduces a case study on end-user flexibility in Skagerak Nett, a Norwegian 
Distribution System Operator. The case study presents different scenarios and alternatives 
where end-user flexibility is used to defer reinvestment in the distribution network. A 
sensitivity analysis for flexibility payments is also conducted 
Chapter 6 analyzes how the Norwegian Regulatory Model affects the economic output of using 
end-user flexibility as in the Skagerak case. The analysis covers several aspects of the 
Norwegian Regulatory Model, and discusses how it can affect the deployment of end-user 
flexibility. 
Chapter 7 concludes our thesis, and we discuss our results and propose topics for future 
research and projects related to end-user flexibility. 
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2. The Norwegian Electricity System 
2.1 Technical Structure 
New technologies are providing new challenges and opportunities to the traditional electricity 
power system. However, as electricity transmission is a capital-intensive industry, the changes 
are not adopted overnight. In this chapter, we will introduce the traditional structure of the 
electricity system and its components.  
2.1.1 The Electricity Value Chain 
How distribution systems are designed and operated varies between commodities. Electric 
power and electricity is a commodity that has technical properties that require a complex and 
specific design. Electricity is a continuous flow, as it is generated and consumed continuously, 
and is costly to store in large quantities (Ottesen, 2017). The consumption of electricity varies 
with a characteristic pattern during the hours of a day, the days of a week, and the months of 
a year. Electricity is regarded as an absolute necessity in modern society, so the security of 
supply is paramount. The electrical power system in Norway is typically divided into a central 
transmission network and a distribution network. The network that connects the two is often 
denoted as the regional transmission network. The transmission network is tasked with 
carrying high-voltage electricity over long distances, while the distribution network is tasked 
with distributing electricity to end-users and consumers at a much lower voltage (Sintef, 
2017a). It is worth noting that some countries only use two network levels, commonly the 
transmission network and the distribution network. Figure 2-1 displays the Norwegian 
electricity power system. 
 




The specific physical properties and features of electricity is reflected in the design of the 
electricity system. All transport systems have capacity constraints. This is no different in the 
electricity system. Since queues cannot form in the electrical power system, the network must 
have sufficient capacity to transport the highest possible load, known as peak load.  
Today, the power line frequency in Norway is 50 Hz. Given the instantaneous nature of 
electricity, there must be a perfect relation between generation and consumption. If this 
relationship is imbalanced, the frequency will deviate from 50 Hz. Such imbalances can be 
critical to the system, causing unnecessary blackouts and system malfunction with critical 
consequences for the consumer and the society connected to the network. A stable electricity 
supply is crucial in a well-functioning society. Voltage quality is the part of the power quality 
concept that concerns the applicability of the voltage in the outlet. It is regulated to ensure that 
electrical equipment is functioning as intended, and the network is planned and dimensioned 
to satisfy voltage requirements (Sintef, 2017b).  
2.2 Economic Structure 
The technical structure of the Norwegian electricity market is closely tied to its corresponding 
economic structure. In the following sections, we introduce the roles and responsibility of 
different participants, the marketplaces in which they sell and purchase electricity, and how 
these roles are regulated and contractually determined. 
2.2.1 Responsibilities 
To ensure a reliable, safe and cost-efficient supply of electricity, a set of responsibilities and 
tasks are assigned to different participants in the electricity system. The responsibility of the 
Transmission System Operator (TSO) is to ensure operation and development of the 
transmission network, and to control frequency (Ottesen, 2017). In Norway, there is only one 
TSO, Statnett1. The Distribution System Operators (DSOs) own and operate the distribution 
networks within different regions, and are responsible for supplying end-users with electricity. 
There are 105 DSOs in Norway. The TSO and DSOs are responsible for transporting 
                                                 
1 www.statnett.no/en 
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electricity and controlling overload and voltage. In Norway, entering a contract with a DSO is 
mandatory for consumers in order to receive electricity. Consumers are not free to choose the 
DSO, as operators have monopoly within their respective regions. The monopoly situation for 
DSOs and the TSO is a result of the deregulation process that occurred in the early 90s, which 
introduced new regulations. 
However, a competitive market exists for the purchase and sale of electricity. Consumers are 
free to choose which retailer to buy their electricity from. When providing electricity to end-
users, the retailer purchases electricity from generators at the Power Exchange (PX), or by off-
exchange trading. The latter is known as over-the-counter (OTC) trading through bilateral 
contracts. The producers and DSOs pay the TSO for being connected to and using the 
transmission network, whilst consumers pay to the DSOs. The economic conditions of these 
payments are regulated through network contracts, mainly by network tariffs. Different 
contracts regulate the economic flows in the market, which can be divided into the wholesale 
market and the end-user market. 
2.2.2 The Wholesale Market 
The current market regime consists of several wholesale market places. The trading in the 
different markets are mostly in a sequential manner, determined by how close to real-time 
operation one trades. Figure 2-2 shows an overview of the market places moving towards real-
time operations. 
 
Figure 2-2: Different Market Places in the Sequential Wholesale Markets 
(Ottesen, 2017) 
 
The main part of the wholesale market is the day-ahead market operated by Nord Pool2. In this 
market, buyers and sellers submit their bid curves for every single hour in the following day. 
                                                 















The power exchange finds the prices that match demand (purchase) and supply (sales) hour 
by hour. Because of intermittent production and unplanned outages, participants can also trade 
in the intraday market to ensure balance. As opposed to the day-ahead market, which is cleared 
simultaneously for all hours of the day, the intraday market is cleared continuously. The bids 
and corresponding commitments are aggregated at zonal levels in both markets.  
The bids from the day-ahead and intraday markets have an hourly resolution that ensures 
market balance in the planning phase. However, to ensure real time balance, the TSO organizes 
reserve markets with different time horizons. The reserves are primarily dispatchable, large 
generators that increase or decrease generation to stabilize the frequency. The market 
participants calculate and report deviations between planned and metered sale and purchase, 
after each single operational hour. The economic consequences of any imbalances are settled 
by the TSO in accordance to imbalance prices. Both the day-ahead, intraday and reserves 
market share the common objective of ensuring balance between generation and load in the 
most efficient way. 
In addition to the day-ahead and intraday market, a PX also exists for trading in financial 
contracts. The exchange includes typical trading instruments such as futures, forwards and 
options, as well as contracts for difference (CfD). Nasdaq3 is responsible for the operation of 
these markets in Norway. Market participants mainly use contracts to hedge price changes and 
manage risk, and the duration of each contract can vary from daily to several years.  
2.2.3 The End-User Market 
Most consumers purchase their electricity from a retailer. The terms are specified through a 
supply contract between each consumer and a freely chosen retailer. The retailer takes part in 
the wholesale market and is responsible for assuring balance on behalf of their group of 
consumers. This part of the market is denoted as the end-user side or demand side of the 
market. Contracts with fixed or variable prices are most common for consumers with 
periodically metered consumption. Variable price contracts usually have a fixed price for a 
period, for example based on the area prices (usually monthly prices). Another variable price 
contract follows the market price from the day-ahead market. Since prices vary hourly, the 
                                                 
3 www.nasdaqomx.com/commodities 
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aggregated consumption for a consumer in a period is distributed, in accordance to a pre-
defined profile, to calculate an average price per kWh. Larger consumers with hourly meters 
can have contracts that settles according to hourly consumption and corresponding hourly 
market prices. Changes in consumption metering are currently being undertaken by the 
industry, and will be discussed further later in this chapter. 
Network contract with the local DSO have a different contract structure. These contracts 
mainly cover the DSOs expenses related to operation, maintenance and reinforcement of the 
distribution network. In addition to covering costs, the contracts aim to distribute expenses 
fairly among the network consumers. The Norwegian system operates with network contracts 
made up by multiple tariffs, dependent on the consumer’s method of metering. Most 
households currently have periodical meters, and their payments consist of two parts: an 
energy fee and a fixed fee. The energy fee is usually a fixed price per kWh multiplied with 
metered consumption, whilst the fixed fee can be determined based on the size of the main 
fuse. For some consumers, especially the larger ones, there could be an additional fee based 
on peak power usage in a period. This fee is known as a power charge, and is usually made up 
by a fixed price per kWh/h per month.  
2.3 Changes in the Norwegian Electricity System Structure 
In a changing technological landscape, the electricity system is facing radical challenges. 
Developments happen fast, and affect both the technical and economic structure of the system. 
Several factors drive the changes in the electricity system. First of all, new climate goals 
promote increased renewable energy generation, which leads to new incentive regimes and 
regulations. Secondly, technology development and new electricity products lead to 
innovative appliances and more cost-efficient electricity services (Ottesen, 2017). Changes in 
market design, contracting and incentivizing initiatives provide a platform for increased end-
user engagement and flexibility deployment. In this sub chapter, we present the three main 
trends electrification, decentralization and digitalization. These trends affect both the technical 
and economic structure of the electricity system. We cover how these trends affect electricity 
systems, and discuss some changes and developments that are specific for the Norwegian 
electricity system. Furthermore, we cover why these trends can lead to increased end-user 
flexibility deployment, and how they enable increased demand side participation. Key 
developments such as the electrification of society, decentralized generation, digitalization of 
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the electricity system, advanced metering infrastructure, changing consumption patterns, new 
ways of contracting the end-user and the introduction of subscribed power tariffs will be 
highlighted. 
2.3.1 Electrification of the Transport Sector 
The shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources has led to an increased electrification 
of several sectors. The electrification of the road transport sector, where traditional combustion 
engine vehicles are replaced with electric vehicles is one such example. With developments 
in battery technology and charging infrastructure, the EV has become a viable option to 
combustion engine vehicles in the road transport sector. In Norway, favourable regulations 
and incentive schemes support a growing EV fleet (Figenbaum, Assum, & Kolbenstvedt, 
2015). With a growing fleet of EVs, simultaneous charging will put stress on the network 
infrastructure. Since EV-owners typically charge their vehicles at similar times, e.g. when 
arriving at work in the morning or at home in the evening, charging often takes place at times 
of peak load. This results in the need for network infrastructure investments. The road 
transport sector is not the only transport sector facing electrification. New, electrical ships and 
ferries operating along the Norwegian coast is a substantial challenge for the current 
Norwegian electricity system. Charging infrastructure in harbours and docks leads to an 
increase in power output that requires investments in the network infrastructure from the 
counties Troms to Rogaland according to a report by NVE (2017a). Estimates from NVE 
concludes that by 2030, 115 transformers will experience overload. Electrification of transport 
are estimated to be directly responsible for investment needs related to such overloads in 33% 
of these overloads.  
In the same report from 2017, NVE highlights that the electrification of the Norwegian 
transport sector can lead to a reduction in 𝐶𝑂2 emissions by 6 tonnes in 2030. This amounts 
to 10% of total 𝐶𝑂2 emissions in Norway. The basis for these estimates is that electrification 
of the transport sector will reduce the energy consumption from 55 TWh in 2016 to 45 TWh 
in 2030 (NVE, 2017a). However, the simultaneous nature of EV charging might lead to 
overload and voltage problems in the distribution network and at charging sites (Ottesen, 
2017). Thus, the electrification of the transport sector might increase the need for investments, 
an investment need that can be lowered by flexibility from the demand side and end-users. 
 11 
2.3.2 Decentralization of Electricity Generation 
The traditional way of generating electricity is through large, centralized power plants. To 
increase the share of renewable energy in the network, incentivizing end-users to generate 
local, distributed energy is highlighted as a viable option. Such decentralized generation is 
often denoted Distributed Generation (DG) and consists of Distributed Energy Resources 
(DER). DER can be defined as electric power generation units connected directly to the 
distribution network or connected to the network on the customer side of the meter 
(Ackermann, Andersson, & Söder, 2001). Typically, DER are small-scale generators with a 
generation capacity of 3 kW up to 10 MW (Viral & Khatod, 2012). The most common DER 
are wind turbines or solar photovoltaic (PV) panels. Kondziella & Bruckner (2016) highlights 
that these generators are often intermittent and uncontrollable. Furthermore, forecasting the 
electricity generation is difficult due to volatile temperature and weather patterns in many 
areas. Developments in local storage solutions and battery technology enables the 
decentralization and distribution of electricity generation. Since DER are intermittent, 
batteries can enable local production to reduce the pressure on the distribution network (Qvartz 
Consulting, 2017). Storage systems at the distribution side of the network is often denoted 
Distributed Storage (DS), and includes home batteries, network batteries and EV batteries. 
These batteries can discharge when additional generation is needed and charge when 
additional load is needed (Ottesen, 2017). Key advantages with DS is the ability to store 
renewable, intermittent energy to be used at a later more beneficial stage. This can help reduce 
peak loads (International Energy Agency, 2014). The decentralization of electricity generation 
offers new possibilities for the end-user in terms of purchase and sale of electricity. In Norway, 
the technological development and rise of companies like Otovo, who sell solar PV solutions 
in regular electronics stores, turn the traditional passive consumer into an economically 
motivated and active prosumer (Dagens Næringsliv, 2017; Ottesen, 2017). Grijalva, Costley 
& Ainsworth (2011) define a prosumer as an entity that can do at least one of the following: 
consume, produce or store electricity. By producing parts of their own demand, prosumers 
can sell their surplus electricity back to the network and thus provide flexibility.  
2.3.3 Digitalization of the Electricity System 
Several digital technologies affect the trends in electricity systems design and operation. 
Technologies such as block chain, artificial intelligence and machine learning are applied 
extensively to electricity markets in research projects (PwC, 2015). Two-way communication 
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between end-users and the network operator through IoT-devices is also creating new business 
models. Internet of Things (IoT) can be defined as a global infrastructure for the information 
society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting physical and virtual things based on 
existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies (Internation 
Telecommunication Union, 2012). By integrating electricity systems with IoT-technology and 
information systems, the intelligence in the network increases. Extensive monitoring, 
communication and predictive analytics can be applied to both network operation and 
investment decisions. These types of networks are often denoted Smart Grids. The European 
Commission (2006) define a Smart Grid as an electricity network that intelligently integrate 
the actions of all users connected to it -  generators, consumers, and those that do both – 
prosumers – in order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity 
supplies. An illustration of how a Smart Grid interconnect electricity and information systems 
is provided in Figure 2-3 below. 
 
Figure 2-3: A Smart Grid (European Technology Platform for the Electricity 
Networks of the Future, 2016) 
Some of these new technologies lead to negative consequences for the electricity system. 
However, integrating end-users, new technologies and the electricity system have benefits 
that can outweigh these negative consequences. End-user flexibility is highlighted as a 
technology that can help balance the fluctuations of variable renewable energy sources and 
facilitate penetration of renewable energy sources in the electricity system. (O'Connell, 
Pinson, Madsen, & O'Malley, 2014). 
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All Norwegian electricity customers will have new and smarter metering infrastructure 
installed by 1.1.2019 (NVE, 2017b). This metering infrastructure is denoted Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (AMI), and network operators are responsible for the deployment and 
installation of the new meters. The main objective with AMI is obtaining more precise and 
detailed information about consumption patterns, load profiles and the general state of the 
electricity system. With more precise and detailed information about their network, network 
operators can reduce O&M costs, correct malfunctions and errors in the network faster and 
better model future investments on the current demand and supply of electricity (NVE, 2017b). 
Ottesen (2017) highlights that AMI also introduces the possibility to meter several parameters 
such as reactive power and voltage, two-way communication with the DSO and adds an open 
interface for third parties, such as aggregators. The end-user will benefit from updated 
information about their consumption, making energy efficiency measures easier to implement. 
NVE estimates the total investment costs of the AMI-deployment to 10 bn. NOK, with an 
average increase in network tariffs of 300 NOK per household (NVE, 2017b). 
2.3.4 New Load Profiles and Consumption Patterns 
The introduction of new technologies, local generation of renewable energy, EVs and smart 
home appliances results in new load profiles and changing consumption patterns in the 
Norwegian electricity system. Increased electricity dynamics, larger peaks and reverse flows 
are some of the challenges DSOs are facing in the future electricity system. These challenges 
might have adverse consequences for the distribution network (Pudjianto, et al., 2013). 
Eurelectric (2013) highlights that unpredictable and bi-directional network flows as well as 
greater variations in voltage challenge the distribution network. 
In Figure 2-4, Ottesen (2017) displays how the aforementioned trends affect the load profile 
of a Norwegian household throughout a day. The traditional load is derived from a research 
report on average, hourly electricity consumption in a Norwegian household by Kipping & 
Trømborg (2015). The load profile highlights the traditional morning and afternoon peaks 
when households perform their morning routines and come home from work, school or other 
occupations respectively. By adding EV charging at 3.7 kW to the traditional load profile, 
Ottesen (2017) adds that this doubles the peak load in the afternoon. An increasing share of 
Norwegian end-users are interested in generating and producing their own electricity through 
solar PV-panels (Sysla, 2016). The traditional load profile is severely transformed when 
introducing generation from solar panels in the lower left figure. The maximum generation is 
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in the middle of the day, which does not correspond well with the traditional load profile 
(Ottesen, 2017). The short sags and surges in the load profile is due to decreased and increased 
generation when clouds pass by. Ottesen (2017) summarize the net result of these new 
technologies and appliances in the lower right corner. At some points of the day, the household 
delivers its surplus electricity back to the distribution network. Furthermore, spikes are present 
in the morning and afternoon, coinciding with the use of heating appliances and EV charging.  
 
 
Figure 2-4: Load and Generation Profiles for a Norwegian Household Over 
the Course of One Day (Ottesen, 2017) 
The changes in load profiles and consumption patterns require increased distribution 
network capacity and reserves in case of malfunction. Typically, this is solved by investing 
in new network infrastructure. This is a costly approach and additional capacity often have 
low utilization levels (Teng, Aunedi, & Strbac, 2015).  
2.3.5 New Flexibility Contracts 
The flexibility services of the future are highly dependent on new flexibility contracts and 
compensation schemes that consider both end-users and network operators. Although 
implementing end-user flexibility is technically possible, incentives must be present for the 
end-user to participate in this market. Thus, enabling end-user flexibility is not only about 
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creating sufficient technical mechanisms, but also providing the right economic motivation or 
moral incentive through correct contract design (Ottesen, 2017). Two possible flexibility 
contract types are direct and indirect control.  
Indirect control contracts are one option in end-user flexibility contracting. In this case, the 
DSO sends a price signal to the end-user, whereas the end-user responds to this price signal 
according to their preferences. This type of control mechanism is often referred to as price-
based or decentralized, since the end-user ultimately decides the outcome through their 
consumption pattern. The most common indirect control mechanisms are Time of Use (ToU), 
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) and Real Time Pricing (RTP). Time of Use (ToU) divides the day 
into time slots, and each time slot has a price attached to it for use of electricity. The time slots 
are usually seasonal and covers broad blocks of the day. When ToU is used as a dynamic way 
of pricing electricity, end-users are notified in advance. Prices can be defined as average prices 
for different time slots, but directly indexed to the day-ahead spot price (Eurelectric, 2017). 
With Critical Peak Pricing (CPP), the price rate increases throughout a pre- determined 
number of hours a year when wholesale prices are higher than usual (Eurelectric, 2017). CPP 
is typically applied when utilities observe emergencies or events that cause specified periods 
of higher prices. There are two common options of CPP application. The first option is 
predetermined surges in prices over a given time if events occurs. The second option is a surge 
in prices over a variable time when the electric network needs to reduce and shift loads 
(Smartgrid.gov, 2017). Real Time Pricing (RTP) is the most rigid and complex of the indirect 
control contracts. When utilizing RTP, electricity prices vary on an hourly basis in accordance 
with the wholesale market price (Schreiber, 2015). Thus, RTP passes the cost of electricity 
directly on to the customer. CPP and RTP are examples of what is called dynamic electricity 
pricing, where end-users and utilities take advantage of smart network flexibility. Since prices 
are predetermined in ToU, this cannot be defined as a dynamic electricity pricing mechanism. 
However, all three of these market mechanisms are reliant on AMI and smart meters, and 
represents viable design mechanisms to promote increased flexibility at the end-user level. 
Ottesen (2016) highlights that indirect control contracts incentivize the end-user to flatten their 
load profile but have certain disadvantages. End-users typically adapt when their flexibility is 
not needed, and indirect contracts do not give a guaranteed response when flexibility is 
actually needed. Furthermore, indirect control contracts give the same price signal to all 
customers, regardless of the network situation. Lastly, indirect control contracts are often 
perceived as a penalty. This might put end-users off, subsequently reducing the flexibility 
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potential in the network. According to microeconomic theory, the most economically efficient 
form of indirect control contracting is RTP, since it incentivizes end-users to consume their 
electricity when their marginal benefit is greater than the instantaneous marginal cost of power 
production (Borenstein, 2005; Caramanis, Schweppe, & Tabors, 1983; Holland & Mansur, 
2006). 
The second option in end-user flexibility contracting is direct control contracts. Ygge & 
Ackermans (1996) denotes this contract type as centralized control, and highlights that a 
central agent remotely controls end users’ equipment. This central agent can be an aggregator 
or a DSO. We discuss the role of the aggregator in chapter 3. To perform the remote control 
of equipment, the central agent must have a legal contract with the end-user. With a direct 
control contract, end-user flexibility can be activated when needed. Furthermore, activation of 
end-users residing in specific locations is possible. In this respect, direct control contracts are 
a more targeted way of utilizing end-user flexibility. Ultimately, the end-user are more likely 
to perceive the direct control mechanism as a reward since they are compensated according to 
their flexible contribution (Ottesen, 2016). A key drawback with direct control contracts is 
that they are technologically intensive, as the end-user must have the sufficient equipment and 
infrastructure to enable direct control. Furthermore, the roles and responsibilities shared by 
the network operator and end-user must be clearly defined. Designing attractive business 
models is a third problem with direct control contracts (Ottesen, 2016). 
2.3.6 Subscribed Power Tariffs in Norway 
A recent development in the Norwegian electricity system is that the power output has 
increased more than the electricity consumption. With a growing population, the need for 
electricity is increasing. However, more energy efficient appliances and better isolation of new 
buildings reduces the growth in electricity consumption at the cost of higher power output, 
even though the population is growing. The power output is increasing faster than the 
electricity consumption due to power demanding appliances and an increasing share of EVs. 
These appliances have a highpower output over shorter times (NVE, 2017c). 
NVE wants the network tariff to reflect the cost drivers in the network. Thus, redesigning the 
network tariff to reflect the cost structure in the network is important. Consumption patterns 
and the decisions of end-users clearly affect costs, and NVE wants to incentive end-users to 
utilize the network more cost-efficiently. Furthermore, a subscription based power tariff 
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makes it easier to implement new technologies and innovative market places that promote 
network efficiency. With the deployment of AMI, network operators are able to calculate 
network tariffs based on consumption per hour, kWh/h. Power tariffs are pricing how much 
electricity an end-user is consuming per hour. By introducing a power tariff, NVE aims to 
reduce peak loads. This results in a reduction in network infrastructure investments and 
deferment of these investments. The proposed network tariff is based around a power 
subscription, and can be expressed as:  
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 
In this network tariff design, the end-users pay an increased price for all Excessive Load 
Consumption exceeding their Load Subscription. In addition to paying for their subscribed 
power output and excess load consumption, the end-users pay for Load Transport Loss, which 
is denoted as an energy variable. This variable accounts for the costs end-users impose on the 
network by consuming one extra unit of kWh (NVE, 2017c). 
Although NVE has not yet decided the specific design of subscribed power output as the 
preferred network tariff, a change in network tariff over the next years can be expected. Since 
end-users must be able to identify which subscription is feasible for their respective power 
output, it is likely that the full-scale deployment of AMI will serve as a learning ground for 
end-users to understand their consumption and power output. Furthermore, a power tariff 
enables new, innovative flexibility solutions, as end-users grasp the concept of better load 




3. End-User Flexibility  
In this chapter, we present the concept of end-user flexibility in depth. We discuss why end-
user flexibility is an alternative to investments in infrastructure for network operators, define 
explicit and implicit end-user flexibility as well as discussing relevant application areas. 
Furthermore, we introduce the three main types of end-user flexibility, and their differences. 
In the second part of the chapter, a comprehensive literature and pilot review is conducted. 
3.1.1 Planned Investments in the Norwegian Electricity System   
In the Reiten-report “A Better Organized Electricity Network” (2014), four, key drivers for 
estimating future investment needs in the Norwegian electricity system is identified.  The first 
driver for increased investments is the technical state of current infrastructure. Substantial 
network investments occurred in the 1970 and 1980s, and parts of the current infrastructure is 
approaching the end of its technical lifetime. Ensuring that the overall state of the electricity 
system is able to handle future electricity demand, load profiles and new appliances is 
important. Thus, the Reiten-report highlights that substantial investments is still needed at all 
network levels in the years to come. 
The second driver for increased investments in the electricity system is population growth, 
urbanization and increased electricity demand. According to the Reiten-report, Norway has 
one of the highest population growth rates in Europe. A growing population increases 
electricity demand, thus resulting in a need for new network infrastructure to respond to this 
increase in demand. Furthermore, population growth rates are higher in urban areas and large 
cities, meaning DSOs in these areas will have higher investment needs than the ones in more 
remote areas (Reiten, et al., 2014). 
A third driver for investments in the electricity system is compliance with national- and 
international climate goals through increased use of new energy carriers. Although the 
Norwegian electricity system has benefitted from flexible hydropower, the increased use of 
renewable power generation challenges the electricity system. Prosumers that sell their energy 
back to the network will also increase the complexity of the electricity system, highlighting 
the need for investments (Reiten, et al., 2014). 
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The fourth and last driver the Reiten-report highlights is load increase predictions. The 
electrification of the transport sector, new power demanding home appliances and the 
introduction of AMI all affect the future load demand, and challenge the network in several 
ways. The electrification of the transport sector is a critical challenge for the current 
Norwegian electricity system. Historically, combustion engines and fossil fuels have been 
used in vehicles, leading to an electricity system that were not dimensioned for a full 
electrification of this sector. Areas in close proximity to transport centers such as harbors, 
train- and bus stations will experience increases in power demand with the electrification of 
the transport sector. This leads to a substantial investment need for capacity increasing 
investments at the distribution and regional network level. 
In addition to these key drivers, the general advances in technology have led to discussions of 
a “smarter network”, where end-user flexibility and flexibility from the demand side is a key 
component. By involving the end-user through a third-party flexibility aggregator, network 
operators can access flexibility volumes that are currently hard to obtain for the specific times 
when capacity is needed. Since changing consumption patterns challenge the network 
capacity, flexible end-users can help alleviate peaks and balance demand and supply.  
In the period from 2016 to 2025, NVE has estimated investment costs of 33 billion NOK and 
15 billion NOK in the high-voltage and low-voltage parts of the Norwegian distribution 
network respectively (NVE, 2016). Since investments at the distribution level of the electricity 
system is based on the specific hour in a calendar year where the power output and 
consumption is estimated to be at its highest, load increase predictions play a vital part in the 
investment decision network operators undertake. By utilizing end-user flexibility and smarter 
investment solutions, network operators aim to optimize their network performance while 
reducing the overall investment costs in new infrastructure through better peak load 
management. 
3.1.2 Implicit and Explicit End-User Flexibility 
The design of power tariffs, pricing areas and forced up- and down regulation are all measures 
to increase end-user flexibility deployment (THEMA Consulting, 2015). A common approach 
in research and literature is distinguishing between implicit and explicit end-user flexibility. 
While implicit end-user flexibility implies that the end-user adjusts their consumption patterns 
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according to price signals, explicit end-user flexibility is characterized by incentivizing end-
users to trade their flexibility in an organized market place (Ramos, et al., 2013).  
Implicit end-user flexibility is often referred to as price-based flexibility, and implies that end-
users adjust their consumption to price signals or track variations in price through apps or 
appliances. Common price signals are time based power tariffs such as ToU and RTP, or 
demand based power tariffs such as CPP, which raises the price of electricity when the peak 
demand is high (EG3, 2015). An example of an appliance that help end-users adjust their 
consumption is the application SmartLiv by the Norwegian DSO Ringeriks-Kraft Nett. The 
application enables end-users to observe their consumption through hourly metering, track 
shifts in consumption patterns over time and compare their consumption with neighbors and 
other end-users (Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS, 2017). Another vital aspect of implicit end-user 
flexibility deployment is a high time granularity of metering. Typically, end-users can be billed 
per hour of electrical usage. The monthly price will then be calculated by multiplying the 
consumption per hour with the spot price from Nord Pool Spot for that specific hour (Lyse 
Elnett AS, 2017). 
Explicit end-user flexibility embodies flexibility that can be traded in a market place. With 
explicit end-user flexibility, the end-user is compensated through a contract that enables 
manual or automatic shifts in their electricity consumption. One of the key drivers for the 
deployment of explicit end-user flexibility is well-defined and liquid flexibility markets. Since 
participation in such markets include substantial transaction costs, end-users are typically 
unable to offer flexibility volumes in this market without a subsidiary. Moreover, volumes 
produced from a change in consumption from a single end-user does not satisfy the required 
bid size. A key driver in explicit end-user flexibility deployment is the establishment of 
aggregators who aggregate flexibility and offer specific flexibility services to the market on 
behalf of the customer.  
The main goal of flexibility services is to enable the end-user to take part in the market place 
and reduce their electricity costs by offering flexibility to the system through their 
consumption patterns. In this respect, flexibility services play a vital role in balancing supply 
and demand in the electricity system. Ultimately, increased end-user flexibility can result in 
lower electricity prices, which even benefits non-flexible end-users (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2017). 
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Both technology and end-user preferences influence end-user flexibility deployment. Specific 
flexibility services can only be provided by explicit end-user flexibility, while other services 
are only possible with implicit end-user flexibility. Explicit end-user flexibility is a measurable 
resource. Hence, it can be incorporated in system adequacy assessments in a similar way to 
generation (SEDC, 2016). Implicit end-user flexibility shifts the commitment to the end user’s 
behavioral patterns. With the deployment of AMI and increasing customer participation, 
SEDC highlights that implicit end-user flexibility has a large untapped potential. 
3.1.3 Utilizing End-User Flexibility in Investment Decisions 
Increased intelligence in the network impose new challenges and tasks for DSOs, but also new 
benefits and opportunities (Reiten, et al., 2014). Increasing the information access and 
receiving it closer to real time will help DSOs achieve better planning of investments and 
operations. The Reiten-report highlights the ability to reduce or postpone investments, as one 
of the main benefits of more active control. Investments that can most easily be deferred are 
mainly reinvestments in existing infrastructure and components. 
The need for large investments in the industry increase the importance of cost efficient DSOs. 
Investments must be thoroughly evaluated to prevent inefficient investments in the network. 
With the implementation of AMI at all end-user levels, network operators can monitor specific 
components and make better predictions of future load demand. Investments can be optimized 
based on load profiles, bottlenecks and components status. Maintenance can be planned 
according to real time need instead of general inspections, reducing uncertainty and increase 
utilization of existing components. 
Flexibility from large industrial players is actively used by the TSO to balance the electrical 
networks. For imbalances in the distribution network, there is a lack of measures to adjust 
production or consumption. Intelligent equipment in the network make it possible to utilize 
end-user flexibility from smaller electricity consumers, such as households and offices, 
enabling them to compensate non-flexible consumers in times of scarcity. 
End-user flexibility can be used to handle peak loads and function as a reserve in case of 
component malfunction. In the case provided by Skagerak Nett, which will be presented and 
discussed in chapter five, we look at two overlying scenarios. In the first framework, end-user 
flexibility is used in case of malfunction in transformers in the distribution network. In the 
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second scenario, end-user flexibility is used both in case of malfunctions and to handle peak 
loads in normal operations. The scenarios represent two possible use areas the industry 
consider valuable and feasible. Both scenarios can help defer capacity-increasing investments. 
Load increases in the network and component malfunctions have traditionally been addressed 
by direct investment in capacity increasing assets and reserves, and end-user flexibility is 
presented as an alternative technology. 
3.1.4 Types of End-User Flexibility 
End-user flexibility have several areas of use. The three most common types of end-user 
flexibility are peak shaving, energy conservation and load shifting (Sæle & Grande, Market 
based solutions for increased, 2005). The base case scenario without utilizing end-user 
flexibility and the three types of end-user flexibility is displayed in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1: Base Case, Peak Shaving, Conservation and Load Shifting 
(U.S. Agency for International Development, 2017) 
According to Sæle and Grande (2005) peak shaving can be defined as reducing the electrical 
load of a particular system during a period of peak demand. Peak shaving can be done by 
turning off or disconnecting loads. The loads chosen are often slow loads, such as water 
boilers, EV charging and heating. Energy conservation implies scaling down and reducing 
electricity consumption in a designated period, e.g. a day, a week or a month. This typically 
occur in situations where there are temporary energy shortages. Since end-users have a 
relatively homogeneous demand over time, loads will often be shifted in time rather than 
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completely shaved. Load shifting takes place when the customer shifts their electricity 
consumption in time. An example of this could be shifting consumption at hours with high 
electricity prices due to peak load, to consumption at hours with lower electricity prices due 
to less load demand (Sæle & Grande, 2005). 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Introduction 
To evaluate the feasibility of using end-user flexibility to postpone and shift capacity 
investments in the network, it is necessary to take a step back and consider the overall 
conditions. By discussing current research and literature on key topics on end-user flexibility, 
we cover trends in both technological and economic aspects. Current academic and 
professional discussions revolve mostly around the overall market design of end-user 
flexibility or flexibility provision from large, industrial generators. The literature review 
includes selected research on several topics related to end-user flexibility deployment in the 
distribution network and as an alternative to network infrastructure investments. 
3.2.2 Handling Peak Demand with End-User Flexibility 
In recent years, electricity market research has focused on making smarter and more cost-
efficient investment decisions to handle capacity problems. In this regard, end-user flexibility 
is promoted as a promising way to deal with new load profiles, an increasing share of 
renewable energy sources and a changing energy demand landscape (Papaefthymiou, Grave, 
& Dragoon, 2014). However, it is necessary to design sufficient incentives and regulatory 
schemes to enable active load management of end-users (Clean Energy Ministrial, 2014). 
Schmalensee (2011) highlight the fact that all end-users that engage in contracted down-
regulation of demand should be explicitly rewarded through sufficient incentives. 
When assessing how to handle peak demand through end-user flexibility deployment in the 
distribution network, large volumes of end-user flexibility have been hard to obtain for 
research and modelling purposes. Researchers at ETH Zürich (Geidl, et al., 2007) solved this 
by studying the interrelation between electrical and thermal energy systems in buildings called 
Energy Hubs. These Energy Hubs relied on various energy input variables such as electricity, 
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natural gas and heating. Furthermore, the Energy Hubs included storage and conversion 
properties, and produced output services that complied with certain loads such as electricity, 
heating and cooling (Geidl, et al., 2007). 
Bozchalui et al., (2012) propose a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) optimization 
problem to the Energy Hub concept. The problem minimizes energy consumption, cost of 
energy, emissions and peak load. Specific end-user preferences and comfort levels are also 
taken into account. The application of the model on a household in Ontario, Canada resulted 
in up to 20% savings on energy costs and a 50% reduction in peak demand, all while satisfying 
the designated preferences and comfort levels of the end-user. 
Strbac et al., (2008) discuss the major benefits and challenges of end-user flexibility in the UK 
power system. Key benefits include improved management of the demand-supply balance in 
electricity systems with an increasing share of renewable energy, deferring new infrastructure 
investments, simplifying outage management and relieving congestion in distribution 
substations. The use of demand response to better utilize infrastructure capacity is proposed 
as a large benefit. Strbac highlights the lack of ICT systems to support demand response and 
end-user flexibility deployment, immature and insufficient market design as well as lacking 
provision of incentives from OFGEM, the UK regulator. 
3.2.3 Applying End-User Flexibility to Investment Decisions 
The traditional approach to expanding capacity in the network is investing directly in physical 
infrastructure. Hoff, Wenger and Farmer (1996) highlights that demand-driven investments in 
increased capacity often results in a period of excess capacity. Furthermore, the cost benefit 
of deferring investments results from the specific investment costs and time they are deferred 
(Wang, et al., 2008). In an early study, Román, Gómez, Muñoz, & Peco (1999) proposes the 
use of geographic information systems (GIS) to model and plan network investments 
alongside roads and transport infrastructure. They conclude that this approach reduced barriers 
and infeasibilities in network planning.  
El Khattam, Hegazy & Salama (2005) proposes a new model for network investments where 
the positioning and sizing of distributed generation (DG) sources are optimized. Several 
investment alternatives are tested, including expanding an existing substation and adding new 
feeders to purchasing power from an existing intertie to meet load demand growth. They 
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conclude that optimizing this positioning and sizing can result in a 20% reduction in 
investment costs.  
Méndez et al., (2006) also studies the impact of DG on deferring distribution network 
investments. A main result from their research is that with 0% penetration of DG, load 
increases in the distribution network can grow by 171.4 % until reaching an overload 
probability of 0.5%, while a 30% penetration of DG allows a load increase of 196.4% until 
reaching an overload probability of 0.5%. They also highlight that DG plants with solar PV 
generation allow higher load growths before making network reinvestments than DG plants 
with wind power generation. This is due to a higher randomness in wind energy production.  
Piccolo & Siano (2009) discusses how DG can serve as an alternative distribution planning 
option by providing opportunities to capture the deferment benefit. They highlight the 
regulatory side of the issue and conclude that European legislations must be revised to make 
DG a feasible option to investments in infrastructure. By obliging network operators to require 
for local power generation as a direct alternative to network infrastructure reinvestments, the 
deferral benefits of DG can be reaped.  
Pudjianto et al., (2013) introduces smart control to minimize distribution network 
reinforcements. They simulate how network infrastructure investments differs in a business-
as-usual scenario and a Smart Grid scenario. Without smart infrastructure management, they 
estimate that between 2010 and 2050, the total distribution network reinforcements in the UK 
will amount to £36 billion.  By applying smart charging of vehicles, smart heat pumps and 
optimized control of network voltage regulators, they conclude that there is a substantial 
savings potential in infrastructure investment costs. The report does not explicitly estimate any 
savings. 
Spiliotis, Ramos and Belmans (2016) analyze how end-user flexibility can be used to solve 
capacity problems and defer physical network expansions in the distribution network. They 
develop and define the FlexMart model, which enables the DSO to purchase end-user 
flexibility offered by residential end-users. The model works as a long-term planning tool and 
provide an optimal combination of physical expansions, flexibility deployment and dispatch 
to reassure capacity needs in network operations are met.  
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3.2.4 Quantifying the Technical Potential of End-User Flexibility 
The technical potential can be described as the amount of flexibility end-users can offer to the 
electricity system. Several research projects have studied and quantified the flexibility 
potential in Norway and the Nordic region. 
An early study conducted by Meland et al., in 2006, estimated the technical potential of end-
user flexibility by considering electricity volumes that could be replaced by other energy 
carriers. This study focused on office buildings, residential homes and industrial complexes. 
The flexible load is estimated partly by assuming plausible changes in energy carriers and by 
assuming an average time of 2000 hours each year. The study concluded that by switching 
energy carriers, 2700 to 4000 MW of flexibility were made available. 
In a SINTEF-study from 2010, Sæle & Grande estimates the technical potential in Norwegian 
households by analyzing results from a pilot by the DSO Malvik Everk. The results from the 
pilot was an estimated reduction in power output of 1 to 2,5 kWh/h per end-user, depending 
on whether they were equipped with hot water boilers or water based residential heating 
systems respectively. By scaling these results based on a 50% acceptance rate of automated 
control of warm water tanks nationally, the study concluded that the technical potential in 
these Norwegian households amounted to 1000 MW. 
Xrgia & EC Group (2012) estimated the technical potential of end-user flexibility in the 
Norwegian counties of Oslo and Akershus. Based on electricity consumption statistics, 
estimates of future power outtakes and qualitative assessments of end-user flexibility 
deployment, an estimated technical potential of 550 MW in Oslo and Akershus was found. 
The technical potential of end-user flexibility will also be influenced by a growing fleet of 
EV´s.  In the report “Does the electrical network have enough capacity to include electrical 
buses, ferries and cars?” from 2017, NVE estimates that each additional EV represent an 
increase of 0.7 kW in peak demand. The current fleet of roughly 125 000 EVs accounts for 
100 MW in potential flexibility. This does not account for the technical potential in charging 
appliances in the Norwegian distribution network (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2017). 
Even though the electricity systems in Norway and Sweden are slightly different, both 
countries possess long-term storage and flexibility solutions in hydropower generation, and 
have integrated electricity markets through Nord Pool. Comparing technical potential between 
 27 
the two countries is thus a feasible approach. In 2016, The Swedish Energy Market 
Inspectorate (EI) conducted an extensive study of the technical potential of end-user flexibility 
in Sweden. The technical potential in Sweden was estimated to almost 8000 MW in the winter 
months with 5500 MW of this potential being supplied by residential end-users. In the summer 
months, the estimated flexibility was 3700 MW, with 1700 MW being supplied by residential 
end-users. 
An earlier Swedish project, Elforsk, studied the possibility of curtailing electric heating and 
water heater loads. An average controllable load of 4-5 kW per house at 10-15 degrees below 
zero implied a technical potential of approximately 1500 MW in Sweden (Elforsk, 2006). 
Gaia Consulting (2011) estimated the practical potential for end-user flexibility in the Nordic 
region. The research highlighted that most of the flexibility potential is in Swedish and 
Norwegian households, with some flexibility available in Finnish households and a very 
limited flexibility potential in Danish households. The results relied heavily on economical, 
technical and practical assumptions, but estimated the end-user flexibility potential in the 
Nordic region to between 4000 MW and 7000 MW, excluding flexibility from the industry. 
From this potential flexibility, between 1000 MW and 3500 MW originated from Norwegian 
end-users. 
In summary, several attempts of quantifying the technical potential of end-user flexibility has 
been conducted, both in Norway and abroad. However, it is not clear from these research 
projects if this potential results from explicit- or implicit end-user flexibility. In a report from 
2016, COWI Belgium highlighted that roughly 92% of potential peak reductions induced by 
end-user flexibility deployment would come from explicit end-user flexibility. The remaining 
8% would come from price based programs and implicit end-user flexibility.  
3.2.5 End-User Flexibility Deployment and Electrical Vehicles 
The distribution network is tasked with several challenges due to a growing fleet of EV´s. 
Simultaneous charging of EV´s may result in thermal overloads, voltage deviations and even 
blackouts (Clement-Nyns, Haesen & Driesen, 2009).  Several research projects study the effect 
of how EV´s can increase the flexibility of the distribution network by curtailing their time of 
charging.  
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Habib, Kamran & Rashid (2015) highlight the use of EV batteries to supply flexibility to the 
electrical network, and denote this Vehicle to Grid (V2G). Their research proposes that V2G 
applications improve reliability, efficiency and stability in the distribution network. However, 
they highlight that the economic benefits of V2G technology is reliant on the strategies of 
charging and aggregation. 
Teng et al., (2015) conclude that with smart charging technology, 70 to 100% of EV charging 
demand can be shifted away from peak hours. Their research suggests that charging can 
typically be delayed by several hours when shifted away from peak load times and towards 
the night hours.  
Sbordone et al., (2014) analyze how the installation of a prototype-charging system including 
separate battery banks and DER units may lead to a reduction in network reinforcements. The 
prototype system delivered feasible results in peak shaving implementation when compared 
to the main distribution network, and exhibited nearly zero impact on the infrastructure. 
3.2.6 Dynamic Pricing, Tariffs and End-User Flexibility  
Faruqui & Sergici (2010) review 15 different Demand Response pilots in the U.S, Canada, 
Australia and France. All pilots target peak demand reductions through dynamic electricity 
pricing. The review conclude that ToU-rates induce a peak demand reduction of 3 to 6%, while 
CPP-tariffing induce a peak demand reduction of 13 to 20%. Faruqui and Sergici highlight 
that by accounting for enabling technologies, the CPP-tariffing leads to a peak demand 
reduction of 27 to 44% due to different compensation mechanisms. 
Bartusch et al., (2011) analyze how end-users respond to a demand based ToU-tariff. By 
utilizing this indirect control contract, a Swedish DSO wanted to investigate how they could 
reduce peak load in their distribution network. The study concludes that end-users respond 
positively to being charged according to this type of tariff. Furthermore, the introduction of 
the tariff decreased the peak demand substantially.  
In a later study, Bartusch et al., (2014) study the effect of a power tariff on electricity 
consumption in a residential area of Stockholm. The attitude to shift consumption were 
measured over a long period, where the researchers tested the attitude over six years. The 
research concluded that although the attitude to shift consumption from times of high demand 
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of electricity to times of low demand of electricity were significant, it was not reflected 
through an actual shift in consumption over time.  
Haring & Andersson (2014) highlight the need for incentive based rewarding contracts when 
pursuing direct control flexibility mechanisms. Efficient contracts between the prosumer and 
central agent must be individually rational and incentive compatible. To make contracts 
individually rational, the end-user must be rewarded and not make a loss from entering the 
flexibility contract. Incentive compatibility occurs when the end-user receives incentives to 
display and share their actual flexibility costs. By introducing a non-linear framework of 
pricing, capacity reservation and deployment of reserve energy are being rewarded separately. 
Another viable business model is proposed by Campaigne and Oren (2016). By utilizing a fuse 
control paradigm, flexibility aggregators impose capacity constraints on prosumers or penalize 
them for breaching a capacity threshold. Subsequently, the prosumers allocate the available 
electricity to separate devices. The contract between the flexibility aggregator and the 
prosumer is seasonal, and typically allow the aggregator to curtail consumption over time 
given a certain probability of curtailment. 
3.2.7 Aggregation of Flexibility Volumes 
To offer flexibility volumes from end-users efficiently to the market, pooling and aggregation 
of flexibility volumes is required. A much-discussed proposition is to introduce a participant 
often denoted as an aggregator. Although the definite role of the aggregator is yet to be 
decided both nationally and elsewhere in Europe, numerous models and designs have been 
discussed in recent literature and research. We discuss integrated aggregators, independent 
aggregators and regulated aggregators. 
According to NordREG (2016), integrated aggregators are the desired option in Norway. This 
is due to regulations requiring the aggregator to assume balance responsibility in order to profit 
from any contracted reserve or activation of end-user flexibility. The aggregator can either 
assume the role as electricity provider and Balance Responsible Party (BRP), or the electricity 
provider and BRP can assume the role as an aggregator. ENFO (2016) highlights that the 
former solution is heavily reliant on well-defined and liquid flexibility markets. ENFO 
propose that the latter solution, will result in a more specific, flexibility oriented electricity 
provider and BRP.  
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The independent aggregator model is promoted in the European Commission. USEF (2017) 
propose a framework where a third-party assumes the role as an independent aggregator. 
NordREG (2016) highlights three ways of organizing the independent aggregator role. The 
first way relies on an independent aggregator with shared balance responsibility and no 
imbalance settlements when flexibility is activated. This model utilizes several BRPs per 
access point, and would not be possible to implement in Nordic countries. The second way is 
that the independent aggregator assumes shared balance responsibility and includes imbalance 
settlements and revenue reimbursements when flexibility is activated. By transferring any net 
profit from activating flexibility from the electricity provider to the independent aggregator, 
this model distributes the risk and return more neutrally between the electricity provider and 
the aggregator. The third way is based on the aggregator assuming no balance responsibility. 
By allowing no balance responsibility, the aggregator will reap the profit while the electricity 
provider assumes the risk of balancing and delivering electricity. SEDC (2015) highlights that 
this model is heavily dependent on future regulation- and policy development.  
ENFO (2016) propose that a regulated aggregator model can be introduced by handing the 
aggregator role to either DSOs or the TSOs. When a DSO assumes the regulated aggregator 
role, the end-user can provide available flexibility and receive a reduction in their network 
tariff in turn. This model has been touted a viable option in countries looking to base their 
tariff regime on Time of Use (ToU). Alternatively, the DSO can source the aggregated 
flexibility through a direct contract. In this case, security of flexibility supply has to be 
accounted for in the same way as security of electricity supply. NordREG (2016) also proposes 
that the system operator and TSO can assume the aggregator role in a regulated model. In this 
model, the aggregated flexibility is serviced externally, but the system operator interacts 
directly with the end-user. This model emphasizes security of electricity supply and is a stark 
contrast to the many market based, independent aggregator models proposed by the European 
Commission in the Third Package and the Winter Package (2016). 
3.2.8 Trading End-User Flexibility in Flexibility Markets 
Eid et al. (2016) discuss a flexibility market design inspired by the French trading system and 
markets for flexibility in both the short-, medium- and long-term trading periods. In the French 
trading system, minimum bid capacities for balancing services have been reduced from 50 
MW to 10 MW to motivate smaller parties like independent aggregators to participate in the 
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balancing markets. The research is based on five markets; ancillary services, system balancing 
and network congestion management, spot markets and generation capacity markets.  
Zhang et al. (2014) introduces a clearinghouse concept for flexibility called FLECH at the 
distribution level. The FLECH market utilizes aggregator-based offers to promote small scale 
DERs with up to 5MW for their active market participation. In this market design, the 
compensation is stipulated by the capacity needs of the DSO. The aggregator then responds to 
this capacity need by bidding prices and quantities of flexibility, and the FLECH market runs 
single-side auctions or super market trading where the aggregator designs specific flexibility 
products that are presented to the end-users.  
A third, bid-less flexibility market design is presented by Gantenbein et al (2012). By updating 
and publishing prices in five-minute intervals, customers can respond to this price 
continuously by shifting their load (Larsen, et al., 2015).  
ENFO (2016) discuss a “traffic light regulation” of monopoly and market functions in the 
electricity system, which was first proposed by Eurelectric (2014) in their report “Active 
Distribution System Management”. This system is based on the need for specific option 
schemes for Norwegian DSO´s. Separating monopoly- and market activities makes it possible 
to introduce new products that enables the end-user to participate in the market.  
3.3 Project and Pilot Review -  Norway 
To supplement academic research and reports, we review current projects and demos involving 
end-user flexibility in Norway. Most of the relevant research projects on end-user flexibility 
is conducted by members of the Norwegian Smart Grid Centre. Some of these projects are in 
a start phase, while others have been running for several years. 
3.3.1 EMPOWER (2015 to 2018) 
Local Electricity Retail Markets for Prosumer Smart Grid Power Services (EMPOWER) is a 
project addressing the local energy and flexibility markets of the future. Among the 
participants is Universität St.Gallen, NewEn Projects GmbH, Schneider Electric Norway, 
eSmart Systems and Smart Innovation Norway. The project received funding from the 
European Union´s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program. EMPOWER is enabling 
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consumers to become prosumers, encouraging the active participation of end-user´s 
consuming and producing energy in the electricity system. The end-goal is to develop a fully 
functional energy market in Europe where consumers can trade local energy while offering 
flexibility services to free up capacity from the regional and distribution network. The 
flexibility in the EMPOWER has multiple purposes. It handles imbalances and problems in 
the local micro grid, but also enables the prosumers to trade energy with wholesale markets. 
To enable end-user flexibility in the future, EMPOWER covers topics such as building site 
methods for data collection and acquisition and analyzes the impact of both single and 
multiple, organized prosumers on the energy system. The end goal is a local market place 
where flexibility is created and exploited for the benefit of both the DSO and the end-user 
(EMPOWER, 2017) 
3.3.2 Smart Energy Hvaler (2012 to 2015) 
Smart Energy Hvaler was a pilot included in the project Demonstration and Verification of 
Intelligent Distribution Networks (DeVID). The project implemented Smart Grid solutions in 
25 households on the small peninsula of Hvaler between 2012 and 2015. The project proposed 
and analyzed methods for utilizing end-user flexibility. Smart Energy Hvaler focused on the 
response to price signals, dynamic tariffs and visualized consumption. Each participating 
household were equipped with a tablet displaying consumption in real time and introduced to 
a subscribed power tariff. Through the winter of 2013 and 2014, end-users reduced their net 
electricity consumption by 15% after correcting for temperature effects. Furthermore, a key 
finding in the project was the fact that end-users reduced both their power output and overall 
energy consumption. This resulted in 85% of all end-users documenting electricity cost 
savings (THEMA Consulting, 2014) 
3.3.3 Demo Steinkjer (2011 to 2017) 
Demo Steinkjer utilized the same infrastructure as Smart Energy Hvaler to conduct research 
on full-scale deployment of end-user flexibility in the distribution network. For NTE, Demo 
Steinkjer was an active arena for developing and testing out new energy solutions and trends 
such as demand-response mechanisms, end-user flexibility, design of tariffs and consumer 
behavior. NTE prioritized research on network rental models such as the subscribed power 
tariff and dynamic micro grids. By implementing a subscribed power tariff similar to the one 
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in Smart Energy Hvaler, end-users reduced their net energy consumption by 5.3% during the 
first 6 months of the pilot. This reduction in consumption were not a result of shifted loads, 
but rather a permanent reduction in consumption due to the new tariff (THEMA Consulting, 
2014). 
3.3.4 ChargeFlex (2015 to 2017) 
ChargeFlex is a R&D project that aims to solve the increased stress simultaneous charging of 
EV´s puts on the distribution network. The project explores how flexibility can increase 
network capacity by up to 25%, and how Demand Response, flexibility and EV´s can add 
value for network owners in the future. A key concept in ChargeFlex is to develop predictive 
models for EV charging, load management and available end-user flexibility. By utilizing 
these predictive models, an optimization model for load shifting will be made. This model will 
be used to activate flexibility immediately when required. The end-user can influence the 
flexibility offered to the system by setting a desired time for full charging of their EV. Key 
partners in the project include NTNU, eSmart Systems, Smart Innovation Norway, Fortum 
Charge & Drive, SFE Nett and Norgesnett (THEMA Consulting, 2014). 
3.4 Project and Pilot Review – Abroad 
In this part, we review relevant projects and pilots outside of Norway. Although these projects 
are influenced by different market schemes and regulations, they highlight the technical and 
economic efficiency of end-user flexibility in the distribution network. 
3.4.1 INVADE (Various Countries) 
The goal of the INVADE project is to integrate EV´s and increase the use of DS and batteries 
in the distribution network by designing a flexible energy management system. Like 
EMPOWER, INVADE is funded by the Horizon 2020 program, and is one of the largest R&D 
projects in Smart Grids and storage ever in the EU. The project has a budget of €16 million, 
and pilot sites are situated in Norway, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and Bulgaria. Partners 
in the project include NTNU, Schneider Electric Norway, Lyse Elnett, GreenFlex BV, NewEn 
GMBH and eSmart Systems. The project has a broad mandate by focusing on the integration 
of DER and DS, coping with network limitations, handling uncertainty and increasing 
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flexibility in a microgrid. This is mainly due to its focus on establishing a flexible 
infrastructure compatible with new, inexpensive technologies in energy production (INVADE, 
2017). 
3.4.2 Flexible Households (Sweden) 
During March and April 2017, the Swedish TSO Svenska Kraftnät performed a pilot project 
together with Fortum Sweden. The scope of the pilot project was to investigate how 100 
Swedish end-users could contribute through flexible consumption. The flexibility was utilized 
as a reserve to balance the system under normal operations. This kind of flexibility reserve is 
denoted FCR-N. By utilizing the flexible capacity in hot water boilers, aggregated flexibility 
delivered from 100 end-users amounted to 0.1 MW, which is the minimal required bid size of 
FCR-N. The pilot project concluded that the hot water boilers responded well to the flexibility 
needs, and that flexibility from the end-user was activated quick enough to satisfy the 
flexibility need. However, changes in metering and ICT-systems were highlighted as areas of 
improvement to make the flexibility reserves even more efficient (Svenska Kraftnät, 2017). 
3.4.3 USEF (Netherlands) 
The Universal Smart Energy Framework (USEF) was launched in November 2015 and gives 
clear design outlines for a common, European flexibility market. USEF is one of the few 
projects on the European continent that has tested integrated flexibility markets with a third-
party aggregator. By doing this, flexibility can be traded like a commodity. Key partners in 
the USEF were large, household names in the European energy industry such as ABB, 
Alliander, DNV GL, RWE and IBM. At the Dutch pilot site Heerhugowaard, the USEF was 
put to test by involving 203 residential end-users. By installing smart meters in the household, 
the project proved that the flexibility framework was able to handle serious load congestions, 
created value for the end-user, DSO and BRP as well as successfully implementing an 
independent aggregator to sell and deliver flexibility (USEF, 2017). 
3.4.4 GRID4EU (France) 
GRID4EU was completed in 2016, and had a budget of €54 million. The project is one of the 
largest Smart Grid and demand response projects ever conducted in Europe. By including 6 
large DSO´s, the GRID4EU project covered more than 50% of all European electricity 
customers. In 2014 and 2015, the contributing French DSO in the project ERDF conducted a 
 35 
study on demand response and peak shaving involving 217 households. By offering vouchers 
for consumption reductions between 6pm and 8pm on certain peak demand days, the project 
proved that end-users would adapt to this price reduction and reduce their consumption with 
21% in this time slot on the specified days (GRID4EU, 2017). 
3.4.5 LINEAR (Belgium) 
LINEAR (Large-scale Implementation of Smart Grid Technologies in Distribution Networks) 
was a large-scale demand response project located in the region of Flanders in Belgium. By 
including 239 households and testing the influence of smart appliances on electricity 
consumption, the resulting analysis showed that an average maximum increase of 430W per 
household could be realized at midnight, and a maximum decrease of 65W per household 
could be realized in the evening. This potential end-user flexibility could be used to determine 
the impact of similar Demand Response programs including residential end-users. (D'Hulst, 
et al., 2015). 
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4. Regulations, Legislations and Policies 
The following chapter discusses the regulatory framework that affect Norwegian network 
operators and end-users. The buildup of the regulatory model and how it affects investment 
decisions, is explained in detail. The main focus will be on Norwegian regulations, but we 
begin by describing the current and predicted regulation in the European Union (EU), which 
affects the Norwegian regulation. 
4.1 European Union 
The EU have a complex regulation of the European energy system, consisting of several 
directives, legislations and proposals. Despite not being a member of the EU, Norway is 
strongly affected by the shape of the regulation due to the European Economic Area (EEA) 
membership and interconnectedness of the European electricity system. 
4.1.1 The Third Energy Package 
The latest regulatory contribution to the European energy market is commonly known as the 
Third Energy Package. It was adopted by the European Commission (EC) in 2009 (European 
Parliament, 2017). 
The legislation embraces five main areas; unbundling, independent regulators, Agency for 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators4 (ACER), cross-border cooperation, and open and fair retail 
markets (European Commission, 2017a). Unbundling is the separation of electricity 
generation and supply from the operation of transmission networks. The main goal of 
unbundling is to increase competition and reduce consumer prices. To ensure a competitive 
European energy market, the European Commission stresses the need for industry- and 
government independent regulators. ACER is an agency established to promote cross-border 
cooperation between regulators and to strengthen the internal energy market. The European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity5 (ENTSO-E) is established to 
                                                 
4 http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Pages/default.aspx  
5 https://www.entsoe.eu/Pages/default.aspx 
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ensure optimal network management across borders. The final focus area of the Third Energy 
Package is open and fair retail markets, with explicit focus on the role of end-users, market 
pricing, non-discrimination and transparency in future energy markets. 
4.1.2 The Winter Package 
Even though the Third Energy Package is the latest adopted energy legislation, there is a more 
recent proposal currently being overlooked by Member States and other European nations. 
Clean Energy for All Europeans, more commonly known as The Winter Package, is the latest 
contribution on changes to the European energy market, from the EC. The package is a 
compilation of proposals published by the EC on the 30th of November 2016 (Losch & Van 
Driessche, 2016). 
There are eight proposals; proposal for a recast of the Internal Electricity Market Directive (1), 
proposal for a recast of the Internal Electricity Market Regulation (2), proposal for a recast of 
the ACER Regulation (3), proposal for a Regulation on Risk-Preparedness in the Electricity 
Sector and Repealing the Security of Supply Directive (4), proposal for a recast of the 
Renewable Energy Directive (5), proposal for a revised Energy Efficiency Directive (6), 
proposal for a revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (7), and finally, proposal 
for a Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union (8) (Losch & Van Driessche, 2016). 
The proposals aim to transit EU to a clean energy economy and enlighten the need to re-design 
and change operational aspects of the existing electricity market. The main scope of the 
package is to implement actions necessary to reach the climate goals set by the EU in the Paris 
Agreement6. 
The package can be divided into three categories; proposals amending existing legislations in 
the energy market, proposals amending existing legislations on climate change, and proposals 
for new measures. The most relevant proposals for Norwegian DSOs, electricity markets and 
end-user flexibility are proposal (1) and (2). 
The first proposal discusses a new market design, and the roles of participants (European 
Commission, 2017b). The proposition seeks to better adapt to the future electricity market, 
fueled by more variable and decentralized production, increased cooperation and transparency 
                                                 
6 http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php  
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for cross border transmission and trading. The proposal also highlights the need to incentivize 
active end-user participation in electricity markets.  
Consumers should be allowed to enter contracts and agreements with aggregators and 
providers of flexibility measures without having to seek permission from suppliers or 
operators. Prosumers are encouraged to participate directly, or through aggregators, in 
wholesale and flexibility markets. The aggregators should be treated in a non-discriminatory 
manner based on their technical capabilities, and will not be required to pay compensations to 
suppliers or generators. The installation of AMI increases competitiveness for businesses and 
allow for more active end-users to help control their electricity costs (European Union, 2012). 
The legislative proposals discuss smart metering data. Each country must define which parties 
that have access to consumption data and metering. 
The first proposal also highlights the role of the DSO. The proposal aims to clarify the role of 
DSOs in providing network services suitable for flexibility, storage and recharging points for 
EV’s. The DSOs are incentivized to improve their system for better utilization of flexible end-
users. This includes increased distributed generation, demand-side response programs, local 
storage solutions and energy efficiency initiatives. The proposal states that DSOs should be 
compensated accordingly, and must specify standardized market products for their services. 
Although DSOs are encouraged to embrace technologies such as storage, end-user flexibility 
and EV charging, they are expected not to provide these services. For example, DSOs should 
facilitate EV charging infrastructure, but can only own, develop, manage or operate charging 
points if regulators allow them to. Regulators can only allow the former if no other third party 
expresses an interest in taking on this responsibility. 
The second proposal discusses the different regulatory measures set to improve the internal 
market for electricity (European Commission, 2017c). The importance of dynamic pricing of 
electricity, and how trading in the wholesale markets prevents introduction of capping of 
wholesale prices is highlighted. By implementing correct pricing mechanisms, the 
Commission aims to increase investment interest in new generation, capacity and end-user 
flexibility. 
Rules on balancing markets for energy and capacity are introduced, including the need for free 
access to all participants individually or by aggregation. This will enable end-user flexibility 
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and storage as alternative balancing mechanisms. Market participants should also be 
responsible for any imbalance they cause.  
As an additional part of the Winter Package, the Commission also released a report on capacity 
mechanisms, known as Final Report of the Sector Inquiry on Capacity Mechanisms (European 
Commission, 2016). This report is not one of the eight proposals, but is interesting to discuss 
in terms of end-user flexibility. The European Parliamentary Research Service define Capacity 
mechanisms as administrative measures to ensure the achievement of the desired level of 
security of supply by remunerating generators for the availability of resources (Erbach, 2017).  
In addition to intermittency challenges from renewable electricity generation, many countries 
experience critically low investment rates in generation to meet peak demand. There are not 
only challenges on the supply side of the electricity market, higher loads from more power 
demanding devices must be balanced out by operators. Capacity mechanisms are common 
tools to meet these challenges, but are costly and not fully utilized in normal operations. 
To handle the challenges associated with capacity mechanisms, the Commission appeals for 
an assessment of all new capacity mechanisms before establishment. One criteria states that 
the objective of the measure must be of common interest, meaning that it must sort out a long- 
or short-term generation adequacy problem. Existing measures will generally support short-
term adequacy, whilst long-term adequacies will generally appeal for new investment. End-
user flexibility is a possible measure to resolve short-term adequacy related to certain hours, 
a day or even a month. However, the Commission stress that any payments for flexibility must 
not turn into subsidies for energy-intensive consumers. Capacity mechanism should be open 
to all capacity providers, both domestic and foreign, and especially new entrants. 
4.2 Norwegian Regulations and Legislations 
4.2.1 Natural Monopoly 
It would not be optimal for society to have competition on electricity distribution and 
transmission, contrary to economic the benefits of having competition between electricity 
retailers. Competition amongst DSOs would lead to overinvestments in the network systems. 
Due to this aspect, electricity networks at all levels in Norway are natural monopolies. The 
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monopolistic situation results in network operators being subject to strict governmental 
regulations. The Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Directorate7 (NVE) is the national 
regulatory authority in Norway, and is a directorate governed by the Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy8. Policy instruments are used to ensure socially efficient operation, high 
levels of utilization and development of the network. The regulations are divided into direct 
and economic revenue regulations, and compliance monitoring. Direct regulations set a 
framework for operations and definition of roles, whilst compliance monitoring ensures 
operators abides regulations. The regulations on economic revenue make sure that operators 
provide a stable and secure service in a socially efficient way. In Norway, all DSOs and the 
TSO are regulated by NVE (NVE, 2017d). 
4.2.2 Revenue regulation 
To promote efficient energy markets and cost-effective energy systems, a revenue cap 
regulation was introduced by NVE in 1997. The revenue cap regulation is part of the regulation 
on economic and technical reporting, revenue cap for network operators and tariffs (Olje- og 
Energidepartementet, 2017). It determines what income a company can expect and how they 
should adjust their network tariffs accordingly. The revenue cap covers the network operator’s 
costs and give a reasonable return on assets under the assumption of efficient operation, 
reasonable maintenance and network development. When calculating a company’s cost-
efficiency, the regulatory uses a benchmarking method known as Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) (NVE, 2017e). 
Bogetoft and Otto (2011) define benchmarking as the relative performance of evaluations and 
the systematic comparison of production entities. A general explanation of the theory behind 
the DEA is included in the next sections, before focusing on how DEA is applied to Norwegian 
network operators. 
                                                 
7 www.nve.no  
8 https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/id750/ 
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4.2.3 Data Envelopment Analysis  
Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) is defined as a mathematical programming method for 
estimating best practice production frontiers and evaluating the relative efficiency of different 
entities (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011). Every DEA begins by finding a feasible production area for 
the technology in the market. The area is found by using minimal extrapolation to locate the 
smallest production area that still includes all the data (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011). 
 
Figure 4-1: Possible Production Area (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011, p. 26) 
The dots in figure 4-1 shows how much output, y, a company produce with input, x. The most 
efficient companies are located on the outer line as they produce the most output at their 
respective input. These companies establish the efficiency frontier, and are denoted reference 
companies. These companies are considered 100 percent efficient and the rest of the 
companies in the industry are measured against them. If the figure represents an entire 
industry, all companies will be located either on the frontier or in the dotted area below. It is 
important to separate productivity and efficiency. Productivity can be explained as a 
company’s absolute performance, whilst efficiency can be interpreted as the relative 
performance (Bjørndal, Bjørndal, & Fange, 2010). Bogetoft and Otto define efficiency as 
actual performance divided by optimal performance (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011). 
The DEA measure technical efficiency by measuring the distance between a specific company 
and a reference company along the frontier. 
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Figure 4-2: Technical Efficiency (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011, p. 27) 
Technical efficiency is either input- or output driven. Input driven efficiency is the difference 
in use of input between the specific company, x, and that of a reference company, x*, at a 
given production volume (x,y). Output driven efficiency is defined as the amount produced by 
the specific company at a given amount of input, y, compared to that of a reference company, 
y* (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011). 
There are some assumptions necessary for DEA. The first assumption is free disposability. 
This means that if a company can produce a given output at a given input, they can also 
produce similar, or a smaller, output with a higher input than originally. In figure 4-3 below 
we see that a company located in point 3 still lies within the allowed production area if it 
increases its input and/or reduce their output, resulting in point 2, 4 and 5 all being feasible. 
However, this would not be optimal as they provide a lower, or similar, output at a higher 
input (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010) 
 
Figure 4-3: Free Disposability (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011, p. 12) 
The second assumption is convexity. If two combinations of inputs and outputs are feasible, 
then any mixture of the two is also feasible. By combining inputs and outputs, the possible 




Figure 4-4: Free Disposability and Convexity (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011, p. 12) 
A frontier represented by the full lines between the three reference companies, 1, 3 and 6 is 
shown in Figure 4-4. Production point 2 show that it is possible to produce the same output 𝑦2 
at a lower input 𝑥2
∗. Similarly, it is possible to produce a higher output 𝑦2
∗ at the current input, 
𝑥2. The former reflects input efficiency, whilst the latter reflects output efficiency. The final 
assumption necessary is the option of scaling operations. This assumption is based on the 
reasonability that if a production plan is feasible, it is likely that one can produce somewhat 
fewer (more) outputs with somewhat fewer (more) inputs. Different assumptions can be made 
about the scalability options, but the two most common assumptions are constant returns to 
scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS). Both are displayed in the figures below. 
 
Figure 4-5: CRS & VRS (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011, p. 87) 
 
In the case of CRS, an increase in input will generate a proportional increase in output. VRS 
assumes that the output will increase relatively less than the increase in input. Considering 
company B in figure 4-5, output increase proportionally with increased input in CRS. On the 
other hand, considering company B in figure 4-6, increasing input will cause a relatively 





Figure 4-6: Technical Efficiency Under CRS and VRS (Bjørndal, et al. 2010, 
p. 324) 
Figure 4-7 displays all assumptions in one figure. The combination of free disposability and 
convexity creates a VRS frontier, A’ABCC’, where company A, B and C are reference 
companies. By evaluating company D and considering the VRS frontier to be correct, the 
company’s data point is not located on the frontier. Figure 4-7 displays two common 
directions, vertical (output) and horizontal (input). Beginning with the output direction, the 
reference point for company D will be N. The output efficiency can be calculated as MD/MN. 
The higher this value is, the more efficient the company is. For input direction, the reference 
point for company D will be R. The input efficiency can then be calculated as PR/PD.  
The assumption on scaling operations have an impact when calculating efficiency. When 
considering the CRS frontier instead of the VRS, the entire front is shifted upwards, except 
for in point B. By re-evaluating company D, the reference point in the output direction is now 
O, with output efficiency calculated as MO/MD. For the input direction, the new reference 
point is Q, with input efficiency calculated as PQ/PD. With CRS, output and input efficiency 
will be equal (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011). This highlights that CRS will give higher (lower), or 
equal, efficiency measures for output (input) compared to VRS. 
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4.2.4 The Regulatory Model for Norwegian DSOs 
The Revenue Cap in Distribution Networks 
The following sections will give an interpretation of the revenue cap model for distribution 
networks (NVE, 2017f). The revenue cap model for regional and transmission networks are 
similar, but differ in terms of complexity and output variables. Many network operators 
operate within both the distribution and regional network level, whilst only a few companies 
have costs on the transmission level. 
The revenue cap for the forthcoming year is notified by NVE in November the year in advance, 
and network operators set their tariffs accordingly. All data, results and calculations are 
published to ensure transparency and understanding of the methodology. Only power prices, 
inflation, and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) can cause deviation between 
notified and final Revenue cap for a year, these are merely estimated in the notification. Any 
cost errors or technical data discovered in hindsight are also corrected in the final edit. The 
Revenue cap is calculated based on actual total costs from two years back, adjusted for 
inflation, and a cost norm. 
Mathematically, the Revenue cap model can be written as follows: 
𝑅𝐶𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌) × 𝐶𝑡 + 𝜌 × 𝐶𝑡
∗ 
𝑅𝐶𝑡 is the revenue cap for period 𝑡, 𝐶𝑡 is the cost recovery based on the company’s own costs, 
denoted the cost basis, whilst 𝐶𝑡
∗ is the cost norm calculated after the the DEA. 𝜌 is a norm 
share with a value between 0 and 1. In Norway, 𝜌 is equal to 0.6, resulting in the model giving 
a 40 percent cost recovery part based on the company’s own costs, and 60 percent cost norm 
resulting from a benchmarking model. The size of 𝜌 reflects the efficiency focus of the RC-
model, and influence network operator’s investment decisions. Increasing 𝜌 will increase the 
weight of benchmarking in the model, and increase the focus on efficiency (Amundsveen & 
Kvile, 2015). 
The formula for the cost basis can be written as follows: 
𝐶𝑡 = (𝑂𝑀𝑡−2 + 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑡−2) × (
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−2
) + 𝑁𝐿𝑡−2 × 𝑃𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡−2 + 𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑡−2 × 𝑟𝑁𝑉𝐸 
 46
Where 𝑂𝑀𝑡−2 are operation and maintenance costs from two years back, 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑡−2 is the value 
of lost load for consumers from two years back, both the previous are adjusted for change in 
the consumer price index (CPI). 𝑁𝐿𝑡−2 is the transmission loss from two years back, multiplied 
with the reference price on power, 𝑃𝑡, measured as volume weighted average system price per 
MWh on the power exchange over the year. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡−2 are the yearly depreciations from two 
years back. This measure is included to increase investment incentives (Amundsveen & Kvile, 
2015). 𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑡−2 is the regulatory asset base from two years back, multiplied with the reference 
rate of NVE, 𝑟𝑁𝑉𝐸. The asset base is equal to the amount invested in network capital per the 
31st of December the previous year, plus 1 percent working capital. The mathematical 
calculation for the reference rate can be found in the appendix. 
Calculation of the Cost Norm 
The final factor in the Revenue Cap Model is the cost norm 𝐶𝑡
∗, which requires a more thorough 
explanation than the previous fractions due to its complexity. The cost norm is calculated in 
three steps: the DEA, a regression analysis to consider geographical differences and a final 
calibration. The DEA-model used by NVE is an input oriented model with a CRS assumption 
(Bjørndal et al., 2010). By identifying the most efficient companies, the DEA finds the 
companies that provide services using the least amount of resources. These companies form 
the efficiency frontier, and are denoted as reference companies. In the current model for 
distribution networks, the resources are represented by costs. Previously, the model hade 
multiple input variables which have later been removed. The tasks are represented by output 
variables on kilometers of high voltage power lines, number of customers and number of 
network stations. The outputs in the model differ between the regional and distributional 
network level, both in terms of variables and weighting measures. For example, a capacity 
increase at a network station in the model for regional networks will increase the output related 
to number of network stations. A similar increase in capacity in the distributional network 
model will not increase the output, because the model for distribution networks only counts 
the number of stations (NVE, 2015a). 
By using one or more reference companies, a virtual company with measurements equal to a 
weighted average of comparable reference companies, is generated. This virtual company’s 
cost will be a weighted average of the costs of one, or several, of the most comparable 
reference companies, and represents the cost level that specific company will have to acquire 
to be denoted as fully efficient (100 percent) in fulfilling their specific tasks. The cost basis of 
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a company is compared to the input of all network operators in the distribution network. The 
input is equal to the average costs over the last four years. Then, the reference companies most 
comparable to the specific company is found. For example, for a company in 2017 their cost 
basis will be based on costs from 2015, and these will be compared to the average costs of one 
or more of the reference companies in the period between 2011 and 2015. 
To simplify the explanation of the DEA-model used by NVE, two network operators are 
selected for exemplification. The network operators chosen are Agder Energi Nett AS and 
Stryn Energi AS. The DEA-data is extracted from the regulatory model tool Adaptiv provided 
by Adapt Consulting (Adapt Consulting AS, 2017). The results will be explained and 
presented in the tables below. The example will continue throughout the stepwise explanation 
of the DEA. All numbers are inn 1,000 NOK. 
 
Table 4-1: Input and output variables for Agder Energi Nett AS and Stryn Energi 
AS 
 
Table 4-1 show the input- and output variables of the two companies. We immediately see that 
the two companies differ in size, both reflected in the cost basis and the magnitude of the 
output variables.   
 
Table 4-2: Weighted comparison to reference companies for Agder Energi Nett AS 
and Stryn Energi AS 
Table 4-2 shows the first step of the DEA, where a virtual company is generated for the chosen 





Cost basis 832 712 39 025
Number of subscribers 194 426 4 681
Km of HV-lines 5 824 274





AS Eidefoss 19.47% 45.57%
Nord-Salten Kraft AS 0 % 0 %
Trøgstad Elverk AS 18.91% 45.21%
Hafslund Nett AS 61.63% 9.22%
DEA-result after step 1 87.32% 60.88%
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after step one is not the result of the shares above, but the efficiency of the respective company 
after the first step of the DEA. The virtual company of Agder Energi AS is a weighted average 
of 19.47 % of AS Eidefoss, 18.91 % of Trøgstad Elverk AS, and 61.63 % of Hafslund Nett 
AS. Similarly, the virtual company of Stryn Energi AS is a weighted average of 45.57 % of 
AS Eidefoss, 45.21 % of Trøgstad Elverk AS, and 9.22 % of Hafslund Nett AS. Note that none 
of the example companies have Trøgstad Elverk AS as a reference company. 
In the second step, the results of the DEA are adjusted for differences in their operational 
framework, to provide a more just comparison of the companies. The results are therefore 
adjusted for differences in topography, climate and network structures using regression 
analyses. When comparing companies, it is important to differ between exogenous and 
endogenous variables. Exogenous variables are variables that lie outside the company’s 
control, whilst the endogenous variables are related to choices on technology (investments) 
and organizational factors (operation). The exogenous variables in the second step of the DEA 
in distribution networks are (Amundsveen & Kvile, 2015): 
• Share of ground cables 
• Share of power lines in dense forest 
• Mountain - steepness, small scale power generation and share of airborne cables in broad-
leaved trees 
• Wind-coastal - wind conditions, distance to mainland, number of islands and share of 
undersea cables 
• Frost - snow, winter darkness, icing and temperature  
 
 
Table 4-3: Adjustment in DEA-result for difference in framework for Agder Energi 
Nett AS and Stryn Energi AS 
Table 4-3 shows how the different framework-variables impact the DEA-result for the two 
companies. Negative numbers will indicate that the company operate in easier conditions than 





Share of ground cables -6.43 % -0.04 %
Share of power lines in dense
forest
1.17 % 2.52 %
Mountain 4.46 % 11.98 %
Wind-Coastal 1.44 % -0.02 %
Frost 0.53 % -1.04 %
Adjustment step 2 1.18 % 13.41 %
DEA-result after step 2 88.50 % 74.29 %
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example, we see that both network operators have a reduction in their results from having a 
smaller share of underground cables, but also an increase from having a larger share of 
airborne power lines in dense forest than their virtual company has. Agder Energi Nett AS 
have a smaller number of islands and subsea cable and frost. For Stryn Energi AS we see that 
it have a significant increase in their DEA-result because they operate in steep landscape and 
have small-scale generation located within their area of operation. They also have an increase 
in efficiency due to share of power lines in dense forest. The three other variables cause a 
slight reduction in the efficiency. In total, both the companies have an increase in efficiency 
in the second step, because their surroundings are more demanding than for their respective 
virtual companies. 
In the final and third step of the DEA, the calibrated DEA-result is calculated. At first, the cost 
norm is re-calculated, using the expected electricity price for the present year, the expected 
reference rate of NVE, depreciations and the basis for return on assets, excluding customer 
owned assets. The reasoning for calibrating the DEA-result from the second step is to ensure 
that age differences in assets are taken into consideration, and that the average network 
operator receive a reasonable return on assets. An additional value is added to companies 
according to the book value of their asset. The calibration is necessary to give network 
operators the incentives to invest in new assets. When investing in new assets, the operator’s 
efficiency in step one of the DEA are reduced because of the investment cost. The third step 
of the DEA seeks to compensate for some of the negative effects on efficiency. In time, the 
effect of the investment will decrease because of the depreciation in asset value (Amundsveen 
& Kvile, 2015). By multiplying the company’s cost basis with the results of its DEA after the 
second step, you find the company’s DEA-norm. Adding up the DEA-norm for the entire 
industry and then subtracting the total cost basis for the industry, results in a gap between the 
two. In 2018, this gap was approximately 1.5 billion NOK (NVE, 2017g). The gap is to be 
added to the companies, and is distributed according to the company’s regulatory asset base 
divided by the industries total regulatory asset base. The larger the gap is, the greater is the 
incentive to increase assets through investments. By adding this share to the DEA-norm from 
the second step, the calibrated cost norm (calibrated DEA-norm) is obtained. When dividing 
this calibrated cost norm with the cost basis for the company, we get the final DEA-result, 
often denoted as the calibrated DEA-result. 
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Table 4-4: Calibration adjustment in DEA-result for Agder Energi Nett AS and Stryn 
Energi AS 
Table 4-4 shows how both the companies get an addition to their DEA-result from step two. 
Agder Energi Nett AS gets a larger addition to its DEA-result as company has a larger share 
of the industry’s total assets, approximately 6.83 %. By calibrating the DEA-result, the 
company’s efficiency increases from 88.50 % to 102.39 %. The company is therefore 
considered more efficient than the average company in the industry. Stryn Energi AS is a 
relatively smaller company, which means it has a smaller share of the industry’s total assets, 
approximately 0.23 %. The company’s efficiency increases from 74.29 % to 84.07 %. The 
company is therefore considered less efficient than the average company in the industry. 
Allowed Revenue 
Finally, the parts above are merged into what is known as the allowed revenue for Norwegian 
network operators. Mathematically it can be written as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝐶𝑡 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡 − 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑡 + (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡−2) + (𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑡 − 𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑡−2) × 𝑟𝑁𝑉𝐸 
Here, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑡 is the costs in overlying network and 𝐸𝑡 is the property tax. Both are added to the 
revenue cap. Note that the revenue cap (RC) in this equation includes the individual revenue 
caps from both the distribution, regional and transmission network. The value of lost load for 
consumers 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑡 is subtracted from the equation. This value of VoLL can also be read as the 
quality adjusted revenue cap of energy not supplied to consumers. The VoLL is included in 
the model to incentivize network operators to focus on asset maintenance, prevent power 
outages and invest efficiently. Consumers are divided into six groups; agriculture, households, 
industry, trade and services, public services and industry with electricity driven operation. 
Each group have a rate on cost per lost load at different timeframes. Lastly, changes in 
depreciation (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡−2) and regulatory asset base (𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑡 − 𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑡−2) are added. The 





Cost basis for step 3 771 144 37 315
DEA-norm 682 436 27 721
Share of the industry's base
for return on assets
6.83 % 0.23 %
Addition to norm 107 171 3 649
Cost norm 789 607 31 371
DEA-result after step 3 102.39 % 84.07 %
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regulatory asset base are included to remove time lag for investments due to the costs used for 
calculating the revenue cap being two years old (NVE, 2017d).  
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5. Investment Case, Skagerak Nett 
This chapter includes a discussion of the economic effects of how end-user flexibility can be 
used to defer investments in capacity increasing components. The data and case will be 
presented individually. The case outline and costs are provided by Skagerak Nett9, and are 
useful to highlight the economic effect of utilizing end-user flexibility. Certain assumptions 
and modifications are made to adjust the case to the scope of our thesis and to make it 
applicable to analysis in the context of the regulatory model for distribution networks.  
5.1 Case Presentation 
The data is derived from a regional network substation in the southern part of Norway. This 
circuit is connected to several distribution networks. We denote these underlying distribution 
networks. The regional network supplies approximately 6,000 end-users. About 85 percent are 
residential consumers, whilst the rest are a mix of commercial, industrial, agricultural and 
public-sector consumers. 
The investment case looks at a reinvestment in two transformers to increase capacity at a 
transformer station. When malfunctions occur in a major component at a transformer station, 
network operators rely on sufficient reserve capacity as a backup. The backup must be 
constantly available. The reserves in the case are supplied either through the other transformer 
on the respective station, through reserves in the underlying networks, or through end-user 
flexibility. The first solution requires free capacity on the second transformer. The maximum 
load at the station is not the typical load. The station might be operating well below the 
maximum capacity at all days of the year, except one. If a malfunction occurs on a day of the 
year when the transformer operates at full capacity, it can result in outages if there are not 
substantial reserves in the network. It is important to note that one transformer can supply all 
consumers if the other malfunction, in most hours of the year. The use of end-user flexibility 
in case of malfunction is only desirable if a malfunction occurs at a day when load usage is 
high. 
                                                 
9 http://www.skagerakenergi.no/eway/nett.html 
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The station considered in the case has historically operated at full capacity on several days 
during the year. The network operator can change connection to reserves in the underlying 
network. Both transformers are approximately 28 years old in 2017. The technical lifespan of 
the transformers is approximately 50 years. Because of increasing power usage in critical 
hours amongst consumers, the transformers must be upgraded to increase capacity before their 
technical lifespan is over. Changing a transformer early has a cost, as the full value of the 
transformer is not realized. The transformer is depreciated over 25 years. Which year this 
investment is undertaken traditionally depends on the predicted load increase. In the analysis, 
Skagerak Nett studied how utilizing end-user flexibility as a reserve can help defer 
investments. Using end-user flexibility in case of component malfunctions and peak hour 
management during normal operational periods are both discussed in the case.  
5.2 Investment and End-User Flexibility Cases 
The analysis discusses four cases, one traditional investment case and three cases with end-
user flexibility. To increase the complexity of the analysis, we include two different scenarios 
where end-user flexibility is utilized, and two different flexibility volumes. Lastly, we include 
three load increase prediction levels. In this section, we present the cases, scenarios, flexibility 
volumes and load increase prediction before analyzing their desirability. 
Case 1: Investing in capacity increase without utilizing end-user flexibility 
Case 2: Compensating flexible end-users through discount in tariffs  
Case 3: Compensating flexible end-users through an availability payment of 20.000 NOK per 
MWh and activation payment of 20.000 NOK per MWh 
Case 4: Compensating flexible end-users through an activation payment of 30.000 NOK per 
MWh 
In Case 1, capacity is increased by investing in two new transformers on the station. The 
investment is undertaken in the year when the N-1 criteria is no longer met, which in this case 
is 2019 (year 1). The investment ensures the capacity needed to handle peak loads and normal 
operations. This can be considered the traditional capacity increasing solution for a network 
operator today. 
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Case 2 to 4 utilize end-user flexibility to defer the investment in new transformers. In these 
cases, transformer capacity is primarily used to supply prioritized loads. Using end-user 
flexibility is acceptable to the network operator if disconnecting or curtailing flexible end-
users guarantee supply of all non-flexible consumers in case of malfunction. The three 
flexibility cases differ in terms of compensation rates. The rates are tentative, but are set 
according to an estimate the network operator uses for cost of VoLL. The rough estimate used 
by the network operator is 50.000 NOK per MWh, and can be considered an opportunity cost. 
The cost of VoLL vary between consumer segments. Based on this estimate, the values for 
availability and activation are chosen as lower values. The costs amount to 20.000 NOK per 
MWh for availability and 20.000 NOK per MWh for activation in Case 2, and 30.000 NOK 
per MWh for activation in Case 3. It is worth noting that we denote payments in costs per 
MWh to reflect the set up in the investment case provided by Skagerak Nett. For example, a 
cost of 30,000 NOK per MWh is equal to 30 NOK per kWh. The magnitude of this payment 
can be argued as large, but is used as an average based on flexibility being provided from 
different segments, with different valuation of electricity. The magnitude of the compensation 
payments is an average for all end-users in this case, but is likely to differ between end-user 
segments in reality. 
We introduce two different scenarios where end-user flexibility is utilized 
Scenario 1: Ensure sufficient capacity in transformers to handle normal operations and peak 
loads. End-user flexibility is only utilized as a reserve in case of component malfunction on a 
transformer.  
Scenario 2: Ensure sufficient capacity in transformers to handle normal operations. End-user 
flexibility is utilized to handle peak loads and as a reserve in case of component malfunction 
on a transformer. 
Scenario 2 includes a more extensive application of end-user flexibility, whilst Scenario 1 
requires capacity-increasing investments at an earlier stage to handle peaks in normal 
operations. Some of the prioritized loads in the two scenarios are also managed by redirecting 
currents and reserves in underlying networks.  
Furthermore, the analysis considers three different load increase predictions (34, 16 and 0 
percent) and two different flexibility volumes (F1 and F2). F1 includes consumers that are 
already flexible to the TSO. The existing flexible end-users are connected at both the regional 
 55 
and distribution network level. Existing flexibility therefore provide a feasible flexibility 
option at distribution network level. F2 also includes a tentative flexibility from households, 
in addition to the existing flexibility. The tentative household flexibility assumes that 33 
percent of all households adjust their consumption by 1.5 kW in hour 8, 9, 10, 16 and 17 (peak 
hours), and 1 kW in other hours. When aggregated, household flexibility it provides 2.52 MW 
in peak hours and 1.68 MW in the other hours.  
For Case 1, the flexibility volume is irrelevant. The investment in a new transformer will be 
undertaken in year 1 independently of the flexibility volume and LIPs. For the flexibility cases, 
Case 2 to 4, both LIPs and flexibility volumes affect when the investment is undertaken. In 
total, 42 alternatives are displayed. The following section will provide a general discussion of 
the different cases, scenarios and flexibility volumes, in addition to how these react to different 
LIPs.  
5.3 Data 
The calculation of loads in the case are based on estimated load in MWh for two transformers 
on the substation. Both transformers are situated at a station included in the regional network. 
The load values are historical data from 01.01.2010 to 31.12.2016. These values are used to 
predict the load imposed on the transformers under different load increase predictions. The 
load predictions are estimated yearly from 2018 to 2040. The total load increase predictions 
are calculated as the sum of estimated yearly increases. All load increase predictions are based 
on the electricity system statement of Skagerak Nett. The data obtained have previously been 
used by Skagerak Nett to perform an analysis of the present value (PV) of different investment 
alternatives and alternatives using end-user flexibility in the regional distribution network.  
Consumption, flexibility and costs are assumed scalable at an equal rate. The analysis 
considers the cost of different alternatives of the cases relative to each other. All costs are 
downscaled equally to sustain comparability. Estimations done by Skagerak Nett on costs, 
load changes, compensation methods and malfunction probability are used to display 
economic effects at the distribution network level. There are some reserves in the underlying 
network. This allows the operator to use end-user flexibility as a reserve for a short period 
until they re-connect to the underlying network. This use-area is however not discussed further 
in the analysis.  
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An investment in a transformer with greater capacity will increase the output side of the DEA 
in the regulatory model for regional networks, since it has an additional weight rate for 
increased capacity. This is not the case in the regulatory model for distribution networks, 
which only take number of stations into account. When transferring the data and case to the 
distribution network level, this output effect is removed. The network operator would only 
have an increased output in the regulatory model for distribution networks by building a new 
network station. The changes therefore only occur on the input side (cost), and not on the 
output side (tasks). 
5.4 Cost and Load Estimates 
Skagerak Nett assume a maximum load increase prediction (LIP) of 34 percent until 2040. 
The assumed load profile is displayed in the figures below. 
 
Figure 5-1: Annual and Accumulated Load Increase Prediction 
 
After 2040, we assume a flat growth rate in load. For 16 percent LIP the figures will have the 
same shape and trend, but the values will be half of the above. For 0 percent LIP both curves 
will be flat. The different LIPs are based on expected load development in different areas. 34 
percent LIP is an estimate for urban areas, and densely populated cities. 16 percent LIP is an 
estimate for semi-urban areas like villages. 0 Percent LIP is an estimate for rural areas like 
agriculture land. The large difference between annual load increase from 2017 to 2018 is 
caused by a new firm accessing the grid. Based on historical data, the operator reports 
approximately 1.3 failures in 100 transformers a year. This amounts to 1.3 percent probability 
of a transformer failure a year. The case looks at two transformers, and the failure in one is 
independent of a failure in the other. The probability of a failure in at least one of the two is 
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therefore approximately 2.6 percent. It is assumed that all transformers can be overloaded by 
5 percent without malfunctioning. 
5.4.1 Choosing the Discount Rate 
We use real values to calculate when calculating present values and changes in the revenue 
cap. To get more accurate results when calculating change in revenue cap and efficiency, 
nominal values and rates should be used. This is because the revenue cap is calculated using 
efficiency numbers from the DEA used by NVE, as we explained in section 4.5.2. The DEA 
uses capital costs based on the book values of both the respective operator, and the other 
operators in the industry. When using book values, the effect investments has on change in 
efficiency and in revenue cap is greater in the short term, than in the long term. The calibration 
in the third step account for the age differences, by adding the gap between cost norms and 
cost basis to network operators according to their regulatory asset base. 
In our analysis, we use real values for estimating the effect different end-user flexibility cases 
has on the change in revenue cap an efficiency. One should ideally account for changes in 
book value for the entire industry as well as the operator, to get more accurate results. This is 
because the industry also reinvests and increase their book value. Because this affects the total 
value of assets for the industry, it also affects the efficiency calculation for each respective 
operator. The main scope of the thesis is however to discuss the relative effect of the different 
flexibility alternatives, not calculate the exact costs of different investment alternatives. 
The discount rate used for calculating the PV and Net Present Value (NPV) in this chapter, 
and the following, is based on the reference rate calculated by NVE (NVE, 2017h). Because 
the values in the case are real values, we exclude the inflation from the reference rate. The 
predicted reference rate for 2018 is 5.88 percent including inflation. When removing inflation 
from the nominal rate, we get a real rate of 4.88 percent. Note that the RC-model tool uses the 
reference rate when calculating the revenue cap. When discounting the values, it is reasonable 
to use the expected rate of return, which in the long term should be equal to the reference rate. 
5.4.2 Investment costs 
The investment costs consist of the price of a new transformer, the cost of installing it, the cost 
of necessary changes on the station, and the cost of moving the previous transformer. The 
operator can report installation costs and changes as operation and maintenance costs. In this 
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analysis, all costs related to the transformer is denoted as installation costs. In the original case 
from the regional network level, the current transformers on the station are two 25 MVA 
transformers with a price of approximately 4,5 million NOK each, including installation. Due 
to the expected load increase, the network operator will upgrade the transformers to two 40 
MVA transformers when the load reaches the dimensioning criterion. Network operators 
dimension their network according to the N-1 criterion. The criterion ensures that operators 
always have reserves to supply priority load in case of a malfunction in a major component. 
Priority load is all load from non-flexible end-users and the load that flexible end-users denote 
non-flexible. The price of a new 40 MVA transformer is approximately 5,5 million NOK, 
including installation. Changing transformers also impose a relocation cost on the transformers 
that are moved. There is also an additional cost of approximately 400,000 NOK per 
transformer to prepare the station for two transformers with greater capacity. The technical 
life expectancy of a transformer is 50 years, and its value is depreciated over 25 years. The 
total cost of installing two new transformers amounts to approximately 11,8 million NOK. 
In terms of downscaling the case to a distribution network level, the necessary capacity on the 
transformer decreases. To scale down the investment cost, the estimated price of 2,500,000 
for a new 10 MVA transformer is used as a basis. Because the price is approximately half of 
the price for a 40 MVA transformer in the original case, we make the simplification of 
reducing all costs by 50% when downscaling the case from a regional to distribution network 
level. This includes reducing the costs by 50% for operation and maintenance, value of lost 
load and network loss. The transformers that are moved from the station is either stored, reused 
or discarded.  
When the transformers are removed from the station, the remaining value of the transformer 
is calculated with a linear model. It is calculated as the age of the transformer subtracted from 
the total technical lifespan of a transformer (50 years), divided by the total technical lifespan. 
This share is multiplied with the purchase value and installation costs. Finally, the price for 
reinstalling the transformer at another station is subtracted. The calculation is multiplied with 
an assumed re-use rate of 2/3, estimated by the network operator. The re-use rate reflects the 
probability of reusing the old transformer when installing the new. This is a rough estimate, 
as some transformers are immediately reused, whilst others are stored or discarded. The total 
remaining value of the relocated transformer is subtracted from the total costs for the new 
investment. In situations where the investment can be postponed to the end of the case’s time 
horizon, the same calculation is done. However, in cases where the investment is deferred until 
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the end of the technical lifespan of the current transformers, the original transformers are 
discarded. The cost of reinstalling the transformer then become irrelevant. It is assumed that 
the network operator does not have any additional costs related to aggregating flexibility 
volumes, hardware or software. It is assumed that these costs are assigned a third party that 
aggregates the flexibility volume and provide it to the network operator. 
5.4.3 Operational costs 
Costs related to operation and maintenance (O&M), network loss (NL) and costs of value of 
lost load (VoLL) will be discussed in detail below. A general description of the calculation of 
costs are given, but the magnitude of the costs will differ depending on the utilization of end-
user flexibility, flexibility volumes and LIP. 
The O&M costs from normal operations are calculated for all cases. For Case 2 to 4 utilizing 
end-user flexibility, an additional O&M cost for end-user flexibility is included. O&M costs 
also include costs of switching parts to sustain enough capacity and desired reserves in normal 
operations. These are considered maintenance costs, not investment costs. Expected reparation 
costs in case of malfunctions are also included in O&M costs. The cost is found by multiplying 
the probability of malfunctions with an estimated repair cost of 10,000 NOK. The expected 
costs of flexibility activation and availability are added to O&M, and are calculated by taking 
the average activation cost multiplied with the probability of having to activate end-user 
flexibility. 
 
Figure 5-2: Change in O&M Costs Prior to Investment 
Figure 5-2 displays the change in O&M costs in the first four years, for all cases in Scenario 
2 with 34 percent LIP and F2 flexibility volume. After year four, the O&M costs for all 
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flexibility cases drop after the network operator invests in new transformers. For Case 1, the 
costs for O&M are small because the investment is undertaken in the first year. For Case 2, 
the costs are also low, because the network operator does not pay directly for flexibility. For 
Case 3 and 4, the O&M costs are large, corresponding with the network operator paying for 
both availability and activation of flexible end-user. When the flexibility volume available is 
lower, the curves for Case 3 and Case 4 lie closer to the x-axis. Similarly, if the network 
operator use flexibility less extensively, as in Scenario 1. 
Calculating the value of lost load is complex. The first step is to calculate the number of hours 
without reserves before and after activating flexibility. In the original analysis from the 
regional network, this calculation is the number of hours before connection to underlying 
networks. The probability of load curtailment is then calculated. These calculations are based 
on historical data and predictions from Skagerak Nett. The average MWh in hours without 
reserves is calculated for each year, and reflects the VoLL costs that occur if the malfunction 
happens in a critical period. A critical period is when there are not enough reserves on the 
transformers and the operator needs time to activate reserves or end-user flexibility. The 
average MWh is then multiplied with the VoLL cost per MWh, estimated to 50.000 NOK per 
MWh by the network operator. The cost of VoLL is relatively equal for the different flexibility 
cases under the two scenarios, and only vary slightly with flexibility volume. For the Case 1, 
the cost of VoLL are lower than for the flexibility cases. 
The costs of network loss are based on the thermic loss from transmitting electricity. The 
longer the investment is deferred, the more substantial the network losses are. Costs related to 
network loss are therefore greater for the scenarios with 16 percent LIP, as the investment is 
deferred for a longer period. The network losses are also greater in the first scenario where use 
of end-user flexibility is limited to cases of malfunction. In this situation, the network operator 
handles peak loads in normal operation by switching capacity. This switching imposes greater 
network losses than using flexibility. The explanation for the increase in costs for network loss 
is an increase in thermic loss. When the load increases and end-user flexibility is activated, 
the operator redirect the priority load of some end-users from other transformer stations in the 
network, to ensure sufficiency capacity in normal operations. These stations are located further 
away from the end-users, increasing the distance electricity travels and therefore the thermic 
loss. When LIP is 0 percent the costs of network loss is zero, because it is unnecessary for the 
operator to redirect currents from other stations. 
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Figure 5-3: Cost of Network Loss in Case 2 
Figure 5-3 displays the costs of network loss for Case 2 (C2) with 16 percent LIP, in the two 
Scenarios (S1 & S2) and with different flexibility volumes (F1 & F2). The costs for network 
loss increase with the yearly load increase, and drops when the investment is undertaken. The 
curves for Scenario 1 (S1) with F1 and F2 flexibility volume are overlapping. This is because 
the network operator must redirect more priority load when peak loads in normal operations 
are not managed by flexibility. The curves for Scenario 1 are therefore identical, because they 
are independent of the flexibility volume. For Scenario 2 (S2), the network operator must 
redirect more priority load if they have less flexibility available. The cost of network loss 
therefore decreases when households are included in the flexibility volume. 
The compensation cost of end-user flexibility differs between the cases. In Case 2, the operator 
will not issue a direct payment. The compensation method is based on a tariff discount. 
Subsequently, this tariff will not be reflected as a direct payment in the value stream. The 
compensation to flexible end-users will be in the shape of lower network tariffs. For Case 3 
where the operator pays for availability and activation, there will be an additional cost added 
to O&M. For the availability, they will pay a cost for flexibility calculated by multiplying the 
total available flexibility in MWh with the given availability cost. In our case, it is set to 20.000 
NOK per MWh. The calculation of the activation is different for Scenario 1 and 2. For Scenario 
1, the calculation looks at the cost of flexibility activation to function as a reserve in case of 
component malfunctions. This cost is based on the product of the probability for activation 
and the average activation cost in case of malfunction. For Scenario 2, the calculation for 
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flexibility activation to handle peaks in normal operation is added to the cost of using end-user 
flexibility in case of malfunctions. The cost of using flexibility to manage peak loads in normal 
operations is calculated as the total lack of capacity (MWh) caused by peaks loads multiplied 
with the activation cost of 20.000 NOK per MWh. The probability for activation is in this case 
equal to the probability for malfunction. 
 
Figure 5-4: Annual Present Value Flow for All Cases in Scenario 2 
 
Figure 5-4 displays annual PV flow for the Case 1 to 4, in Scenario 2 with 34 LIP and F2 
flexibility volume. The PV-flows are calculated backwards from year 22. The negative PV 
reflects the remaining value of the transformers being calculated and subtracted from the cost 
in year 22. The annual PV is calculated as the value of the next years PV discounted with one 
year, added to the sum of cost in the current year. For Case 1, the PV increase in year 1 
indicates the year the investment occurs. For Case 2 to 4, the investment is deferred until year 
5. In Case 2, the cost of end-user flexibility is not reflected in a direct payment. The yearly PV 
therefore decrease from year 5 to year 0. In Case 3 and 4, the network operator issues a direct 
payment when using end-user flexibility. This cause an increase in PV from year 5 to 0, mainly 
caused by the change in costs of O&M that we saw in figure 5-2. 
 63 
5.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Compensation Payments 
The compensation method has a large impact on the economic benefits of utilizing end-user 
flexibility. To evaluate what effect the magnitude of the compensation payments has, we 
conduct a sensitivity analysis. The analysis studies how the PV in the different alternatives 
change if the compensations payment is changed. We study how a 10 and 20 % increase and 
reduction influence the PV respectively. 
 
Table 5-1: Changes in PV by Change in Compensation Rate for Case 3 
Table 5-1 shows how changes in the compensation rate affect the PVs in Case 3. The change 
in compensation payments includes a percentage change in both the availability and activation 
simultaneously. The table shows that the effect of a price change in the alternatives with 34 % 
LIP have little effect on the PV, especially in Scenario 1. In Scenario 1, flexibility is only used 
to manage malfunctions. Since end-user flexibility is utilized less extensively, the impact of a 
change in payment for availability and activation therefore have a small impact on the PV. 
When flexibility is used more extensively, the effect of a change in compensation rate 
increases. The change in PV in both scenarios increase with increased flexibility volume. This 
reflects that the availability cost increase when more flexibility becomes available. In the cases 
with 34 % LIP, the investment is deferred by 3 years with F1 flexibility volume, and 4 years 
with F2 flexibility volume. The increase in compensation rate will therefore only affect the 
PV of the alternatives in years prior to the investment. 
In the alternatives with 16 % LIP, we see that the changes in compensation rate have a larger 




Volume -20 % -10 % 0 10 % 20 %
S1 - F1 -1 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 1 %
S1 - F2 -2 % -1 % 0 % 1 % 2 %
S2 - F1 -2 % -1 % 0 % 1 % 2 %
S2 - F2 -5 % -2 % 0 % 2 % 5 %
S1 - F1 -7 % -3 % 0 % 3 % 7 %
S1 - F2 -8 % -4 % 0 % 4 % 8 %
S2 - F1 -15 % -7 % 0 % 7 % 14 %
S2 - F2 -17 % -9 % 0 % 9 % 17 %
S1 - F1 -11 % -6 % 0 % 6 % 11 %
S1 - F2 -13 % -6 % 0 % 6 % 13 %
S2 - F1 -18 % -9 % 0 % 9 % 18 %
S2 - F2 -18 % -9 % 0 % 9 % 18 %





as in the alternatives with 34 % LIP. The explanation for the greater effect on PV compared 
to 34 % LIP is that the investment is deferred by 22 years. End-user flexibility is utilized for 
a longer period, which in terms makes the PV more sensitive to changes in compensation rate. 
The same is reflected in the change in PV for the alternatives with 0 % LIP. The effect is 
however stronger relatively to the basis PV in these alternatives. The PV is more sensitive to 
the compensation rate, since the costs related to network loss are zero in Scenario 1, and 
constant for the entire time span in Scenario 2. In comparison, the cost of network loss 
increases throughout the period with 16 percent LIP in Scenario 1, whilst it remains constant 
throughout the period in the same Scenario with 0 percent LIP. This is a result of the network 
operator having to do less redirection of priority loads when the load increase is flat. 
 
Table 5-2: Change in PV by Change in Compensation Method for Case 4 
Table 5-2 show how changes in compensation rate affect the different PVs in Case 4. For all 
the different LIPs in Scenario 1, a change in compensation rate has little to no impact on the 
change in PV. This can be explained by the compensation method. Since the network operator 
only pays for activation, there are no costs for having end-user flexibility available. For 
Scenario 2, we see similar patterns as we saw in the sensitivity analysis of Case 3. When the 
utilization of flexibility and volume increase, the PV become more sensitive to the 
compensation rate. As in Case 3, the length of the investment deferral also has a large impact 
on the sensitivity for changes in compensation rate. 
To summarize, the alternatives where the investment is deferred for a longer period are more 




Volume -20 % -10 % 0 10 % 20 %
S1 F1 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
S1 F2 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
S2 F1 -1 % -1 % 0 % 1 % 1 %
S2 F2 -5 % -2 % 0 % 2 % 5 %
S1 F1 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
S1 F2 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
S2 F1 -14 % -7 % 0 % 7 % 14 %
S2 F2 -17 % -9 % 0 % 9 % 17 %
S1 F1 -1 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 1 %
S1 F2 -2 % -1 % 0 % 1 % 1 %
S2 F1 -18 % -9 % 0 % 9 % 18 %
S2 F2 -18 % -9 % 0 % 9 % 18 %
16
0
Percentage Change in Compensation Rate
34
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in compensation rate for all alternatives, as the PV is also affected by investment costs, cost 
of network loss and cost of VoLL. For the alternatives with 16 and 0 % LIP, the costs of 
network loss have the largest impact besides changes in O&M costs, especially in scenario 2. 
5.5 Results 
The downscaled present value (PV) of the costs streams will be used when discussing the 
results of the analysis. Because all costs are equally downscaled, the relations and comparisons 
remain equal to those of the original case at the regional network level. The PV is calculated 
using the formula: 






Complete downscaled cost streams can be found in the Appendix. Table 5-1 display the 
downscaled PVs of the different alternatives. 
 
Table 5-3: Present Values of Different Cases and Alternatives 
Both scenarios are presented with different LIPs and different volumes of flexibility. Since the 
analysis look at the PV of costs, a low PV is preferred by the network operator. To discuss the 
possible cost savings of the different flexibility alternatives, it is of interest to consider each 
alternative relative to the investment scenario, Case 1. Table 5-3 show the PVs of the different 




34 % 16 % 0 % 34 % 16 % 0 %
1 - 4384 4382 4382 4384 4382 4382
F1 4079 1828 687 3796 712 238
F2 3960 1816 680 3570 550 292
F1 4272 2745 1611 4128 2666 2591
F2 4308 3067 1969 4618 4431 3079
F1 4081 1840 709 4006 2280 2404
F2 3967 1816 737 4626 4495 2596
3
Scenario 1 Scenario 2





Table 5-4: Present Values of Different Cases as a Share of Investment 
Case 1 serves as the benchmark for all flexibility alternatives. The investment occurs in year 
one, and supply all end-users. Costs related to O&M and VoLL are low for the entire period. 
There are no costs related to network loss. Because the present value of the investment 
alternatives is close to identical for all scenarios, PVs of flexibility alternatives will be 
discussed and compared across rows and columns. 
For all end-user flexibility alternatives with 16 or 0 percent LIP, the investment is deferred 
with 22 years. With 34 percent LIP, the investment is deferred until with 3 years with F1 
flexibility volume, and 4 years with F2 flexibility volume. The investment years for the 
different alternatives in the cases are displayed in the table below. 
 
Table 5-5: Investment Year for Different Cases in Different Alternatives 
In Case 2, flexible end-users are compensated through a tariff discount. The PV-shares are all 
below 100 percent, implying that all the alternatives are less costly than the investment 
alternative. A higher flexibility volume benefits the network operator in Case 2, since the 




34 % 16 % 0 % 34 % 16 % 0 %
1 - 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
F1 93 % 42 % 16 % 87 % 16 % 5 %
F2 90 % 41 % 16 % 81 % 13 % 7 %
F1 97 % 63 % 37 % 94 % 61 % 59 %
F2 98 % 70 % 45 % 105 % 101 % 70 %
F1 93 % 42 % 16 % 91 % 52 % 55 %
F2 90 % 41 % 17 % 106 % 103 % 59 %
3
4
Scenario 1 Scenario 2





34 % 16 % 0 % 34 % 16 % 0 %
1 - 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019
F1 2022 2040 2040 2022 2040 2040
F2 2023 2040 2040 2023 2040 2040
F1 2022 2040 2040 2022 2040 2040
F2 2023 2040 2040 2023 2040 2040
F1 2022 2040 2040 2022 2040 2040




Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Load Increase Prediction Load Increase Prediction
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imposed as a tariff discount, the operator does not issue a direct payment to consumers. In this 
case, the flexibility is not reflected in O&M costs. In Case 2, the flexibility payment is imposed 
as a redistribution of network tariffs between flexible and non-flexible consumers. The effect 
of the redistribution will be discussed further in the next chapter. Having access to F2 
flexibility instead of F1, reduces the PV for all alternatives, except for the alternative with 0 
percent LIP in the second scenario. In this alternative, a switch of capacity is necessary to 
ensure supply of priority load in the second year which adds a cost to O&M in year one. Figure 
5-5 displays the differences in PV of Case 2 in Scenario 1 and 2, with different flexibility 
volumes. The blue line reflects the PV of Case 1. 
 
Figure 5-5: Comparison of PV for Case 2 in Both Scenarios and Case 1 
From Figure 5-5, we see how Case 2 compare to the base investment case of Case 1. We 
observe that the PV is lower in all alternatives of Case 2 compared to Case 1. This is the case 
for both scenarios, both flexibility volumes and all LIPs. We also observe that F2 is the 
preferred flexibility volume for all LIPs, except 0% LIP in Scenario 2. 
We also observe that end-user flexibility is more beneficial in Scenario 2 than Scenario 1, 
where it is utilized more extensively. In Scenario 2, end-user flexibility is used to both handle 
peaks in normal operation and in case of malfunction. Because the cost of flexibility is not 
directly reflected in the cost stream, costs related to handling peak loads are reduced. Based 
on the observations, it seems beneficial for the operator to use end-user flexibility for all 
volumes and all LIPs. However, flexibility is barely beneficial for a LIP of 34 percent, and 
other aspects might make the operator choose investment in new components if the benefits 
are not notably high.  
For Case 3, where the operator compensates flexible end-users with an availability cost and 
an activation cost, we see different patterns in the PVs. The deviation between different 
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flexibility volumes are greater compared to case two. Contrary to the second case, we see that 
having more flexibility is less beneficial and impose a larger cost on the operator. This is due 
to the compensation method. When compensating all flexible consumers for being available, 
the costs for the operator increase according to the flexibility volume. In addition to 
compensating for availability, the operator compensates for activation. This increases the cost 
of end-user flexibility, and the alternatives become less beneficial the higher the LIP is. This 
is because the network operator must respond by extending the use of end-user flexibility when 
the load use increases. Figure 5-6 displays the differences in PV of Case 3 in Scenario 1 and 
2, with different flexibility volumes. The blue line reflects the PV of Case 1. 
 
Figure 5-6: Comparison of PV for Case 3 in Both Scenarios and Case 1 
From Figure 5-6, we see how Case 3 compare to the base investment case of Case 1. We 
observe that the PV in Case 3 is higher than the base investment Case 1 for both Scenario 2 
with F2 flexibility volume and 34% and 16% LIP. Furthermore, Scenario 1 with a 34% LIP is 
close to Case 1. We also observe that F1 flexibility reduces the PV for both scenarios, as the 
investment is deferred for a shorter period. Less flexibility is utilized since less is available. 
From the PVs in Case 3, we see that several flexibility alternatives are not desirable. In 
Scenario 2 and with F2 flexibility volume, the PV of the flexibility alternative is higher than 
the PV of Case 1. In Scenario 1 with 34 % LIP, the PV of Case 3 are barely lower than the PV 
of Case 1. All other PV-shares in Case 3 with 16 and 0 percent LIP, are lower than for Case 
1, but notably higher than in Case 2. The variety in economic benefit is a direct result of the 
compensation method for flexibility. Including a direct payment for availability and activation 
increases the PV-share of all the flexibility alternatives. 
In Case 4, consumers are compensated with an activation cost only. The network operator does 
not pay for availability in this alternative, but the activation cost is set higher than in Case 2. 
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In general, we see that the pattern of the PVs in scenario one is similar those in the same 
scenario in Case 2. For Scenario 2 in Case 4, we see that the PVs are more similar those in the 
same scenario in Case 4. In Scenario 1, the use of end-user flexibility is limited, as the 
probability of malfunction is low. In Scenario 2, the network operator extends the use of end-
user flexibility, and therefore experience greater costs. The cost increase mainly occurs in 
O&M costs, making the PV increase. Figure 5-7 displays the differences in PV of Case 4 in 
Scenario 1 and 2, with different flexibility volumes. The blue line reflects the PV of Case 1. 
 
Figure 5-7: Comparison of PV for Case 4 in Both Scenarios and Case 1 
 
From Figure 5-7, we see how Case 4 compare to the base investment case of Case 1. Similar 
to the observations in Case 3, we observe that the PV in Case 4 is higher than Case 1 for 
Scenario 2 with F2 flexibility volume and both 34% and 16% LIP. We observe that F1 is less 
beneficial in 34% and 16% LIP for Scenario 1, differing from the results in and Case 3, where 
F2 was less beneficial for all LIPs in both Scenario 1 and 2. It is worth noting that F2 flexibility 
volume in Scenario 2 have is much less beneficial than in Scenario 1.  
For the Case 2, the PV in Scenario 2 are lower than in Scenario 1. This means that an extensive 
use of end-user flexibility decreases the PV. This is also reflected by the benefits of having F2 
flexibility instead of F1. For Case 3 and Case 4, Scenario 2 is less desirable. In these cases, 
the cost of end-user flexibility is reflected in the cost stream, which makes deferring 
investments costlier. Because end-user flexibility is utilized to manage peak loads in addition 
to malfunction, the PV-shares also increase when end-user flexibility becomes costlier. 
Similarly, having F2 flexibility increase the PV, compared to having F1 flexibility. All 
alternatives with F1 flexibility have a PV-share below 100 percent. The alternatives with 34 
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and 16 percent LIP, and F2 flexibility in Scenario 2, is unbeneficial in Case 3 and 4. With 0 
percent LIP and F2 flexibility, the PV-shares are lower than 100. 
The PV-analysis is not sufficient to reflect the economic effect the investment decisions will 
have on the network operator. As discussed in chapter four, the revenue cap of the network 
operator is determined by the combination of a benchmarking model and a coverage of own 
costs. In the next section, the cost streams of the case are transmitted to NVE’s regulatory 
model for distribution networks. We seek to observe the relative impact different types of end-
user flexibility will have on the revenue cap and efficiency of the network operator. 
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6. End-User Flexibility in the Revenue Cap Model 
In the following chapter, the flexibility cases from Skagerak Nett presented in chapter five, 
are transferred to the regulatory revenue cap model. The previous chapter discussed 42 
different alternatives. The following chapter consider the investment case under the two 
scenarios with 34 percent load increase prediction (LIP), and under both flexibility volumes 
(F1 and F2). Since all alternatives with 16 and 0 percent LIP defer the investment until year 
2040, they are less relevant to discuss in terms of the current regulatory model. The regulatory 
model changes annually through changes in frontier companies, number of network operators, 
reference rates, electricity prices, inflation and the calibration pot. The regulatory model is 
under continuous development by NVE and affected by changes in the industry. Thus, there 
are greater uncertainties when considering investments in the long term. Discussing the 
alternatives where the investment occurs within the first 5 years in the current regulative 
environment is more certain, and we focus on analyzing the alternatives with 34 percent LIP 
under the four cases. 
6.1 Evaluating Investments in Adaptiv  
Before discussing the results from the analysis, we provide an explanation of the regulatory 
model tool, Adaptiv, used in the following chapter. The function explained is the investment 
prediction tool, which predict the effect an investment will have on a network operator’s RC, 
OR, efficiency and rate of return. The changing regulatory landscape increase the uncertainty 
of future investments. By basing the investment analysis on historical data, we can evaluate 
future outcome of investments, based on the tentative outcome from previous years. The model 
tool displays the value of change in RC, OR and efficiency today based on the outcome if the 
investment was undertaken t-2 years ago. The time lag of two years before costs are reflected 
in the model means that the latest available accounting data is from year t-2. 
Table 6-1 displays how the effect of an investment will be predicted in the model. The first 
column displays the year the effect of the investment is predicted for. The second and third 
columns shows a tentative investment depreciated linearly over 4 years. The fourth column 
display what year the model assumes the investment occurred to give a prediction of the impact 
in year t, based on historic data. 
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Table 6-1: Example of Basis Year for Investment Prediction in Adaptiv 
For example, in year t, we see what changes would have occurred if the investment was 
undertaken in year t-2. For year t+1, we see what changes would have occurred in year t if the 
investment was undertaken in year t-3. For each additional year we predict for, the book value 
is lowered with the yearly linear depreciation. This calculation method provides tentative 
future values based on the outcome of investments, had they been undertaken in a previous 
year. 
It is important to note that the model lower the tentative investment with the depreciated value. 
This prevents the model from treating the size of the investment as equal in all years. The 
yearly linear depreciation is calculated based on the size of the investment cost the year it is 
undertaken, it is therefore equal for all years. 
By doing this, we can consider the current regulatory landscape as fixed, and study how an 
investment affects predicted changes for the network operator in question. Basing predictive 
investment outcomes on what impact the investment would have had if it had been undertaken 
in previous years, is therefore an alternative to making a predictive analysis that would make 
assumptions on future industry development.  
6.2 Analysis Description 
The time horizon of the analysis is extended to year 2050. This is because the time horizon of 
depreciation exceeds year 2040 for all alternatives.  
Each case is divided into the period before and after the investment. In Case 1, the investment 
is undertaken in year one and there is no period before the investment occurs. Because the 
costs in O&M, VoLL and Network loss vary between years, we calculate an arithmetic mean 
with the value from the first and last year, and one year in the middle. For Case 1, cost values 







t 75 25 t - 2
t + 1 50 25 t - 3
t + 2 25 25 t - 4
t + 3 0 25 t - 5
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is deferred for 3 years, and the costs in year 1, 2 and 3 are used to calculate the average. In the 
alternatives with F2 flexibility volume the investment is deferred for 4 years, and the costs in 
year 1, 3 and 4 are used. Note that using the second year instead of the third have a minimal 
impact. An average is not calculated for the investment cost, as it is a one-time cost. The 
individual costs are then used as an input in the model, to see what effect the different 
alternatives have on the change in the revenue cap (RC) and efficiency. To compare 
alternatives, the NPV of the change in RC is calculated for all alternatives, using the following 
formula. 







The rate of return is similar to NVE’s real rate of return, calculated to 4.88 percent. The 
assumed depreciation period of 25 years remains. In Case 1, the investment occurs in year one. 
For the flexibility alternatives where the investment is deferred, 𝐼 is equal to zero for the years 
prior to the investment. The NPVs therefore only include a change in RC because of changes 
in costs. After calculating the NPV of utilizing end-user flexibility, the NPV of the deferred 
investment is calculated and depreciated with the number of deferred years. Because the time 
horizon is extended to 2050, there will be a period with low changes in costs of O&M, VoLL 
and Network loss after the investment is fully depreciated. These years after the depreciation 
will have a small impact on the change in RC and efficiency. 
To visualize the process, an example is provided. We first provide the cost profile for the 
flexibility case where end-users are compensated with an availability cost of 20,000 NOK per 
MWh and activation costs of 20,000 NOK per MWh. Flexibility is utilized to manage peak 
loads in normal operations, and in the case of malfunctions. The flexibility volume in the 
example is F2, which includes existing flexibility and an estimated flexibility for households, 
and the LIP is 34 percent. 
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Table 6-2: Cost Profile of Case 2 in Scenario 2 with 34 Percent LIP and F2 
Flexibility Volume (numbers in 1,000 NOK) 
The cost profile displayed in table 6-2 is used as a basis for calculating the input to the 
regulatory model. The investment is deferred by 4 years until year 2023. 
 
Table 6-3: Input in the Regulatory Model for Case 2 in Scenario 2 with 34 
Percent LIP and F2 Flexibility Volume (numbers in 1,000 NOK) 
Year ∆ O&M ∆ VoLL ∆ Invest ∆ NL Sum PV
1 243.091 0.535 0 19.654 263.280 4523
2 275.749 0.622 0 19.654 296.026 4430
3 370.360 0.722 0 19.654 390.736 4300
4 289.775 0.539 0 28.676 318.990 4065
5 12.502 0.042 5880 0 5892.544 3896
6 0.003 0.053 0 0 0.056 -2076
7 0.004 0.066 0 0 0.069 -2159
8 0.005 0.079 0 0 0.084 -2246
9 0.005 0.095 0 0 0.100 -2336
10 0.006 0.112 0 0 0.119 -2429
11 0.008 0.132 0 0 0.139 -2527
12 0.009 0.153 0 0 0.162 -2628
13 0.010 0.175 0 0 0.185 -2733
14 0.011 0.200 0 0 0.212 -2843
15 0.013 0.227 0 0 0.240 -2957
16 0.015 0.259 0 0 0.274 -3075
17 0.017 0.293 0 0 0.310 -3198
18 0.018 0.322 0 0 0.340 -3327
19 0.020 0.353 0 0 0.373 -3460
20 0.022 0.384 0 0 0.406 -3599
21 0.024 0.417 0 0 0.440 -3743
22 0.026 0.454 -3894 0 -3893.520 -3894
Cost Sum Mean Sum Mean
O&M 889.20 301.08 12.72 4.18
VoLL 1.88 0.60 3.81 0.23
Network Loss 0 0
Investment 58.96 22.66 5880
At Investment & AfterBefore Investment
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6.3 Results 
When implementing the values from table 6-3, the model provides us with an output for the 
change in book value, linear depreciation, change in efficiency, change in revenue cap and 
change in operational income. 
 
Table 6-4: Output from the Regulatory Model in Case 2 in Scenario 2 with 


















2019 1 0 0 -0.04 % 158 -150 150.65
2020 2 0 0 -0.04 % 158 -150 143.64
2021 3 0 0 -0.04 % 158 -150 136.96
2022 4 0 0 -0.04 % 158 -150 130.58
2023 5 5 645 235 -0.05 % 385 149 303.39
2024 6 5 410 235 -0.05 % 374 138 281.01
2025 7 5 174 235 -0.05 % 363 127 260.05
2026 8 4 939 235 -0.05 % 351 115 239.75
2027 9 4 704 235 -0.05 % 340 104 221.43
2028 10 4 469 235 -0.04 % 329 93 204.30
2029 11 4 234 235 -0.04 % 318 82 188.28
2030 12 3 998 235 -0.04 % 306 70 172.75
2031 13 3 763 235 -0.04 % 295 59 158.79
2032 14 3 528 235 -0.04 % 284 48 145.75
2033 15 3 293 235 -0.04 % 273 37 133.59
2034 16 3 058 235 -0.04 % 261 25 121.77
2035 17 2 822 235 -0.04 % 250 14 111.22
2036 18 2 587 235 -0.04 % 239 3 101.37
2037 19 2 352 235 -0.04 % 228 -8 92.21
2038 20 2 117 235 -0.04 % 216 -20 83.29
2039 21 1 882 235 -0.04 % 205 -31 75.37
2040 22 1 646 235 -0.04 % 194 -42 68.01
2041 23 1 411 235 -0.03 % 183 -53 61.17
2042 24 1 176 235 -0.03 % 171 -65 54.50
2043 25 941 235 -0.03 % 160 -76 48.62
2044 26 706 235 -0.03 % 149 -87 43.17
2045 27 470 235 -0.03 % 138 -98 38.12
2046 28 235 235 -0.03 % 126 -110 33.19
2047 29 0 235 -0.03 % 115 -121 28.88
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 0 -1 0.00
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 0 -1 0.00
2050 32 0 0 0.00 % 0 -1 0.00
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Table 6-4 display the output from the regulatory model tool. The discount rate is set to zero in 
table 6-4. The rate will be included when the PV and NPV are calculated in table 6-4. The 
column with changes in RC is used to calculate the NPV of the changes in RC. End-user 
flexibility is utilized for 4 years. The investment is undertaken in year 2023, and the value of 
the investment is depreciated until 2047. From year 2048 to 2050, there are only the change 
in costs for O&M, VoLL and Network loss from the column named At Investment & After in 
table 6-3 that is used as input. The change in RC is therefore close to zero for the years after 
the investment is fully depreciated. 
 
Table 6-5: Present Value and Net Present Value for Case 2 in Scenario 2 
with 34 percent LIP and F2 Flexibility Volume (numbers in 1,000 NOK) 
Table 6-5 includes the change in RC and discounted change in RC for the different 












2019 1 158 150.65 3831.85 -1027.86
2020 2 158 143.64
2021 3 158 136.96
2022 4 158 130.58
2023 5 385 303.39
2024 6 374 281.01
2025 7 363 260.05
2026 8 351 239.75
2027 9 340 221.43
2028 10 329 204.30
2029 11 318 188.28
2030 12 306 172.75
2031 13 295 158.79
2032 14 284 145.75
2033 15 273 133.59
2034 16 261 121.77
2035 17 250 111.22
2036 18 239 101.37
2037 19 228 92.21
2038 20 216 83.29
2039 21 205 75.37
2040 22 194 68.01
2041 23 183 61.17
2042 24 171 54.50
2043 25 160 48.62
2044 26 149 43.17
2045 27 138 38.12
2046 28 126 33.19
2047 29 115 28.88
2048 30 0 0.00
2049 31 0 0.00
2050 32 0 0.00
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in O&M, VoLL and Network Loss. Thus, the absolute change in RC will be constant over the 
period when end-user flexibility is used to defer the investment. The value of changes in RC 
from the investment diminish towards the end of the depreciation period, since the book value 
of the investment diminishes yearly with the depreciation. Lowering the book value will lower 
the change in RC, as it is included in both the cost base and cost norm of the RC equation. 
Increasing the book value of the network operator therefore increase RC. When the changes 
in RC are discounted, the values towards the end of the period becomes lower, as they have a 
lower value today. 
When summing up the discounted changes in RC, we get the PV of the end-user flexibility 
alternative. From the table, we see that the value is 3,832 NOK. To get the NPV, we subtract 
the investment cost in the alternative, discounted for four years. Four years is the duration the 
investment is deferred. The NPV is -1,028 NOK, indicating that the project is not economically 
desirable. All the alternatives are necessary reinvestments to ensure security of supply, and do 
not increase the output of the company. Because of this, all the alternatives have a negative 
NPV-value. 
 
Figure 6-1: Change in RC and discounted RC for Case 3 in Scenario 2 with 
F2 flexibility (numbers in 1,000 NOK) 
Figure 6-1 shows the change in RC and discounted change in RC for the alternative in Case 
3, exemplified above. The figure shows that the absolute change in RC is constant from year 
1 to 4. It increases at the year of the investment, but diminishes yearly in accordance to the 
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depreciation. The discounted changes in RC are lower, as the future changes in RC have a 
lower value today. 
The change in efficiency is negative to the network operator since the input of the network 
operator increases without a corresponding increase in output. The network operator therefore 
increases costs to fulfill the tasks, and becomes less effective compared to its virtual company 
on the efficiency frontier. The changes in efficiency is mainly interesting to discuss in the first 
year, because of the continuous changes in the model. The use of flexibility in Case 2 under 
Scenario 2 with F2 flexibility volume reduces the efficiency by approximately 0.04 percent in 
the first year. 
6.3.1 Changes in Revenue Cap 
The discussion will now consider the different cases under the two scenarios. All NPV are 
calculated in the same manner as in the previously explained example.  
 
Figure 6-2: Discounted Change in RC for Case 1 
Figure 6-2 displays the discounted change in RC for Case 1. We see that the investment has 
a greater influence on the change in RC in the beginning of the time period, and that the 
change diminishes towards the end of the period in accordance with the reduction in book 
value of the investment caused by depreciation. 
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Figure 6-3: Discounted Change in RC for Case 2 
Figure 6-3 displays the change in RC when end-user flexibility is compensated by a tariff 
discount. With F1 flexibility, the investment is deferred until years 4. With F2 flexibility, the 
investment is deferred until year 5. This investment deferral depends on the flexibility 
volume, and is therefore identical for all the investment cases. We see that the change in RC 
is low for the year prior to the investment. The change in RC is lower for Scenario 2 than for 
Scenario 1. When the investment is undertaken, we get a change in RC similar to Case 1. 
However, because the investment is deferred, the discounted value of the change in RC from 
the investment is lower than for Case 1. 
 
Figure 6-4: Discounted Change in RC for Case 3 
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Figure 6-4 displays the change in RC when end-user flexibility is compensated by a direct 
payment for availability and activation. We see that the change in RC is now higher for the 
years prior to the investment, especially in Scenario 2 with F2 flexibility. The change in RC 
is higher for Scenario 2 than for Scenario 1. Having access to more flexibility is now more 
expensive to the operator, because they have a direct payment for availability and activation. 
When the investment is undertaken, we get a change in RC similar to Case 1. 
 
Figure 6-5: Discounted Change in RC for Case 4 
Figure 6-5 displays the change in RC when end-user flexibility is compensated by a direct 
payment for activation. Like in Case 3, we see that the change in RC is now higher for the 
years prior to the investment, especially in Scenario 2 with F2 flexibility. The change in RC 
is higher for Scenario 2 than for Scenario 1, and having access to F2 flexibility instead of F1 
increase the change in RC. The change in RC for Scenario 1 is low, because the use of 
flexibility limited to malfunctions. Because the network operator does not pay for 
availability, as opposed to Case 3, they do not pay for end-user flexibility unless it is used. 





Table 6-6: Net Present Value of All Alternatives with 34 percent LIP 
(numbers in 1,000 NOK) 
Table 6-6 display the NPV of all the different alternatives of all cases under both scenarios 
with 34 percent LIP and the two flexibility volumes. The NPV values are calculated as 
discounted investment cost subtracted from the sum of discounted changes in RC. Because the 
cases consider cost profiles, the alternatives with a NPV closer to zero is more desirable to the 
operator in terms of cost coverage. From table 6-6 we see that flexibility Cases 3 and 4, where 
end-users are compensated by a direct payment for flexibility, have a NPV closer to zero than 
Case 1 and 2. The regulatory model compensates for cost increases through the cost basis and 
the cost norm. The greater the cost is to the operator, the greater the change in RC. The 
alternative with the highest NPV is Case 4 in Scenario 2, with F2 flexibility. End-users are 
compensated through an activation payment, and flexibility is used both to handle peak loads 
and in case of malfunctions. The second highest NPV is for Case 3 under Scenario 2, with F2 
flexibility. Both these alternatives had the highest PV in the previous analysis in chapter five. 
Because the costs are compensated in the regulatory model, the costlier alternatives receive a 
higher reimbursement. Compared to Case 1 all flexibility cases, except Case 2 with F1 
flexibility volume in Scenario 2, have a higher NPV. Based on the observed NPV, the network 
operator can therefore receive a higher change in RC from using end-user flexibility with a 
direct payment to defer the investment. 




34 percent LIP 34 percent LIP
1 - -1586.85 -1586.85
2 F1 -1559.56 -1595.04
F2 -1473.79 -1523.57





NPV-values of Change in RC
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Table 6-7: Internal Rate of Return for All Cases With 34 Percent LIP 
From table 6-7 we see the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the different alternatives. All 
IRR are lower than the expected rate of return, which in our analysis is NVE’s reference rate. 
The alternatives with the highest IRR are in Scenario 2 with F2 flexibility in Case 3 and 4. 
Here, the IRR are close to 2 percent. The IRR in Scenario 2 for Case 3 and 4 are similar, 
which corresponds to the observations made in the PV values. For Scenario 1, the values in 
Case 2 and 4 are similar. This is also similar to the pattern observed in the analysis in the 
previous chapter. All the flexibility alternatives have a higher IRR than the investment 
alternative, indicating that using end-user flexibility to defer the investments is desirable.  
There are notable differences in the IRR between the different flexibility cases. In Case 2, 
where end-users are compensated through a tariff discount, the IRR are closest to those of 
Case 1, although higher. When including an availability and activation cost for flexibility, the 
IRR increase. The NPV is less negative when the network operator has access to household 
flexibility in addition to existing flexibility. This corresponds to the cost of end-user flexibility 
increasing when the access to flexibility volumes also increase. The same can be seen in the 
difference in IRR between the two scenarios. In Scenario 2, the operator uses end-user 
flexibility more extensively, as opposed to Scenario 1. The same observation can be made for 
Case 4, where end-users are compensated through an activation cost. With F2 flexibility 
volume, the IRR increases. Similarly, the IRR of Scenario 2 are greater than for Scenario 1 
because end-user flexibility is used more extensively. With F1 flexibility, the IRR are higher 
in Case 3 than in Case 4. This can be explained with less flexibility being available to the 
network operator. The availability cost therefore outweighs the difference in activation costs 
between the two cases, which results in higher cost for Case 3. The same is observed in F2 
flexibility in Scenario 1 being larger for Case 3 than Case 4. 




34 percent LIP 34 percent LIP
1 - 0.6351 % 0.6351 %
F1 0.7912 % 0.7248 %
F2 0.8406 % 0.7451 %
F1 0.9739 % 1.0380 %
F2 1.1816 % 1.7538 %
F1 0.7912 % 0.9264 %
F2 0.8475 % 1.8523 %






Figure 6-6: The Change in Revenue Cap in Year One for the Different 
Flexibility Cases (numbers in 1,000 NOK) 
 
Figure 6-6 shows the change in RC for year one, for the different flexibility cases under the 
two scenarios and with the different flexibility volumes. Because the weighted average of costs 
is used as input in the RC-model, the yearly change in RC from using end-user flexibility will 
remain constant for the different cases and alternatives, before the value is discounted. Figure 
6-6 show that Case 2 have the highest change in RC when end-user flexibility is only used in 
case of malfunctions (S1). When end-user flexibility is used to manage peaks in normal loads 
in addition to malfunctions, Case 4 with F2 flexibility volume is slightly higher than the same 
alternative in Case 3. The change in RC for year one corresponds with the NPVs for the 
different alternatives in the flexibility cases, displayed in table 6-6.  
The change in the operator’s rate of return (RoR) from the different cases and alternatives 
varies little. The current RoR for the operator is 7.55 percent. In the investment case, the RoR 
is reduced to 7.54 percent for the first 4 years after the investment is undertaken. For the 
flexibility cases, the RoR is 7.55 percent for the years the investment is deferred. Because the 
investment reduces the rate of return by approximately 0.01 percent more, the network 
operator can defer the reduction in RoR by 3 or 4 years, depending on the flexibility volume 
available.  
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6.3.2 Changes in Efficiency 
In addition to looking at the change in RC, we display the change in efficiency for the different 
alternatives. The change in efficiency from the project will have an impact on the future 
revenue cap of the network operator. It is important to note that Skagerak Nett is a large 
network operator, so the impact on efficiency is not very large. However, it will still be 
possible to compare the relative change in efficiency between the cases. 
 
Figure 6-7: Change in Efficiency for Case 2 in Scenario 1 
 
Figure 6-8: Change in Efficiency for Case 2 in Scenario 2 
Figure 6-7 and 6-8 display the change in efficiency for Case 2 in the two scenarios, and with 
different flexibility volumes. The figures show that the operator can defer the efficiency 
reduction of the investment by using end-user flexibility. We see from the figures that the 
























than Scenario 1. This is a result of the network operator using end-using end-user flexibility 
more extensively in Scenario 2, without having a direct payment for flexibility. 
 
Figure 6-9: Change in Efficiency for Case 3 in Scenario 1 
 
Figure 6-10: Change in Efficiency for Case 3 in Scenario 2 
Figure 6-9 and 6-10 display the change in efficiency for Case 3 in the two scenarios, and 
with different flexibility volumes. We see from the figures that the negative efficiency 
change from using end-user flexibility in Case 3 is lower for Scenario 1 than Scenario 2. 
This is a result of end-user flexibility now being costlier due to a compensation as a direct 
payment. Because the network operator uses end-user flexibility more extensively in 
Scenario 2, the reduction in efficiency is greater. Similarly, we see that the efficiency 
reduction is greater in Scenario 2 with F2 flexibility, as the network operator has more 
flexibility available to manage peak loads. 
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Figure 6-11: Change in Efficiency for Case 4 in Scenario 1 
 
Figure 6-12: Change in Efficiency for Case 4 in Scenario 2 
Figure 6-11 and 6-12 display the change in efficiency for Case 4 in the two scenarios, and 
with different flexibility volumes. We see from the figures that the negative efficiency 
change from using end-user flexibility is lower for Scenario 1 than Scenario 2. The 
explanation is the same as for Case 3, end-user flexibility now being costlier due to a 
compensation as a direct payment. Because the network operator uses end-user flexibility 
more extensively in Scenario 2, the reduction in efficiency is greater. Similarly, we see that 
the efficiency reduction is greater in Scenario 2 with F2 flexibility, as the network operator 
has more flexibility available to manage peak loads. Compared to Case 3, we see that the 
efficiency reduction in Scenario 1 is lower, because the network operator does not pay to 
have flexibility available, only to activate it. The same explains the relatively lower 




Table 6-8: Change in Efficiency for Year 1 in the Different Cases 
Table 6-8 show that the change in efficiency for the first year is greatest for Case 1, where it 
is close to 0.05 percent. The investment occurs in year one, and hence the investment cost is 
imposed on the network operator the same year.  
For the different flexibility cases, the differences in efficiency change in the years prior to the 
investment are large. The lowest efficiency change is in Case 2, where flexible end-users are 
compensated with a tariff discount. The efficiency reduction is approximately 0.006 percent 
in Scenario 1, and 0.003 percent in Scenario 2. This efficiency change is lower than for the 
other flexibility cases, because there is no direct payment to end-users for flexibility.  
For Case 3, the reduction in efficiency with F1 and F2 flexibility volume in Scenario 1, is 
approximately 0.014 and 0.018 respectively. When increasing the utilization of end-user 
flexibility in Scenario 2, the reduction in efficiency is 0.017 percent with F1 flexibility volume, 
and 0.0375 percent with F2 flexibility volume.  
The changes in efficiency for the Scenario 1 in Case 4 are similar to those in Scenario 1 in 
Case 2, approximately 0.0065 percent. However, for Case 4, we observe the largest efficiency 
reduction of all the flexibility cases in Scenario 2 with F2 flexibility volume. Here we observe 
a reduction in efficiency of approximately 0.04 percent. With F1 flexibility volume, the 
reduction is 0.012 percent. 
In all the cases in our analysis the investment will be undertaken at some point. The changes 
in efficiency of the different alternatives therefore reflect what effect the network operator 
may expect end-user flexibility to have on their efficiency in the period of deferral. Because 




34 percent LIP 34 percent LIP
1 - -0.0467 % -0.0467 %
F1 -0.0061 % -0.0028 %
F2 -0.0065 % -0.0029 %
F1 -0.0143 % -0.0171 %
F2 -0.0178 % -0.0375 %
F1 -0.0062 % -0.0120 %
F2 -0.0067 % -0.0380 %





the investment only affects the input side and not the output side of the DEA, the operator will 
be considered less efficiency in providing its tasks in all the cases.  
Based on the changes in efficiency, the case with compensation through tariff discounts is 
preferable to the operator, as it has the least negative effect on efficiency. As observed, the 
greatest efficiency reduction in the first year is in Case 1. However, the investment is 
undertaken at a later stage in all flexibility cases with 34 percent LIP. Despite the efficiency 
reduction being greater in year one for the investment case, the overall efficiency reduction 
for the whole period can be considered lower because the efficiency change in the years after 
the investment is depreciated is close to zero. Using end-user flexibility to defer the investment 
imposes a negative effect on efficiency in the short run, and may therefore have a more 
negative overall effect on efficiency, dependent on how the network operator value future 
change in efficiency. The long term predicted efficiency change is uncertain, due to changes 
in the model and the industry, so the short term predicted efficiency change are likely to be of 
greater interest to the network operator. 
6.3.3 Compensation Methods 
For the analysis in this thesis, compensation of end-users has been divided into three cases. It 
is interesting to discuss how the different compensation methods affect both the PV in chapter 
five, and the NPV and IRR from the regulatory model in this chapter. The results of the 
flexibility cases differ according to the utilization of end-user flexibility and the volume. The 
explanation of the notable differences is the effects end-user flexibility has on the 
compensation costs in the different cases. 
In Case 3 and 4, the end-users are compensated with a payment for availability and activation. 
The direct payments increase the costs of the flexibility, which causes a greater change in RC, 
and a greater reduction in efficiency change compared to Case 2. In Case 3, the cost of end-
user flexibility is greater for both flexibility volumes in scenario one, and with F1 flexibility 
volume in Scenario 2. The alternative in Case 4 with F2 flexibility volume in Scenario 2 is the 
costliest of the flexibility alternatives. The latter is reflected by the NPV of change in RC being 
the highest of all alternatives.  
In Case 2, the changes in RC when the investment is deferred, are lower. This also lower the 
efficiency reduction. The IRR is higher for all alternatives in Case 2, compared to Case 1. This 
means that the network operator can achieve a higher IRR by using end-user flexibility, 
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without having a significant reduction in efficiency. The case differs notably from the other 
flexibility cases, as there are no direct payments for flexibility. To compensate the end-user, 
the network operator redistributes the revenue cap amongst existing consumers. This will be 
reflected in lower network tariffs for flexible end-users, and higher network tariffs for non-
flexible end-users. Despite having a small increase in RC when using end-user flexibility in 
Case 2, the main change in network tariffs for consumers will have to come from the 
redistribution. When redistributing between flexible and non-flexible end-users, the larger 
share of change in RC can be expected assigned to non-flexible end-users. Despite the change 
in RC being lower for Case 2 relatively to the two other flexibility cases, some non-flexible 
end-users might experience a greater increase in network tariffs in Case 2. This compensation 
method of redistribution in network tariffs is unlikely to be accepted by end-users or the 
regulator, but can be favorable to network operators as it has the lowest impact on efficiency 
and liquidity. 
The compensation methods also impose a challenge to the neutrality principal. Negotiations 
of flexibility prices could result in a differentiation between end-users. Estimates for value of 
lost load for different consumer segments are currently used by operators. Because they differ 
notably between groups, there might have to be a regulated market place for trading flexibility, 
instead of a direct contact between the operator and customer, or between the operator and a 
third-party participant. If trading of flexibility is not regulated and standardized, the network 
operators could have incentives to prioritize end-users that accept lower prices. Since different 
end-users exhibit different consumption patterns, it can be expected that larger end-users with 
higher electricity usage will be willing to accept a lower payment per MWh or kWh of 
flexibility. One can therefore argue that household flexibility is likely to be less desirable in 
flexibility trading. It is important to note that end-users outside the local distribution network 
circuit will also be affected by a change in the revenue cap. This means that the costs of end-
user flexibility at a local distribution level in the network can increase the network tariffs for 





The European Commission stresses the need to face the challenges of the future electricity 
systems. This includes incentivizing end-user participation in electricity markets. Network 
operators are required to improve their network systems to account for flexible end-users, local 
storage and distributed generation. Meanwhile, national regulators are responsible for assuring 
functioning regulatory frameworks for market participants. The regulator must incentivize 
investments in aging infrastructure, but also put ensure that network operators investigate 
alternative technologies for load management. Academic research on utilizing end-user 
flexibility in investment decisions mainly discuss how investments in the network can be 
deferred. There is a strong academic interest in analyzing how end-user flexibility can reduce 
costs while fulfilling the strict criteria of security of supply. 
From an analysis of the present values in an investment case provided by Skagerak Nett, we 
observe possible savings related to the use of end-user flexibility. Deferring investments by 
compensating end-users with a tariff discount or direct payment was beneficial in many of the 
investigated alternatives. Overall costs for a network operator can be notably reduced in both 
managing transformer malfunctions alone, or with peak load management in addition. The 
dimension of the network is decided by peak loads that rarely occur, and end-user flexibility 
can be used in the few critical hours where capacity is challenged. Deferring the investment 
increase the utilization of existing components, and reduce the present value of future 
investment costs.  
In all the cases discussed in this thesis, we saw that the net present value of the change in 
revenue cap could be influenced by utilizing end-user flexibility. The choice of compensation 
method has a notable impact on the change in revenue cap and efficiency in the regulatory 
model. Direct payments for availability and activation is reflected by a greater increase in 
costs, which in turn increase the revenue cap. Increasing the flexibility volume and utilization 
level when end-users are compensated through direct payments, impose a greater increase in 
revenue cap, and a more negative effect on efficiency. However, using end-user flexibility to 
defer investments resulted in more desirable internal rate of return than the traditional 
investment case, for all flexibility alternatives. The negative effect on efficiency change with 
a direct payment compensation was also lower in the short run for all flexibility alternatives. 
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 If the compensation method includes a redistribution of tariffs, the impact on change in 
revenue cap is small. As the compensation method does not impose a direct payment, it is not 
reflected by an increase in costs. The change in efficiency is also lower than for the investment 
case and the other flexibility cases with compensation through direct payments. The operator 
therefore benefits from cheaper end-user flexibility in terms of efficiency change. 
The notable difference between the compensation methods in the different flexibility cases 
highlights a challenge in the regulation of end-user flexibility. When end-user flexibility is 
activated with direct payments, it will be reflected in lower efficiency and a higher revenue 
cap. If activated through a redistribution of network tariffs between flexible and non-flexible 
end-users, it will have a marginal effect on both efficiency and change in revenue cap. The 
network operator can therefore defer the investment without a notable increase in the revenue 
cap or change in efficiency. Redistributing network tariffs between end-users impose 
regulatory challenges, as non-flexible end-users would compensate flexible end-users. Whilst 
compensation methods with direct payments impose a cost to the network operator, a 
compensation through redistribution of the revenue cap only impose a redistribution of 
income. Network operators are likely to prefer a redistribution of network tariffs between 
consumers, as they maintain close to unaffected efficiency wise. The latter shows that the 
regulatory model treat the effect of compensation methods differently.  
The Norwegian regulator faces challenges on how the flexibility markets of the future should 
be managed, and what role they should assume. Regulatory authorities must ensure non-









8. Further Research 
In order to analyze end-user flexibility in the current regulatory framework, we have had to 
make several assumptions. 
We assumed that the available end-user flexibility in the cases are already aggregated. 
Currently, a clear overview of how much flexibility is available at end-user level, is lacking. 
In this regard, wide scale mapping of flexibility volumes at end-user level is necessary, and 
would be interesting to conduct. 
Our analysis discussed the impact on end-user flexibility in a single distribution network 
operated by one network operator. It would be interesting to investigate how implementation 
of end-user flexibility in a large scale could impact the outcome of the regulatory model for 
the entire industry. 
How a flexibility market should be structured, what participants can be expected, which 
products will be offered, and several other interesting questions remain unanswered. How a 
market design for flexibility is developed will also affect the current role of DSOs, the 
regulator and other current participants. At the national and international level, current 
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The reference rate of NVE 
 
𝑟 = (1 − 𝐺) × [
𝑅𝑓 + 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙 + 𝛽𝑒 × 𝑀𝑃
1 − 𝑠
] + 𝐺 × (𝑆𝑤𝑎𝑝 + 𝐾𝑃) 
𝐺: fixed debt share at 60 percent 
𝑅𝑓: fixed neutral rate at 2.5 percent 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙: adjustment for yearly inflation calculated as the average of the actual inflation in the two 
most recent years based on KPI, and an estimation of the two coming years. If the average is 
negative, the value is set as equal to zero. The calculation is based on numbers from the 
Norwegian Bureau of Statistics (SSB). 
𝛽𝑒: Private equity beta, fixed at 0.875 
𝑀𝑃: Fixed market premium at 5 percent 
𝑆𝑤𝑎𝑝: Yearly average of a 5-year swap rate at the two of the largest banks in Norway 
𝐾𝑃: Yearly average industry specific risk premium given as the spread between 5 year energy 
obligations and 5-year swap rates at two of the largest banks in Norway. Energy obligations 
shall be based on an energy company with minimum credit rating of BBB+. 






Cost flows from the Skagerak Energi AS Investment Case 
Case 1 – Investment 
Scenario 1: Flexibility in case of malfunction 













Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 0.0007764 0.0010583 0.0014136 0.0018384 0.0023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.013586698 0.01852047 0.024737692 0.032171754 0.041538249 0.052918651 0.065594392 0.079052773 0.095055041
Change in investments 5640 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 5640.014363 0.019578783 0.026151275 0.034010139 0.043911863 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4384 -1317.420065 -1381.730698 -1449.186584 -1519.942559 -1594.16181 -1672.015579 -1753.682666 -1839.350028
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.112205938 0.131586593 0.153159885 0.175402443 0.200161479 0.227224363 0.258852775 0.29315637 0.321570478 0.352593185 0.383720684 0.416656315 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3422
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3421.519887
-1929.2157 -2023.485833 -2122.377836 -2226.119687 -2334.948802 -2449.116229 -2568.885032 -2694.533619 -2826.351892 -2964.634399 -3109.699489 -3261.878267 -3421.519887
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 0.0003321 0.0003936 0.0004654 0.0005448 0.0006284 0.0007267 0.0008241 0.0009252 0.0010388
Change in VoLL costs 0.005811293 0.006888184 0.008143805 0.009533922 0.010997765 0.012718067 0.014421051 0.016190988 0.018178351
Change in investments 5640 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 5640.006143 0.007281795 0.008609165 0.010078718 0.011626208 0.013444813 0.015245111 0.017116187 0.019217114
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4382 -1319.231901 -1383.618055 -1451.147645 -1521.974221 -1596.258757 -1674.170285 -1755.885784 -1841.590962
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0011404 0.0012563 0.0013900 0.0015080 0.0016557 0.0017988 0.0019526 0.0021254 0.0022655 0.0024008 0.0025550 0.0027215 0.0028931
0.019956525 0.02198488 0.024324892 0.026390752 0.028974853 0.031478178 0.034170909 0.037193856 0.039646297 0.042014197 0.044712766 0.047625517 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3422
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.021096898 0.023241159 0.025714886 0.027898795 0.030630558 0.033276931 0.036123533 0.039319219 0.0419118 0.044415009 0.047267781 0.050346975 -3421.946478
-1931.480755 -2025.759143 -2124.640564 -2228.349994 -2337.122734 -2451.206448 -2570.860224 -2696.356089 -2827.979504 -2966.028861 -3110.817652 -3262.675128 -3421.946478
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186
Change in VoLL costs 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138
Change in investments 5640 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 5640.002194 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4382 -1319.521951 -1383.916923 -1451.45437 -1522.287644 -1596.577582 -1674.492868 -1756.210421 -1841.915791
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186
0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3422
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 -3421.997806
-1931.803582 -2026.077897 -2124.9528 -2228.652797 -2337.413354 -2451.481427 -2571.116021 -2696.588784 -2828.184617 -2966.202327 -3110.955302 -3262.772221 -3421.997806
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Scenario 2: Flexibility for peak loads and in case of malfunction 
















Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 0.0007764 0.0010583 0.0014136 0.0018384 0.0023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.0135867 0.0185205 0.0247377 0.0321718 0.0415382 0.0529187 0.0655944 0.0790528 0.0950550
Change in investments 5640.0000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 5640.0143631 0.0195788 0.0261513 0.0340101 0.0439119 0.0559426 0.0693426 0.0835701 0.1004868
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4384 -1317.420065 -1381.730698 -1449.186584 -1519.942559 -1594.16181 -1672.015579 -1753.682666 -1839.350028
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.1122059 0.1315866 0.1531599 0.1754024 0.2001615 0.2272244 0.2588528 0.2931564 0.3215705 0.3525932 0.3837207 0.4166563 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3422.0000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.1186177 0.1391058 0.1619119 0.1854254 0.2115993 0.2402086 0.2736444 0.3099082 0.3399459 0.3727414 0.4056476 0.4404652 -3421.5198868
-1929.2157 -2023.485833 -2122.377836 -2226.119687 -2334.948802 -2449.116229 -2568.885032 -2694.533619 -2826.351892 -2964.634399 -3109.699489 -3261.878267 -3421.519887
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 0.0003321 0.0003936 0.0004654 0.0005448 0.0006284 0.0007267 0.0008241 0.0009252 0.0010388
Change in VoLL costs 0.0058113 0.0068882 0.0081438 0.0095339 0.0109978 0.0127181 0.0144211 0.0161910 0.0181784
Change in investments 5640.0000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 5640.0061434 0.0072818 0.0086092 0.0100787 0.0116262 0.0134448 0.0152451 0.0171162 0.0192171
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4382 -1319.231901 -1383.618055 -1451.147645 -1521.974221 -1596.258757 -1674.170285 -1755.885784 -1841.590962
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0011404 0.0012563 0.0013900 0.0015080 0.0016557 0.0017988 0.0019526 0.0021254 0.0022655 0.0024008 0.0025550 0.0027215 0.0028931
0.0199565 0.0219849 0.0243249 0.0263908 0.0289749 0.0314782 0.0341709 0.0371939 0.0396463 0.0420142 0.0447128 0.0476255 0.0506290
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3422.0000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.0210969 0.0232412 0.0257149 0.0278988 0.0306306 0.0332769 0.0361235 0.0393192 0.0419118 0.0444150 0.0472678 0.0503470 -3421.9464780
-1931.480755 -2025.759143 -2124.640564 -2228.349994 -2337.122734 -2451.206448 -2570.860224 -2696.356089 -2827.979504 -2966.028861 -3110.817652 -3262.675128 -3421.946478
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186
Change in VoLL costs 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751
Change in investments 5640.0000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 5640.002194 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4382 -1319.521951 -1383.916923 -1451.45437 -1522.287644 -1596.577582 -1674.492868 -1756.210421 -1841.915791
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186 0.0001186
0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751 0.0020751
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3422.0000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 0.002193717 -3421.997806
-1931.803582 -2026.077897 -2124.9528 -2228.652797 -2337.413354 -2451.481427 -2571.116021 -2696.588784 -2828.184617 -2966.202327 -3110.955302 -3262.772221 -3421.997806
XXIV 
 
Case 2 – Compensation through tariff discount 
Scenario 1: Flexibility in case of malfunction 
Existing flexibility 

















Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0031644 0.0041271 0.0053016 12.5018384 0.0023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.454213372 0.532012749 0.621408083 0.032171754 0.041538249 0.052918651 0.065594392 0.079052773 0.095055041
Change in investments 0 0 0 5820 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 133.9992945 133.9992945 133.9992945 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 159.4566723 134.5354344 134.6260042 5832.53401 0.043911863 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4079 4111.289636 4170.819806 4233.16006 -1677.423399 -1759.327716 -1845.241581 -1935.362097 -2029.895415
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.112205938 0.131586593 0.153159885 0.175402443 0.200161479 0.227224363 0.258852775 0.29315637 0.321570478 0.352593185 0.383720684 0.416656315 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3776
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3775.519887
-2129.059702 -2233.082222 -2342.202529 -2456.671825 -2576.751884 -2702.719302 -2834.863934 -2973.492293 -3118.923748 -3271.483762 -3431.523101 -3599.406872 -3775.519887
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0066744 0.0075424 0.0084579 0.0094020 25.0048467 0.0054223 0.0059703 0.0065264 0.0071168
Change in VoLL costs 0.800103014 0.856448699 0.917555465 0.975226044 0.665416093 0.711553589 0.753362043 0.792302402 0.62235602
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578
Sum 93.69145175 68.74866544 68.81068774 68.86930247 131.8558205 106.9025337 106.9448901 106.9843866 106.8150306
PV with 4 percent discount rate 1828 1819.385369 1836.067775 1853.499233 1871.719871 1824.769416 1801.698786 1777.457886 1751.992607
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0077267 25.0045452 0.0049447 0.0053044 0.0057217 0.0061553 0.0066088 25.0043893 0.0046639 0.0049514 0.0052499 0.0055495 12.5028931
0.65379045 0.686096782 0.719843444 0.751720914 0.471638416 0.494666211 0.518814187 0.54419144 0.565248743 0.586687536 0.607706613 0.630283497 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
106.1855578 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 0
106.847075 162.6536953 137.6878416 137.7200787 137.4404135 137.4638749 137.4884763 187.361612 162.3829439 162.4046702 162.4259878 162.4488643 612.553522
1725.462242 1697.603587 1609.855446 1544.009384 1474.916223 1402.744629 1327.026455 1247.587432 1111.96484 995.9214928 874.1924435 746.5006588 612.553522
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518
Change in VoLL costs 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312
Sum 57.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805
PV with 4 percent discount rate 687 660.4774752 658.9892288 657.4283559 655.7913124 654.0743812 652.2736638 650.3850713 648.4043156
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 0.0130518 12.5001186
1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 0.619482046 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 0
32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 32.15059805 31.56373381 612.5021937
646.326899 644.1481044 641.8629846 639.4663511 636.9527618 634.3165093 631.5516077 628.6517789 625.6104385 622.4206807 619.0752627 615.5665882 612.5021937
XXV 
 
Existing flexibility + households 



















Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0016578 0.0022203 0.0029436 25.0019439 12.5023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.534668198 0.62205944 0.721634293 0.539030576 0.041538249 0.052918651 0.065594392 0.079052773 0.095055041
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 5880 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 119.1805004 119.1805004 119.1805004 149.957996 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 144.7168264 119.8047801 119.9050783 175.4989704 5892.543912 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 3960 4001.830328 4071.468395 4144.399607 4162.582987 -1814.383018 -1902.983582 -1995.921907 -2093.410544
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.112205938 0.131586593 0.153159885 0.175402443 0.200161479 0.227224363 0.258852775 0.29315637 0.321570478 0.352593185 0.383720684 0.416656315 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3894
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3893.519887
-2195.674369 -2302.947685 -2415.477426 -2533.522538 -2657.352912 -2787.253659 -2923.523569 -3066.478517 -3216.4477 -3373.766883 -3538.797638 -3711.916406 -3893.519887
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0025997 0.0029808 0.0034094 0.0038611 25.0018392 0.0021115 0.0023688 0.0026355 0.0029132
Change in VoLL costs 0.958356393 0.657683769 0.705871108 0.752841332 0.802115557 0.857099333 0.606781931 0.641307081 0.677766869
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578
Sum 93.84563048 68.5453389 68.59395488 68.64137678 131.9895126 107.0447686 106.7947085 106.8295004 106.8662379
PV with 4 percent discount rate 1816 1805.968169 1822.209064 1839.191526 1856.952997 1809.141702 1785.159264 1760.268746 1734.12708
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0031888 25.0017640 0.0019490 0.0021275 0.0023239 0.0025351 0.0027636 0.0017421 0.0018661 0.0020002 0.0021459 0.0022931 12.5028931
0.711118338 0.745690394 0.377813451 0.396957602 0.417427539 0.438718044 0.460195851 0.48299781 0.501901071 0.520297255 0.540563945 0.560755677 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
106.1855578 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 0
106.8998649 162.7105078 137.3428158 137.3621385 137.3828048 137.4043065 137.4260128 162.2977712 162.3167984 162.3353288 162.3557412 162.3760801 612.553522
1706.671172 1677.840147 1589.067965 1522.569337 1452.805309 1379.615123 1302.830704 1222.27644 1111.705628 995.7190047 874.0527993 746.4278746 612.553522
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056
Change in VoLL costs 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312
Sum 56.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402
PV with 4 percent discount rate 680 653.5001535 652.2444613 650.9274914 649.5462533 648.0976108 646.5782745 644.9847947 643.313553
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 0.0054056 12.5001186
0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 0
31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 31.60421402 612.5021937
641.5607547 639.7224199 637.7943743 635.7722401 633.6514258 631.4271157 629.0942593 626.6475595 624.0814607 621.3901363 618.5674753 615.6070684 612.5021937
XXVI 
 
Scenario 2: Flexibility for peak loads and in case of malfunction 
Existing flexibility 
















Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0259550 0.0304007 0.0355087 12.5018384 0.0023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.4542134 0.5320127 0.6214081 0.0321718 0.0415382 0.0529187 0.0655944 0.0790528 0.0950550
Change in investments 0 0 0 5820.0000000 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 34.9264800 34.9264800 34.9264800 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 60.40664842 35.48889348 35.58339679 5832.53401 0.043911863 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 3796 3917.808877 4071.777199 4233.16006 -1677.423399 -1759.327716 -1845.241581 -1935.362097 -2029.895415
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.1122059 0.1315866 0.1531599 0.1754024 0.2001615 0.2272244 0.2588528 0.2931564 0.3215705 0.3525932 0.3837207 0.4166563 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3776.0000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3775.519887
-2129.059702 -2233.082222 -2342.202529 -2456.671825 -2576.751884 -2702.719302 -2834.863934 -2973.492293 -3118.923748 -3271.483762 -3431.523101 -3599.406872 -3775.519887
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0457202 0.0489399 0.0524317 0.0557272 25.0380238 0.0406602 0.0430493 0.0452744 25.0355632
Change in VoLL costs 0.8001030 0.8564487 0.9175555 0.9752260 0.6654161 0.7115536 0.7533620 0.7923024 0.6223560
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 15.7878000 15.7878000 15.7878000 15.7878000 25.3249200 25.3249200 25.3249200 25.3249200 31.5756000
Sum 41.6336232 16.6931886 16.7577872 16.8187532 51.0283599 26.0771338 26.1213313 26.1624968 57.2335192
PV with 4 percent discount rate 712 703.2271424 720.0368107 737.5990398 755.9543646 739.3263937 748.0558238 757.1648958 766.675316
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0373595 0.0392055 0.0411339 0.0429555 25.0269508 0.0282666 0.0296465 0.0310967 0.0322999 0.0335250 0.0347261 0.0360162 12.5028931
0.6537905 0.6860968 0.7198434 0.7517209 0.4716384 0.4946662 0.5188142 0.5441914 0.5652487 0.5866875 0.6077066 0.6302835 0.0506290
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600.0000000
31.5756000 31.5756000 31.5756000 31.5756000 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 0.0000000
32.2667499 32.3009023 32.3365774 32.3702764 70.5851187 45.6094624 45.6349902 45.6618176 45.6840782 45.7067420 45.7289622 45.7528292 612.5535220
744.0625565 746.5314419 749.08499 751.7257351 754.4600051 717.2479809 704.4144783 690.9279271 676.7550956 661.8672831 646.2291755 629.8046237 612.553522
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341
Change in VoLL costs 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357
PV with 4 percent discount rate 238 247.9542408 258.7168937 270.0047641 281.8434825 294.2599304 307.282301 320.9401632 335.2645292
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0689341 0.0353990 0.0001186
1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 0.619482046 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 1.275280357 0.654881021 600.0021937
350.2879242 366.0444608 382.5699165 399.9018143 418.0795089 437.1442748 457.1394014 478.1102902 500.1045583 523.1721467 547.3654334 572.7393525 600.0021937
XXVII 
 
Existing flexibility + households 



















Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0305525 0.0355463 0.0412362 25.0308017 12.5023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.534668198 0.62205944 0.721634293 0.539030576 0.041538249 0.052918651 0.065594392 0.079052773 0.095055041
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 5880 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 19.6542 19.6542 19.6542 28.6758 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 45.21942067 20.31180569 20.41707054 54.24563232 5892.543912 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 3570 3697.246293 3856.36889 4023.146268 4162.582987 -1814.383018 -1902.983582 -1995.921907 -2093.410544
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.112205938 0.131586593 0.153159885 0.175402443 0.200161479 0.227224363 0.258852775 0.29315637 0.321570478 0.352593185 0.383720684 0.416656315 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3894
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3893.519887
-2195.674369 -2302.947685 -2415.477426 -2533.522538 -2657.352912 -2787.253659 -2923.523569 -3066.478517 -3216.4477 -3373.766883 -3538.797638 -3711.916406 -3893.519887
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 0.0547632 25.0375819 0.0403355 0.0430195 0.0458352 0.0489771 25.0346733 0.0366461 0.0387295
Change in VoLL costs 0.958356393 0.657683769 0.705871108 0.752841332 0.802115557 0.857099333 0.606781931 0.641307081 0.677766869
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 9.27936 9.27936 9.27936 9.27936 9.27936 17.721 17.721 17.721
Sum 1.013119616 34.9746257 10.0255666 10.07522084 10.12731073 10.18543644 43.36245518 18.3989532 18.4374964
PV with 4 percent discount rate 550 575.5768229 566.9835845 584.1375691 602.0765909 620.836405 640.4507359 626.2261888 637.4892047
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0406353 0.0426109 25.0215893 0.0226833 0.0238530 0.0250696 0.0262969 0.0275999 0.0286801 0.0297313 0.0308894 0.0320432 12.5028931
0.711118338 0.745690394 0.377813451 0.396957602 0.417427539 0.438718044 0.460195851 0.48299781 0.501901071 0.520297255 0.540563945 0.560755677 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
17.721 17.721 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 0
18.47275367 18.50930127 57.94160279 32.96184089 32.98348054 33.00598765 33.02869276 33.05279769 33.07278113 33.09222853 33.11365331 33.13499886 612.553522
649.2614316 661.5711654 674.4432831 646.5869623 643.5700274 640.3831703 637.0171892 633.463135 629.7103618 625.7534946 621.5831359 617.1867933 612.553522
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 0.0381491 25.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 25.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491
Change in VoLL costs 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 0.705757474 25.70575747 0.705757474 0.705757474 0.705757474 0.705757474 25.70575747 0.705757474 0.705757474
PV with 4 percent discount rate 292 305.7298656 293.6892846 307.2811232 321.5362436 336.4870139 352.1673817 342.3929515 358.3615291
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0381491 0.0381491 25.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 0.0381491 12.5001186
0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.705757474 0.705757474 25.70575747 0.705757474 0.705757474 0.705757474 0.705757474 0.705757474 0.705757474 0.705757474 0.705757474 0.705757474 612.5021937
375.1093733 392.6745123 411.09683 404.1981569 423.1828285 443.0939521 463.9767385 485.8786049 508.8492824 532.9409289 558.2082478 584.7086119 612.5021937
XXVIII 
 
Case 3 – Compensation through availability and activation 
Scenario 1: Flexibility in case of malfunction 
Existing flexibility 




















Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 92.1959350 67.2668087 67.3485304 12.5018384 0.0023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.454213372 0.532012749 0.621408083 0.032171754 0.041538249 0.052918651 0.065594392 0.079052773 0.095055041
Change in investments 0 0 0 5820 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 133.9992945 133.9992945 133.9992945 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 226.6494429 201.798116 201.969233 5832.53401 0.043911863 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4272 4242.762108 4238.163035 4233.16006 -1677.423399 -1759.327716 -1845.241581 -1935.362097 -2029.895415
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.112205938 0.131586593 0.153159885 0.175402443 0.200161479 0.227224363 0.258852775 0.29315637 0.321570478 0.352593185 0.383720684 0.416656315 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3776
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3775.519887
-2129.059702 -2233.082222 -2342.202529 -2456.671825 -2576.751884 -2702.719302 -2834.863934 -2973.492293 -3118.923748 -3271.483762 -3431.523101 -3599.406872 -3775.519887
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 92.4990667 67.5545958 67.6161203 67.6731722 92.3367400 67.3763076 67.4154964 67.4517221 67.4893017
Change in VoLL costs 0.800103014 0.856448699 0.917555465 0.975226044 0.665416093 0.711553589 0.753362043 0.792302402 0.62235602
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578
Sum 161.1838441 136.2957189 136.4183502 136.5330727 199.1877138 174.2734189 174.3544162 174.4295823 174.2972155
PV with 4 percent discount rate 2745 2709.656193 2698.940465 2687.573194 2675.53088 2597.188712 2541.15356 2482.298942 2420.493384
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
67.5261251 92.2947625 67.3222853 67.3470707 67.3746906 67.4028505 67.4321843 92.2679898 67.2867759 67.3069166 67.3247960 67.3444880 12.5028931
0.65379045 0.686096782 0.719843444 0.751720914 0.471638416 0.494666211 0.518814187 0.54419144 0.565248743 0.586687536 0.607706613 0.630283497 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
106.1855578 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 0
174.3654734 229.9439126 205.0051821 205.061845 204.8093824 204.8605701 204.9140519 254.6252125 229.6650559 229.7066355 229.7455339 229.7878028 612.553522
2355.810542 2287.899588 2158.383912 2048.703612 1933.611485 1813.167645 1686.79246 1554.194075 1362.987823 1188.628918 1005.71769 813.8395972 612.553522
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 92.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201
Change in VoLL costs 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312
Sum 125.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664
PV with 4 percent discount rate 1611 1558.009444 1529.031443 1498.639315 1466.764051 1433.333275 1398.271076 1361.497843 1322.930075
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 67.9853201 12.5001186
1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 0.619482046 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 0
100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 100.1228664 99.53600216 612.5021937
1282.480201 1240.056372 1195.562261 1148.896837 1099.95414 1048.62304 994.786982 938.3237245 879.1050599 816.9965246 751.8570927 683.5388566 612.5021937
XXIX 
 
Existing flexibility + households 





















Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 118.1003390 93.3288131 93.5948950 118.1576186 12.5023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.534668198 0.62205944 0.721634293 0.539030576 0.041538249 0.052918651 0.065594392 0.079052773 0.095055041
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 5880 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 119.1805004 119.1805004 119.1805004 149.957996 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 237.8155076 213.131373 213.4970296 268.6546451 5892.543912 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4308 4269.082504 4253.881546 4237.555281 4162.582987 -1814.383018 -1902.983582 -1995.921907 -2093.410544
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.112205938 0.131586593 0.153159885 0.175402443 0.200161479 0.227224363 0.258852775 0.29315637 0.321570478 0.352593185 0.383720684 0.416656315 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3894
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3893.519887
-2195.674369 -2302.947685 -2415.477426 -2533.522538 -2657.352912 -2787.253659 -2923.523569 -3066.478517 -3216.4477 -3373.766883 -3538.797638 -3711.916406 -3893.519887
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 117.0674497 92.0678308 92.0682594 92.0687111 117.0666892 92.0669615 92.0672188 92.0674855 92.0677632
Change in VoLL costs 0.958356393 0.657683769 0.705871108 0.752841332 0.802115557 0.857099333 0.606781931 0.641307081 0.677766869
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578
Sum 185.9104805 160.6101889 160.6588049 160.7062268 224.0543626 199.1096186 198.8595585 198.8943504 198.9310879
PV with 4 percent discount rate 3067 3021.627851 3000.635324 2978.567373 2955.37277 2864.606746 2795.573387 2723.433463 2647.736621
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
92.0680388 117.0666140 92.0667990 92.0669775 92.0671739 92.0673851 92.0676136 92.0665921 92.0667161 92.0668502 92.0669959 92.0671431 12.5028931
0.711118338 0.745690394 0.377813451 0.396957602 0.417427539 0.438718044 0.460195851 0.48299781 0.501901071 0.520297255 0.540563945 0.560755677 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
106.1855578 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 0
198.9647149 254.7753578 229.4076658 229.4269885 229.4476548 229.4691565 229.4908628 254.3626212 254.3816484 254.4001788 254.4205912 254.4409301 612.553522
2568.307244 2484.966444 2339.024411 2212.566043 2079.91624 1940.771452 1794.813848 1641.710747 1455.050714 1259.261716 1053.89878 838.4927246 612.553522
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 119.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551
Change in VoLL costs 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312
Sum 151.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636
PV with 4 percent discount rate 1969 1906.464857 1866.833158 1825.267433 1781.6733 1735.951773 1687.999036 1637.706205 1584.959084
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 94.8954551 12.5001186
0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 0
126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 126.4942636 612.5021937
1529.637904 1471.61705 1410.764779 1346.942916 1280.006547 1209.803683 1136.174919 1058.953071 977.9627975 893.0201984 803.9324005 710.497118 612.5021937
XXX 
 
Scenario 2: Flexibility for peak loads and in case of malfunction 
Existing flexibility 




















Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 123.4196565 114.6770092 136.3542229 12.5018384 0.0023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.4542134 0.5320127 0.6214081 0.0321718 0.0415382 0.0529187 0.0655944 0.0790528 0.0950550
Change in investments 0 0 0 5820.0000000 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 34.9264800 34.9264800 34.9264800 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 158.8003499 150.1355019 171.902111 5832.53401 0.043911863 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4128 4162.431376 4208.095913 4233.16006 -1677.423399 -1759.327716 -1845.241581 -1935.362097 -2029.895415
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.1122059 0.1315866 0.1531599 0.1754024 0.2001615 0.2272244 0.2588528 0.2931564 0.3215705 0.3525932 0.3837207 0.4166563 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3776.0000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3775.519887
-2129.059702 -2233.082222 -2342.202529 -2456.671825 -2576.751884 -2702.719302 -2834.863934 -2973.492293 -3118.923748 -3271.483762 -3431.523101 -3599.406872 -3775.519887
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 159.5307662 147.2376367 162.1635093 178.5435568 151.5544853 137.0758427 147.4865934 158.2069416 154.5826956
Change in VoLL costs 0.800103014 0.856448699 0.917555465 0.975226044 0.665416093 0.711553589 0.753362043 0.792302402 0.62235602
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 15.7878 15.7878 15.7878 15.7878 25.32492 25.32492 25.32492 25.32492 31.5756
Sum 176.1186692 163.8818853 178.8688648 195.3065829 177.5448214 163.1123163 173.5648754 184.324164 186.7806516
PV with 4 percent discount rate 2666 2611.62529 2567.193283 2504.87465 2422.274988 2354.272999 2298.089324 2228.201242 2143.618279
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
137.3127676 145.9101450 155.5516115 165.3630022 137.4213660 118.5074250 125.0102517 131.7294014 137.2311379 143.2427790 149.6837112 156.7961530 12.5028931
0.65379045 0.686096782 0.719843444 0.751720914 0.471638416 0.494666211 0.518814187 0.54419144 0.565248743 0.586687536 0.607706613 0.630283497 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
31.5756 31.5756 31.5756 31.5756 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 0
169.5421581 178.1718418 187.8470549 197.6903231 182.979534 164.0886207 170.6155954 177.3601223 182.8829161 188.915996 195.3779473 202.512966 612.553522
2052.331304 1974.669256 1884.166488 1779.099822 1658.582282 1547.612162 1451.03949 1342.908581 1222.427223 1090.274069 945.3443474 786.5647605 612.553522
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963
Change in VoLL costs 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425
PV with 4 percent discount rate 2591 2534.179367 2474.919145 2412.767025 2347.581881 2279.215702 2207.513254 2132.311726 2053.440363
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.2102963 173.1767612 0.0001186
1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 0.619482046 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 174.4166425 173.7962432 600.0021937
1970.720078 1883.963043 1792.972265 1697.541137 1597.45297 1492.4805 1382.385374 1266.917605 1145.81501 1018.802607 885.5919998 745.8807147 600.0021937
XXXI 
 
Existing flexibility + households 




















Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 243.0910769 275.7494660 370.3600694 289.7747611 12.5023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.5346682 0.6220594 0.7216343 0.5390306 0.0415382 0.0529187 0.0655944 0.0790528 0.0950550
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 5880.0000000 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 19.6542000 19.6542000 19.6542000 28.6758000 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 263.2799451 296.0257254 390.7359037 318.9895917 5892.543912 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4618 4566.728732 4479.113314 4287.890228 4162.582987 -1814.383018 -1902.983582 -1995.921907 -2093.410544
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.1122059 0.1315866 0.1531599 0.1754024 0.2001615 0.2272244 0.2588528 0.2931564 0.3215705 0.3525932 0.3837207 0.4166563 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3894.0000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3893.519887
-2195.674369 -2302.947685 -2415.477426 -2533.522538 -2657.352912 -2787.253659 -2923.523569 -3066.478517 -3216.4477 -3373.766883 -3538.797638 -3711.916406 -3893.519887
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 380.0769367 264.4251605 268.1565044 302.4236846 345.8437011 396.1955388 277.9278544 277.3359395 307.1824058
Change in VoLL costs 0.958356393 0.657683769 0.705871108 0.752841332 0.802115557 0.857099333 0.606781931 0.641307081 0.677766869
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 9.27936 9.27936 9.27936 9.27936 9.27936 17.721 17.721 17.721
Sum 381.0352931 274.3622043 278.1417355 312.4558859 355.9251767 406.3319981 296.2556364 295.6982466 325.5811727
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4431 4247.959575 4167.508923 4079.168306 3950.527986 3770.019426 3527.835375 3389.28083 3244.549413
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
339.5107438 375.9636198 203.1254750 187.1282345 197.7168744 209.9404194 224.3540886 241.0407762 256.2590849 272.8333756 292.3210526 314.0812487 12.5028931
0.711118338 0.745690394 0.377813451 0.396957602 0.417427539 0.438718044 0.460195851 0.48299781 0.501901071 0.520297255 0.540563945 0.560755677 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
17.721 17.721 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 0
357.9428622 394.4303102 236.0454885 220.0673921 230.676502 242.9213374 257.3564844 274.065974 289.303186 305.8958728 325.4038166 347.1842044 612.553522
3061.41389 2835.400414 2560.089445 2437.457302 2325.598538 2197.154231 2049.599459 1879.704431 1683.993614 1462.751321 1213.309994 931.2359989 612.553522
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 205.1172625 230.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 230.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625
Change in VoLL costs 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 205.784871 230.784871 205.784871 205.784871 205.784871 205.784871 230.784871 205.784871 205.784871
PV with 4 percent discount rate 3079 3013.673341 2918.693428 2845.298494 2768.321888 2687.588823 2602.915985 2487.891113 2393.473026
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
205.1172625 205.1172625 230.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 205.1172625 12.5001186
0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
205.784871 205.784871 230.784871 205.784871 205.784871 205.784871 205.784871 205.784871 205.784871 205.784871 205.784871 205.784871 612.5021937
2294.447337 2190.589195 2081.662775 1941.200746 1820.104169 1693.09808 1559.894094 1420.189753 1273.66784 1119.995658 958.8242735 789.7877254 612.5021937
XXXII 
 
Case 4 – Compensation through activation 
Scenario 1: Flexibility in case of malfunction 
Existing flexibility 



















Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.4957202 0.6015495 0.7235448 12.5018384 0.0023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.454213372 0.532012749 0.621408083 0.032171754 0.041538249 0.052918651 0.065594392 0.079052773 0.095055041
Change in investments 0 0 0 5820 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 133.9992945 133.9992945 133.9992945 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 159.9492282 135.1328568 135.3442474 5832.53401 0.043911863 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4081 4112.571882 4171.538049 4233.16006 -1677.423399 -1759.327716 -1845.241581 -1935.362097 -2029.895415
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.112205938 0.131586593 0.153159885 0.175402443 0.200161479 0.227224363 0.258852775 0.29315637 0.321570478 0.352593185 0.383720684 0.416656315 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3776
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3775.519887
-2129.059702 -2233.082222 -2342.202529 -2456.671825 -2576.751884 -2702.719302 -2834.863934 -2973.492293 -3118.923748 -3271.483762 -3431.523101 -3599.406872 -3775.519887
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.9486629 1.0315226 1.1233516 1.2084573 25.7060866 0.7651502 0.8236595 0.8777199 0.9337941
Change in VoLL costs 0.8001030 0.8564487 0.9175555 0.9752260 0.6654161 0.7115536 0.7533620 0.7923024 0.6223560
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 67.8846744 67.8846744 67.8846744 67.8846744 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578
Sum 94.6334403 69.7726456 69.9255814 70.0683578 132.5570605 107.6622615 107.7625793 107.8555801 107.7417079
PV with 4 percent discount rate 1840 1830.436731 1846.584492 1863.359866 1880.804134 1833.56153 1810.123153 1785.43577 1759.446103
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.9887243 25.6432711 0.6843555 0.7213539 0.7625751 0.8045981 0.8483721 25.6031900 0.6312318 0.6612993 0.6879690 0.7173572 12.5028931
0.6537905 0.6860968 0.7198434 0.7517209 0.4716384 0.4946662 0.5188142 0.5441914 0.5652487 0.5866875 0.6077066 0.6302835 0.0506290
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600.0000000
106.1855578 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 0.0000000
107.8280725 163.2924213 138.3672524 138.4361282 138.1972669 138.2623177 138.3302397 187.9604128 163.0095119 163.0610181 163.1087069 163.1606720 612.5535220
1732.30757 1703.754096 1615.636205 1549.359677 1479.776618 1407.048424 1330.702868 1250.560413 1114.45488 997.8759022 875.5538504 747.2124665 612.553522
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 26.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543
Change in VoLL costs 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312
Sum 58.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056
PV with 4 percent discount rate 709 682.4205546 680.260232 677.9944856 675.6181707 673.1258918 670.5119896 667.770529 664.8952851
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 1.6748543 12.5001186
1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 0.619482046 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 0
33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.81240056 33.22553633 612.5021937
661.8797293 658.7170143 655.3999589 651.9210312 648.2723318 644.4455759 640.4320743 636.2227138 631.8079365 627.1777181 622.3215451 617.2283907 612.5021937
XXXIII 
 
Existing flexibility + households 






















Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 26.5524046 1.8948346 2.2935957 26.6381809 12.5023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.534668198 0.62205944 0.721634293 0.539030576 0.041538249 0.052918651 0.065594392 0.079052773 0.095055041
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 5880 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 119.1805004 119.1805004 119.1805004 149.957996 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 146.2675732 121.6973944 122.1957303 177.1352074 5892.543912 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 3967 4007.394525 4075.319151 4146.035844 4162.582987 -1814.383018 -1902.983582 -1995.921907 -2093.410544
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.112205938 0.131586593 0.153159885 0.175402443 0.200161479 0.227224363 0.258852775 0.29315637 0.321570478 0.352593185 0.383720684 0.416656315 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3894
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3893.519887
-2195.674369 -2302.947685 -2415.477426 -2533.522538 -2657.352912 -2787.253659 -2923.523569 -3066.478517 -3216.4477 -3373.766883 -3538.797638 -3711.916406 -3893.519887
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 25.0025997 0.0029808 0.0034094 0.0038611 25.0018392 0.0021115 0.0023688 0.0026355 0.0029132
Change in VoLL costs 0.958356393 0.657683769 0.705871108 0.752841332 0.802115557 0.857099333 0.606781931 0.641307081 0.677766869
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 67.88467438 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578 106.1855578
Sum 93.84563048 68.5453389 68.59395488 68.64137678 131.9895126 107.0447686 106.7947085 106.8295004 106.8662379
PV with 4 percent discount rate 1816 1805.968169 1822.209064 1839.191526 1856.952997 1809.141702 1785.159264 1760.268746 1734.12708
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0031888 25.0017640 0.0019490 0.0021275 0.0023239 0.0025351 0.0027636 0.0017421 0.0018661 0.0020002 0.0021459 0.0022931 12.5028931
0.711118338 0.745690394 0.377813451 0.396957602 0.417427539 0.438718044 0.460195851 0.48299781 0.501901071 0.520297255 0.540563945 0.560755677 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
106.1855578 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 136.9630534 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 161.8130313 0
106.8998649 162.7105078 137.3428158 137.3621385 137.3828048 137.4043065 137.4260128 162.2977712 162.3167984 162.3353288 162.3557412 162.3760801 612.553522
1706.671172 1677.840147 1589.067965 1522.569337 1452.805309 1379.615123 1302.830704 1222.27644 1111.705628 995.7190047 874.0527993 746.4278746 612.553522
Flexibility in case of malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 29.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049
Change in VoLL costs 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312
Sum 60.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335
PV with 4 percent discount rate 737 709.4576854 706.4881169 703.3736334 700.1071631 696.6812891 693.0882324 689.3198345 685.3675388
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 4.2432049 12.5001186
0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 30.9312 0
35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 35.84201335 612.5021937
681.2223711 676.8749193 672.3153117 667.5331953 662.5177117 657.2574724 651.7405334 645.9543679 639.8858374 633.5211627 626.8458918 619.8448678 612.5021937
XXXIV 
 
Scenario 2: Flexibility for peak loads and in case of malfunction 
Existing flexibility 



















Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 72.3199073 71.7037134 104.2169800 12.5018384 0.0023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.454213372 0.532012749 0.621408083 0.032171754 0.041538249 0.052918651 0.065594392 0.079052773 0.095055041
Change in investments 0 0 0 5820 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 34.92648 34.92648 34.92648 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 107.7006006 107.1622061 139.7648681 5832.53401 0.043911863 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4006 4088.816163 4175.95867 4233.16006 -1677.423399 -1759.327716 -1845.241581 -1935.362097 -2029.895415
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.112205938 0.131586593 0.153159885 0.175402443 0.200161479 0.227224363 0.258852775 0.29315637 0.321570478 0.352593185 0.383720684 0.416656315 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3776
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3775.519887
-2129.059702 -2233.082222 -2342.202529 -2456.671825 -2576.751884 -2702.719302 -2834.863934 -2973.492293 -3118.923748 -3271.483762 -3431.523101 -3599.406872 -3775.519887
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 126.4766892 120.5353850 142.9224481 167.4908716 114.5161161 105.2968340 120.9117655 136.9911752 119.0596618
Change in VoLL costs 0.8001030 0.8564487 0.9175555 0.9752260 0.6654161 0.7115536 0.7533620 0.7923024 0.6223560
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 15.7878000 15.7878000 15.7878000 15.7878000 25.3249200 25.3249200 25.3249200 25.3249200 31.5756000
Sum 143.0645923 137.1796337 159.6278036 184.2538977 140.5064522 131.3333076 146.9900475 163.1083976 151.2576178
PV with 4 percent discount rate 2280 2241.469489 2206.979201 2147.262145 2058.80305 2011.909472 1972.348281 1914.435715 1836.792091
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
105.6538717 118.5490147 133.0102503 147.7264255 93.3219737 77.4504042 87.2039544 97.2819538 105.5339569 114.5508060 124.2116037 134.8796214 12.5028931
0.6537905 0.6860968 0.7198434 0.7517209 0.4716384 0.4946662 0.5188142 0.5441914 0.5652487 0.5866875 0.6077066 0.6302835 0.0506290
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600.0000000
31.5756000 31.5756000 31.5756000 31.5756000 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 45.0865295 0.0000000
137.8832621 150.8107115 165.3056937 180.0537464 138.8801416 123.0315999 132.8092980 142.9126747 151.1857351 160.2240230 169.9058398 180.5964344 612.5535220
1767.788555 1709.444672 1634.695297 1541.095816 1427.460923 1351.463523 1288.379401 1211.961924 1121.218853 1017.370734 898.9754707 764.6482289 612.553522
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774
Change in VoLL costs 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236
PV with 4 percent discount rate 2404 2352.937055 2299.227953 2242.897846 2183.81883 2121.856758 2056.870937 1988.713807 1917.23061
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4843774 159.4508423 0.0001186
1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 1.206346284 0.619482046 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.6907236 160.0703243 600.0021937
1842.259033 1763.628843 1681.161499 1594.66975 1503.957202 1408.817883 1309.035765 1204.384279 1094.625801 979.5111091 858.7788203 732.1547958 600.0021937
XXXV 
 
Existing flexibility + households 





















Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 214.0240641 275.5091508 417.4222109 284.0494657 12.5023736 0.0030239 0.0037483 0.0045173 0.0054317
Change in VoLL costs 0.5346682 0.6220594 0.7216343 0.5390306 0.0415382 0.0529187 0.0655944 0.0790528 0.0950550
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 5880.0000000 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 19.6542000 19.6542000 19.6542000 28.6758000 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 234.2129323 295.7854103 437.7980452 313.2642963 5892.543912 0.055942574 0.069342643 0.083570074 0.100486757
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4626 4606.155885 4520.716554 4282.164932 4162.582987 -1814.383018 -1902.983582 -1995.921907 -2093.410544
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
0.0064118 0.0075192 0.0087520 0.0100230 0.0114378 0.0129842 0.0147916 0.0167518 0.0183755 0.0201482 0.0219269 0.0238089 0.0259521
0.1122059 0.1315866 0.1531599 0.1754024 0.2001615 0.2272244 0.2588528 0.2931564 0.3215705 0.3525932 0.3837207 0.4166563 0.4541611
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3894.0000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.118617706 0.139105827 0.161911879 0.18542544 0.211599278 0.240208612 0.273644362 0.309908162 0.339945934 0.372741367 0.405647581 0.440465247 -3893.519887
-2195.674369 -2302.947685 -2415.477426 -2533.522538 -2657.352912 -2787.253659 -2923.523569 -3066.478517 -3216.4477 -3373.766883 -3538.797638 -3711.916406 -3893.519887
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 431.9907484 246.0216748 264.1173139 315.5167421 380.6453591 456.1715447 266.2771700 277.8883112 322.6569690
Change in VoLL costs 0.958356393 0.657683769 0.705871108 0.752841332 0.802115557 0.857099333 0.606781931 0.641307081 0.677766869
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 9.27936 9.27936 9.27936 9.27936 9.27936 17.721 17.721 17.721
Sum 432.9491048 255.9587185 274.102545 325.5489435 390.7268347 466.308004 284.604952 296.2506183 341.0557358
PV with 4 percent discount rate 4495 4260.661428 4200.132202 4117.619904 3977.124024 3761.413372 3455.90651 3326.061074 3177.665206
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
371.1485231 425.8268493 154.0801429 142.5837350 158.4661101 176.8008193 198.4207094 223.4500894 246.2770124 271.1379228 300.3688593 333.0085765 12.5028931
0.711118338 0.745690394 0.377813451 0.396957602 0.417427539 0.438718044 0.460195851 0.48299781 0.501901071 0.520297255 0.540563945 0.560755677 0.050628956
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
17.721 17.721 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 32.5422 0
389.5806414 444.2935397 187.0001563 175.5228926 191.4257377 209.7817373 231.4231052 256.4752872 279.3211134 304.20042 333.4516232 366.1115322 612.553522
2975.036012 2711.625593 2377.977857 2297.897413 2225.946397 2133.805267 2017.915878 1873.67362 1696.117612 1485.936167 1239.404452 950.1633266 612.553522
Flexibility for peak loads and in case of 
malfunction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Change in O&M costs 169.5595443 194.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 194.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443
Change in VoLL costs 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421
Change in investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in network loss costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 170.2271527 195.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 195.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527
PV with 4 percent discount rate 2596 2544.155556 2463.556109 2405.24341 2344.08505 2279.942163 2212.669103 2115.893117 2040.614464
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
169.5595443 169.5595443 194.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 169.5595443 12.5001186
0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.667608421 0.002075138
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
170.2271527 170.2271527 195.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 170.2271527 612.5021937
1961.662212 1878.85709 1792.011078 1674.706981 1577.898444 1476.36565 1369.878056 1258.193867 1141.05949 1018.208956 889.3633151 754.2300071 612.5021937
XXXVI 
 
Output from the regulatory model tool provided by Adapt Consulting 
All alternatives with 34 percent load increase prediction 
Case 1 – Investment 

















2019 1 5414 226 -0.05 % 369 143 351.83 7.54 %
2020 2 5189 226 -0.05 % 358 132 325.46 7.54 %
2021 3 4963 226 -0.05 % 348 122 301.65 7.54 %
2022 4 4738 226 -0.04 % 337 111 278.52 7.54 %
2023 5 4 512 226 -0.04 % 326 100 256.89 7.54 %
2024 6 4 286 226 -0.04 % 315 89 236.68 7.54 %
2025 7 4 061 226 -0.04 % 304 78 217.78 7.54 %
2026 8 3 835 226 -0.04 % 294 68 200.82 7.54 %
2027 9 3 610 226 -0.04 % 283 57 184.31 7.54 %
2028 10 3 384 226 -0.04 % 272 46 168.90 7.54 %
2029 11 3 158 226 -0.04 % 261 35 154.53 7.54 %
2030 12 2 933 226 -0.04 % 250 24 141.13 7.54 %
2031 13 2 707 226 -0.04 % 240 14 129.18 7.54 %
2032 14 2 482 226 -0.04 % 229 3 117.53 7.54 %
2033 15 2 256 226 -0.04 % 218 -8 106.68 7.54 %
2034 16 2 030 226 -0.04 % 207 -19 96.58 7.54 %
2035 17 1 805 226 -0.03 % 196 -30 87.19 7.54 %
2036 18 1 579 226 -0.03 % 186 -40 78.89 7.55 %
2037 19 1 354 226 -0.03 % 175 -51 70.77 7.55 %
2038 20 1 128 226 -0.03 % 164 -62 63.24 7.55 %
2039 21 902 226 -0.03 % 153 -73 56.25 7.55 %
2040 22 677 226 -0.03 % 142 -84 49.78 7.55 %
2041 23 451 226 -0.03 % 132 -94 44.12 7.55 %
2042 24 226 226 -0.03 % 121 -105 38.56 7.55 %
2043 25 0 226 -0.03 % 110 -116 33.43 7.55 %
2044 26 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2045 27 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2046 28 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2047 29 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %

















2019 1 5414 226 -0.05 % 369 143 351.83 7.54 %
2020 2 5189 226 -0.05 % 358 132 325.46 7.54 %
2021 3 4963 226 -0.05 % 348 122 301.65 7.54 %
2022 4 4738 226 -0.04 % 337 111 278.52 7.54 %
2023 5 4 512 226 -0.04 % 326 100 256.89 7.54 %
2024 6 4 286 226 -0.04 % 315 89 236.68 7.54 %
2025 7 4 061 226 -0.04 % 304 78 217.78 7.54 %
2026 8 3 835 226 -0.04 % 294 68 200.82 7.54 %
2027 9 3 610 226 -0.04 % 283 57 184.31 7.54 %
2028 10 3 384 226 -0.04 % 272 46 168.90 7.54 %
2029 11 3 158 226 -0.04 % 261 35 154.53 7.54 %
2030 12 2 933 226 -0.04 % 250 24 141.13 7.54 %
2031 13 2 707 226 -0.04 % 240 14 129.18 7.54 %
2032 14 2 482 226 -0.04 % 229 3 117.53 7.54 %
2033 15 2 256 226 -0.04 % 218 -8 106.68 7.54 %
2034 16 2 030 226 -0.04 % 207 -19 96.58 7.54 %
2035 17 1 805 226 -0.03 % 196 -30 87.19 7.54 %
2036 18 1 579 226 -0.03 % 186 -40 78.89 7.55 %
2037 19 1 354 226 -0.03 % 175 -51 70.77 7.55 %
2038 20 1 128 226 -0.03 % 164 -62 63.24 7.55 %
2039 21 902 226 -0.03 % 153 -73 56.25 7.55 %
2040 22 677 226 -0.03 % 142 -84 49.78 7.55 %
2041 23 451 226 -0.03 % 132 -94 44.12 7.55 %
2042 24 226 226 -0.03 % 121 -105 38.56 7.55 %
2043 25 0 226 -0.03 % 110 -116 33.43 7.55 %
2044 26 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2045 27 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2046 28 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2047 29 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
2050 32 0 0 0.00 % 0 0 0.00 7.55 %
XXXVII 
 
Case 2 – Compensating through a tariff discount 
Scenario 1: Flexibility in case of malfunction 



















2019 1 0 0 -0.01 % 24 -25 22.88 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.01 % 24 -25 21.82 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.01 % 24 -25 20.80 7.55 %
2022 4 5587 233 -0.05 % 383 146 316.54 7.54 %
2023 5 5 354 233 -0.05 % 372 135 293.14 7.54 %
2024 6 5 122 233 -0.05 % 361 124 271.24 7.54 %
2025 7 4 889 233 -0.05 % 350 113 250.74 7.54 %
2026 8 4 656 233 -0.05 % 339 102 231.56 7.54 %
2027 9 4 423 233 -0.04 % 327 90 212.97 7.54 %
2028 10 4 190 233 -0.04 % 316 79 196.23 7.54 %
2029 11 3 958 233 -0.04 % 305 68 180.58 7.54 %
2030 12 3 725 233 -0.04 % 294 57 165.97 7.54 %
2031 13 3 492 233 -0.04 % 283 46 152.33 7.54 %
2032 14 3 259 233 -0.04 % 272 35 139.60 7.54 %
2033 15 3 026 233 -0.04 % 261 24 127.72 7.54 %
2034 16 2 794 233 -0.04 % 249 12 116.18 7.54 %
2035 17 2 561 233 -0.04 % 238 1 105.88 7.54 %
2036 18 2 328 233 -0.04 % 227 -10 96.28 7.54 %
2037 19 2 095 233 -0.04 % 216 -21 87.36 7.54 %
2038 20 1 862 233 -0.04 % 205 -32 79.05 7.54 %
2039 21 1 630 233 -0.04 % 194 -43 71.33 7.55 %
2040 22 1 397 233 -0.03 % 183 -54 64.15 7.55 %
2041 23 1 164 233 -0.03 % 171 -66 57.16 7.55 %
2042 24 931 233 -0.03 % 160 -77 50.99 7.55 %
2043 25 698 233 -0.03 % 149 -88 45.28 7.55 %
2044 26 466 233 -0.03 % 138 -99 39.98 7.55 %
2045 27 233 233 -0.03 % 127 -110 35.08 7.55 %
2046 28 0 233 -0.03 % 116 -121 30.55 7.55 %
2047 29 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.50 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %


















2019 1 0 0 -0.01 % 26 -26 24.79 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.01 % 26 -26 23.64 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.01 % 26 -26 22.54 7.55 %
2022 4 0 0 -0.01 % 26 -26 21.49 7.55 %
2023 5 5 645 235 -0.05 % 387 147 304.96 7.54 %
2024 6 5 410 235 -0.05 % 376 136 282.51 7.54 %
2025 7 5 174 235 -0.05 % 365 125 261.48 7.54 %
2026 8 4 939 235 -0.05 % 353 113 241.12 7.54 %
2027 9 4 704 235 -0.05 % 342 102 222.74 7.54 %
2028 10 4 469 235 -0.05 % 331 91 205.54 7.54 %
2029 11 4 234 235 -0.04 % 320 80 189.47 7.54 %
2030 12 3 998 235 -0.04 % 308 68 173.88 7.54 %
2031 13 3 763 235 -0.04 % 297 57 159.86 7.54 %
2032 14 3 528 235 -0.04 % 286 46 146.78 7.54 %
2033 15 3 293 235 -0.04 % 274 34 134.08 7.54 %
2034 16 3 058 235 -0.04 % 263 23 122.71 7.54 %
2035 17 2 822 235 -0.04 % 252 12 112.11 7.54 %
2036 18 2 587 235 -0.04 % 241 1 102.22 7.54 %
2037 19 2 352 235 -0.04 % 229 -11 92.61 7.54 %
2038 20 2 117 235 -0.04 % 218 -22 84.06 7.54 %
2039 21 1 882 235 -0.04 % 207 -33 76.11 7.54 %
2040 22 1 646 235 -0.04 % 196 -44 68.71 7.55 %
2041 23 1 411 235 -0.04 % 184 -56 61.50 7.55 %
2042 24 1 176 235 -0.03 % 173 -67 55.13 7.55 %
2043 25 941 235 -0.03 % 162 -78 49.23 7.55 %
2044 26 706 235 -0.03 % 151 -89 43.75 7.55 %
2045 27 470 235 -0.03 % 139 -101 38.40 7.55 %
2046 28 235 235 -0.03 % 128 -112 33.71 7.55 %
2047 29 0 235 -0.03 % 117 -123 29.38 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %
2050 32 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.44 7.55 %
XXXVIII 
 
Scenario 2: Flexibility for peak loads and in case of malfunction 




















2019 1 0 0 0.00 % 11 -11 10.49 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 0.00 % 11 -11 10.00 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 0.00 % 11 -11 9.53 7.55 %
2022 4 5587 233 -0.05 % 383 146 316.54 7.54 %
2023 5 5 354 233 -0.05 % 372 135 293.14 7.54 %
2024 6 5 122 233 -0.05 % 361 124 271.24 7.54 %
2025 7 4 889 233 -0.05 % 350 113 250.74 7.54 %
2026 8 4 656 233 -0.05 % 339 102 231.56 7.54 %
2027 9 4 423 233 -0.04 % 327 90 212.97 7.54 %
2028 10 4 190 233 -0.04 % 316 79 196.23 7.54 %
2029 11 3 958 233 -0.04 % 305 68 180.58 7.54 %
2030 12 3 725 233 -0.04 % 294 57 165.97 7.54 %
2031 13 3 492 233 -0.04 % 283 46 152.33 7.54 %
2032 14 3 259 233 -0.04 % 272 35 139.60 7.54 %
2033 15 3 026 233 -0.04 % 261 24 127.72 7.54 %
2034 16 2 794 233 -0.04 % 249 12 116.18 7.54 %
2035 17 2 561 233 -0.04 % 238 1 105.88 7.54 %
2036 18 2 328 233 -0.04 % 227 -10 96.28 7.54 %
2037 19 2 095 233 -0.04 % 216 -21 87.36 7.54 %
2038 20 1 862 233 -0.04 % 205 -32 79.05 7.54 %
2039 21 1 630 233 -0.04 % 194 -43 71.33 7.54 %
2040 22 1 397 233 -0.03 % 183 -54 64.15 7.54 %
2041 23 1 164 233 -0.03 % 171 -66 57.16 7.55 %
2042 24 931 233 -0.03 % 160 -77 50.99 7.55 %
2043 25 698 233 -0.03 % 149 -88 45.28 7.55 %
2044 26 466 233 -0.03 % 138 -99 39.98 7.55 %
2045 27 233 233 -0.03 % 127 -110 35.08 7.55 %
2046 28 0 233 -0.03 % 116 -121 30.55 7.55 %
2047 29 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.50 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %


















2019 1 0 0 0.00 % 12 -11 11.44 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 0.00 % 12 -11 10.91 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 0.00 % 12 -11 10.40 7.55 %
2022 4 0 0 0.00 % 12 -11 9.92 7.55 %
2023 5 5 645 235 -0.05 % 387 147 304.96 7.54 %
2024 6 5 410 235 -0.05 % 376 136 282.51 7.54 %
2025 7 5 174 235 -0.05 % 365 125 261.48 7.54 %
2026 8 4 939 235 -0.05 % 353 113 241.12 7.54 %
2027 9 4 704 235 -0.05 % 342 102 222.74 7.54 %
2028 10 4 469 235 -0.05 % 331 91 205.54 7.54 %
2029 11 4 234 235 -0.04 % 320 80 189.47 7.54 %
2030 12 3 998 235 -0.04 % 308 68 173.88 7.54 %
2031 13 3 763 235 -0.04 % 297 57 159.86 7.54 %
2032 14 3 528 235 -0.04 % 286 46 146.78 7.54 %
2033 15 3 293 235 -0.04 % 274 34 134.08 7.54 %
2034 16 3 058 235 -0.04 % 263 23 122.71 7.54 %
2035 17 2 822 235 -0.04 % 252 12 112.11 7.54 %
2036 18 2 587 235 -0.04 % 241 1 102.22 7.54 %
2037 19 2 352 235 -0.04 % 229 -11 92.61 7.54 %
2038 20 2 117 235 -0.04 % 218 -22 84.06 7.54 %
2039 21 1 882 235 -0.04 % 207 -33 76.11 7.54 %
2040 22 1 646 235 -0.04 % 196 -44 68.71 7.55 %
2041 23 1 411 235 -0.04 % 184 -56 61.50 7.55 %
2042 24 1 176 235 -0.03 % 173 -67 55.13 7.55 %
2043 25 941 235 -0.03 % 162 -78 49.23 7.55 %
2044 26 706 235 -0.03 % 151 -89 43.75 7.55 %
2045 27 470 235 -0.03 % 139 -101 38.40 7.55 %
2046 28 235 235 -0.03 % 128 -112 33.71 7.55 %
2047 29 0 235 -0.03 % 117 -123 29.38 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %
2050 32 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.44 7.55 %
XXXIX 
 
Case 3 – Compensation through availability and activation 
Scenario 1: Flexibility in case of malfunction 


















2019 1 0 0 -0.01 % 59 -57 56.25 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.01 % 59 -57 53.64 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.01 % 59 -57 51.14 7.55 %
2022 4 5587 233 -0.05 % 383 146 316.54 7.54 %
2023 5 5 354 233 -0.05 % 372 135 293.14 7.54 %
2024 6 5 122 233 -0.05 % 361 124 271.24 7.54 %
2025 7 4 889 233 -0.05 % 350 113 250.74 7.54 %
2026 8 4 656 233 -0.05 % 339 102 231.56 7.54 %
2027 9 4 423 233 -0.04 % 327 90 212.97 7.54 %
2028 10 4 190 233 -0.04 % 316 79 196.23 7.54 %
2029 11 3 958 233 -0.04 % 305 68 180.58 7.54 %
2030 12 3 725 233 -0.04 % 294 57 165.97 7.54 %
2031 13 3 492 233 -0.04 % 283 46 152.33 7.54 %
2032 14 3 259 233 -0.04 % 272 35 139.60 7.54 %
2033 15 3 026 233 -0.04 % 261 24 127.72 7.54 %
2034 16 2 794 233 -0.04 % 249 12 116.18 7.54 %
2035 17 2 561 233 -0.04 % 238 1 105.88 7.54 %
2036 18 2 328 233 -0.04 % 227 -10 96.28 7.54 %
2037 19 2 095 233 -0.04 % 216 -21 87.36 7.54 %
2038 20 1 862 233 -0.04 % 205 -32 79.05 7.54 %
2039 21 1 630 233 -0.04 % 194 -43 71.33 7.55 %
2040 22 1 397 233 -0.03 % 183 -54 64.15 7.55 %
2041 23 1 164 233 -0.03 % 171 -66 57.16 7.55 %
2042 24 931 233 -0.03 % 160 -77 50.99 7.55 %
2043 25 698 233 -0.03 % 149 -88 45.28 7.55 %
2044 26 466 233 -0.03 % 138 -99 39.98 7.55 %
2045 27 233 233 -0.03 % 127 -110 35.08 7.55 %
2046 28 0 233 -0.03 % 116 -121 30.55 7.55 %
2047 29 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.50 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %


















2019 1 0 0 -0.02 % 74 -71 70.56 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.02 % 74 -71 67.27 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.02 % 74 -71 64.14 7.55 %
2022 4 0 0 -0.02 % 74 -71 61.16 7.55 %
2023 5 5 645 235 -0.05 % 387 147 304.96 7.54 %
2024 6 5 410 235 -0.05 % 376 136 282.51 7.54 %
2025 7 5 174 235 -0.05 % 365 125 261.48 7.54 %
2026 8 4 939 235 -0.05 % 353 113 241.12 7.54 %
2027 9 4 704 235 -0.05 % 342 102 222.74 7.54 %
2028 10 4 469 235 -0.05 % 331 91 205.54 7.54 %
2029 11 4 234 235 -0.04 % 320 80 189.47 7.54 %
2030 12 3 998 235 -0.04 % 308 68 173.88 7.54 %
2031 13 3 763 235 -0.04 % 297 57 159.86 7.54 %
2032 14 3 528 235 -0.04 % 286 46 146.78 7.54 %
2033 15 3 293 235 -0.04 % 274 34 134.08 7.54 %
2034 16 3 058 235 -0.04 % 263 23 122.71 7.54 %
2035 17 2 822 235 -0.04 % 252 12 112.11 7.54 %
2036 18 2 587 235 -0.04 % 241 1 102.22 7.54 %
2037 19 2 352 235 -0.04 % 229 -11 92.61 7.54 %
2038 20 2 117 235 -0.04 % 218 -22 84.06 7.54 %
2039 21 1 882 235 -0.04 % 207 -33 76.11 7.54 %
2040 22 1 646 235 -0.04 % 196 -44 68.71 7.55 %
2041 23 1 411 235 -0.04 % 184 -56 61.50 7.55 %
2042 24 1 176 235 -0.03 % 173 -67 55.13 7.55 %
2043 25 941 235 -0.03 % 162 -78 49.23 7.55 %
2044 26 706 235 -0.03 % 151 -89 43.75 7.55 %
2045 27 470 235 -0.03 % 139 -101 38.40 7.55 %
2046 28 235 235 -0.03 % 128 -112 33.71 7.55 %
2047 29 0 235 -0.03 % 117 -123 29.38 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %
2050 32 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.44 7.55 %
XL 
 
Scenario 2: Flexibility for peak loads and in case of malfunction 




















2019 1 0 0 -0.02 % 71 -69 67.70 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.02 % 71 -69 64.55 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.02 % 71 -69 61.54 7.55 %
2022 4 5587 233 -0.05 % 383 146 316.54 7.54 %
2023 5 5 354 233 -0.05 % 372 135 293.14 7.54 %
2024 6 5 122 233 -0.05 % 361 124 271.24 7.54 %
2025 7 4 889 233 -0.05 % 350 113 250.74 7.54 %
2026 8 4 656 233 -0.05 % 339 102 231.56 7.54 %
2027 9 4 423 233 -0.04 % 327 90 212.97 7.54 %
2028 10 4 190 233 -0.04 % 316 79 196.23 7.54 %
2029 11 3 958 233 -0.04 % 305 68 180.58 7.54 %
2030 12 3 725 233 -0.04 % 294 57 165.97 7.54 %
2031 13 3 492 233 -0.04 % 283 46 152.33 7.54 %
2032 14 3 259 233 -0.04 % 272 35 139.60 7.54 %
2033 15 3 026 233 -0.04 % 261 24 127.72 7.54 %
2034 16 2 794 233 -0.04 % 249 12 116.18 7.54 %
2035 17 2 561 233 -0.04 % 238 1 105.88 7.54 %
2036 18 2 328 233 -0.04 % 227 -10 96.28 7.54 %
2037 19 2 095 233 -0.04 % 216 -21 87.36 7.54 %
2038 20 1 862 233 -0.04 % 205 -32 79.05 7.54 %
2039 21 1 630 233 -0.04 % 194 -43 71.33 7.55 %
2040 22 1 397 233 -0.03 % 183 -54 64.15 7.55 %
2041 23 1 164 233 -0.03 % 171 -66 57.16 7.55 %
2042 24 931 233 -0.03 % 160 -77 50.99 7.55 %
2043 25 698 233 -0.03 % 149 -88 45.28 7.55 %
2044 26 466 233 -0.03 % 138 -99 39.98 7.55 %
2045 27 233 233 -0.03 % 127 -110 35.08 7.55 %
2046 28 0 233 -0.03 % 116 -121 30.55 7.55 %
2047 29 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.50 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %


















2019 1 0 0 -0.04 % 158 -150 150.65 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.04 % 158 -150 143.64 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.04 % 158 -150 136.96 7.55 %
2022 4 0 0 -0.04 % 158 -150 130.58 7.55 %
2023 5 5 645 235 -0.05 % 385 149 303.39 7.54 %
2024 6 5 410 235 -0.05 % 374 138 281.01 7.54 %
2025 7 5 174 235 -0.05 % 363 127 260.05 7.54 %
2026 8 4 939 235 -0.05 % 351 115 239.75 7.54 %
2027 9 4 704 235 -0.05 % 340 104 221.43 7.54 %
2028 10 4 469 235 -0.04 % 329 93 204.30 7.54 %
2029 11 4 234 235 -0.04 % 318 82 188.28 7.54 %
2030 12 3 998 235 -0.04 % 306 70 172.75 7.54 %
2031 13 3 763 235 -0.04 % 295 59 158.79 7.54 %
2032 14 3 528 235 -0.04 % 284 48 145.75 7.54 %
2033 15 3 293 235 -0.04 % 273 37 133.59 7.54 %
2034 16 3 058 235 -0.04 % 261 25 121.77 7.54 %
2035 17 2 822 235 -0.04 % 250 14 111.22 7.54 %
2036 18 2 587 235 -0.04 % 239 3 101.37 7.54 %
2037 19 2 352 235 -0.04 % 228 -8 92.21 7.54 %
2038 20 2 117 235 -0.04 % 216 -20 83.29 7.54 %
2039 21 1 882 235 -0.04 % 205 -31 75.37 7.54 %
2040 22 1 646 235 -0.04 % 194 -42 68.01 7.55 %
2041 23 1 411 235 -0.03 % 183 -53 61.17 7.55 %
2042 24 1 176 235 -0.03 % 171 -65 54.50 7.55 %
2043 25 941 235 -0.03 % 160 -76 48.62 7.55 %
2044 26 706 235 -0.03 % 149 -87 43.17 7.55 %
2045 27 470 235 -0.03 % 138 -98 38.12 7.55 %
2046 28 235 235 -0.03 % 126 -110 33.19 7.55 %
2047 29 0 235 -0.03 % 115 -121 28.88 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 0 -1 0.00 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 0 -1 0.00 7.55 %
2050 32 0 0 0.00 % 0 -1 0.00 7.55 %
XLI 
 
Case 4 – Compensation through activation 
Scenario 1: Flexibility in case of malfunction 



















2019 1 0 0 -0.01 % 24 -25 22.88 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.01 % 24 -25 21.82 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.01 % 24 -25 20.80 7.55 %
2022 4 5587 233 -0.05 % 383 146 316.54 7.54 %
2023 5 5 354 233 -0.05 % 372 135 293.14 7.54 %
2024 6 5 122 233 -0.05 % 361 124 271.24 7.54 %
2025 7 4 889 233 -0.05 % 350 113 250.74 7.54 %
2026 8 4 656 233 -0.05 % 339 102 231.56 7.54 %
2027 9 4 423 233 -0.04 % 327 90 212.97 7.54 %
2028 10 4 190 233 -0.04 % 316 79 196.23 7.54 %
2029 11 3 958 233 -0.04 % 305 68 180.58 7.54 %
2030 12 3 725 233 -0.04 % 294 57 165.97 7.54 %
2031 13 3 492 233 -0.04 % 283 46 152.33 7.54 %
2032 14 3 259 233 -0.04 % 272 35 139.60 7.54 %
2033 15 3 026 233 -0.04 % 261 24 127.72 7.54 %
2034 16 2 794 233 -0.04 % 249 12 116.18 7.54 %
2035 17 2 561 233 -0.04 % 238 1 105.88 7.54 %
2036 18 2 328 233 -0.04 % 227 -10 96.28 7.54 %
2037 19 2 095 233 -0.04 % 216 -21 87.36 7.54 %
2038 20 1 862 233 -0.04 % 205 -32 79.05 7.54 %
2039 21 1 630 233 -0.04 % 194 -43 71.33 7.55 %
2040 22 1 397 233 -0.03 % 183 -54 64.15 7.55 %
2041 23 1 164 233 -0.03 % 171 -66 57.16 7.55 %
2042 24 931 233 -0.03 % 160 -77 50.99 7.55 %
2043 25 698 233 -0.03 % 149 -88 45.28 7.55 %
2044 26 466 233 -0.03 % 138 -99 39.98 7.55 %
2045 27 233 233 -0.03 % 127 -110 35.08 7.55 %
2046 28 0 233 -0.03 % 116 -121 30.55 7.55 %
2047 29 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.50 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %


















2019 1 0 0 -0.01 % 27 -27 25.74 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.01 % 27 -27 24.55 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.01 % 27 -27 23.40 7.55 %
2022 4 0 0 -0.01 % 27 -27 22.31 7.55 %
2023 5 5 645 235 -0.05 % 387 147 304.96 7.54 %
2024 6 5 410 235 -0.05 % 376 136 282.51 7.54 %
2025 7 5 174 235 -0.05 % 365 125 261.48 7.54 %
2026 8 4 939 235 -0.05 % 353 113 241.12 7.54 %
2027 9 4 704 235 -0.05 % 342 102 222.74 7.54 %
2028 10 4 469 235 -0.05 % 331 91 205.54 7.54 %
2029 11 4 234 235 -0.04 % 320 80 189.47 7.54 %
2030 12 3 998 235 -0.04 % 308 68 173.88 7.54 %
2031 13 3 763 235 -0.04 % 297 57 159.86 7.54 %
2032 14 3 528 235 -0.04 % 286 46 146.78 7.54 %
2033 15 3 293 235 -0.04 % 274 34 134.08 7.54 %
2034 16 3 058 235 -0.04 % 263 23 122.71 7.54 %
2035 17 2 822 235 -0.04 % 252 12 112.11 7.54 %
2036 18 2 587 235 -0.04 % 241 1 102.22 7.54 %
2037 19 2 352 235 -0.04 % 229 -11 92.61 7.54 %
2038 20 2 117 235 -0.04 % 218 -22 84.06 7.54 %
2039 21 1 882 235 -0.04 % 207 -33 76.11 7.54 %
2040 22 1 646 235 -0.04 % 196 -44 68.71 7.55 %
2041 23 1 411 235 -0.04 % 184 -56 61.50 7.55 %
2042 24 1 176 235 -0.03 % 173 -67 55.13 7.55 %
2043 25 941 235 -0.03 % 162 -78 49.23 7.55 %
2044 26 706 235 -0.03 % 151 -89 43.75 7.55 %
2045 27 470 235 -0.03 % 139 -101 38.40 7.55 %
2046 28 235 235 -0.03 % 128 -112 33.71 7.55 %
2047 29 0 235 -0.03 % 117 -123 29.38 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %
2050 32 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.44 7.55 %
XLII 
 
Scenario 2: Flexibility for peak loads and in case of malfunction 




















2019 1 0 0 -0.01 % 50 -48 47.67 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.01 % 50 -48 45.46 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.01 % 50 -48 43.34 7.55 %
2022 4 5587 233 -0.05 % 383 146 316.54 7.54 %
2023 5 5 354 233 -0.05 % 372 135 293.14 7.54 %
2024 6 5 122 233 -0.05 % 361 124 271.24 7.54 %
2025 7 4 889 233 -0.05 % 350 113 250.74 7.54 %
2026 8 4 656 233 -0.05 % 339 102 231.56 7.54 %
2027 9 4 423 233 -0.04 % 327 90 212.97 7.54 %
2028 10 4 190 233 -0.04 % 316 79 196.23 7.54 %
2029 11 3 958 233 -0.04 % 305 68 180.58 7.54 %
2030 12 3 725 233 -0.04 % 294 57 165.97 7.54 %
2031 13 3 492 233 -0.04 % 283 46 152.33 7.54 %
2032 14 3 259 233 -0.04 % 272 35 139.60 7.54 %
2033 15 3 026 233 -0.04 % 261 24 127.72 7.54 %
2034 16 2 794 233 -0.04 % 249 12 116.18 7.54 %
2035 17 2 561 233 -0.04 % 238 1 105.88 7.54 %
2036 18 2 328 233 -0.04 % 227 -10 96.28 7.54 %
2037 19 2 095 233 -0.04 % 216 -21 87.36 7.54 %
2038 20 1 862 233 -0.04 % 205 -32 79.05 7.54 %
2039 21 1 630 233 -0.04 % 194 -43 71.33 7.55 %
2040 22 1 397 233 -0.03 % 183 -54 64.15 7.55 %
2041 23 1 164 233 -0.03 % 171 -66 57.16 7.55 %
2042 24 931 233 -0.03 % 160 -77 50.99 7.55 %
2043 25 698 233 -0.03 % 149 -88 45.28 7.55 %
2044 26 466 233 -0.03 % 138 -99 39.98 7.55 %
2045 27 233 233 -0.03 % 127 -110 35.08 7.55 %
2046 28 0 233 -0.03 % 116 -121 30.55 7.55 %
2047 29 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.50 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %


















2019 1 0 0 -0.04 % 160 -152 152.56 7.55 %
2020 2 0 0 -0.04 % 160 -152 145.46 7.55 %
2021 3 0 0 -0.04 % 160 -152 138.69 7.55 %
2022 4 0 0 -0.04 % 160 -152 132.24 7.55 %
2023 5 5 645 235 -0.05 % 387 147 304.96 7.54 %
2024 6 5 410 235 -0.05 % 376 136 282.51 7.54 %
2025 7 5 174 235 -0.05 % 365 125 261.48 7.54 %
2026 8 4 939 235 -0.05 % 353 113 241.12 7.54 %
2027 9 4 704 235 -0.05 % 342 102 222.74 7.54 %
2028 10 4 469 235 -0.05 % 331 91 205.54 7.54 %
2029 11 4 234 235 -0.04 % 320 80 189.47 7.54 %
2030 12 3 998 235 -0.04 % 308 68 173.88 7.54 %
2031 13 3 763 235 -0.04 % 297 57 159.86 7.54 %
2032 14 3 528 235 -0.04 % 286 46 146.78 7.54 %
2033 15 3 293 235 -0.04 % 274 34 134.08 7.54 %
2034 16 3 058 235 -0.04 % 263 23 122.71 7.54 %
2035 17 2 822 235 -0.04 % 252 12 112.11 7.54 %
2036 18 2 587 235 -0.04 % 241 1 102.22 7.54 %
2037 19 2 352 235 -0.04 % 229 -11 92.61 7.54 %
2038 20 2 117 235 -0.04 % 218 -22 84.06 7.54 %
2039 21 1 882 235 -0.04 % 207 -33 76.11 7.54 %
2040 22 1 646 235 -0.04 % 196 -44 68.71 7.55 %
2041 23 1 411 235 -0.04 % 184 -56 61.50 7.55 %
2042 24 1 176 235 -0.03 % 173 -67 55.13 7.55 %
2043 25 941 235 -0.03 % 162 -78 49.23 7.55 %
2044 26 706 235 -0.03 % 151 -89 43.75 7.55 %
2045 27 470 235 -0.03 % 139 -101 38.40 7.55 %
2046 28 235 235 -0.03 % 128 -112 33.71 7.55 %
2047 29 0 235 -0.03 % 117 -123 29.38 7.55 %
2048 30 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.48 7.55 %
2049 31 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.46 7.55 %
2050 32 0 0 0.00 % 2 -2 0.44 7.55 %
